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Abstract
ABSTRACT OF THE DISSERTATION
Cooperation and Fair Resource Allocation in Communication Networks
Anna Satsiou
Doctor of Philosophy, Graduate Program in Computer & Communication Engineering
University of Thessaly, August 2010
Prof. Leandros Tassiulas, Chairperson
Last few years have witnessed a dramatic growth of communication networks, with peer-to-peer
(p2p) overlay communities becoming a new network paradigm for diverse applications and services.
Peers can simultaneously act as clients and servers taking part in a collaborative work process. How-
ever, although cooperation is of utmost importance to p2p systems, peers seem to be naturally incited
only to consume but not contribute to a community. This phenomenon is known as “free riding” and
leads to the degradation of the system performance. In this thesis we propose distributed reputation-
based resource allocation and server selection policies to motivate cooperation among users of p2p
networks and provide fairness by guarantying that more contributive peers can receive a better QoS
from their community.
We use a common system design that can be applied to both single service (e.g., file sharing
systems) and multiple services’ systems (e.g., p2p grids). Proposed framework consists of an au-
tonomous reputation scheme, reputation-based resource allocation and server selection policies which
iii
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are robust under the presence of misbehavior, strategic peers, greedy peers and newcomers. We quan-
tify a peer’s capability in providing a good quality service by a novel reputation metric and an update
mechanism is proposed to dynamically track the contribution level of the peer as the system evolves.
Our reputation-based allocation policies determine the quality of service given to all competing for
resources peers at a given time according to their reputations, demands, and profiles. On the other
hand, our reputation-based server selection policy is used to choose suitable providers of the requested
service and avoid misbehaving (non contributive) ones. Our simulations in various different setups
of peers with different resource capabilities, consumption and service evaluation profiles present how
proposed policies outperform previous work both for single and multiple services systems and lead
to the dynamic formation of coalitions (cooperation) between peers who mutually benefit by their
transactions.
We further study systems of peers who use their capacity-limited access links both for their up-
stream and downstream connections (single capacity limited-link systems). Such peers have to share
their available resources between their own and other peers’ needs. In the selfish approach, each peer
would like to exploit the full capacity of his access link only for his downloads. However, if all peers
acted selfishly, the system would collapse. In order to motivate peers to cooperate under such systems,
we combine our distributed reputation-based system with a novel capacity adaptation algorithm. In
this way, each peer has to trade off the capacity he will dedicate for uploading in order to increase his
reputation and therefore his revenue and the capacity he will dedicate for his downloads. All peers act
rationally, trying to maximize their utility. Our proposed policies lead rational peers to cooperation
while promoting fairness, as peers receive resources in proportion to their contributions. Our policies
outperform existing work in this area in which the slowest link becomes the bottleneck of a heteroge-
neous system of different link capacity peers. In the contrary, no such bottleneck appears when our
policies are used, improving the performance of the system. Moreover, we apply our reputation-based
framework in a BitTorrent-like file sharing system and we highlight the performance gains both for
ADSL-type and single capacity-limited link systems.
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Finally, we study a wireless internet sharing community and we propose easily applicable dis-
tributed reputation-based policies to motivate users to share their Internet connection in a p2p fashion.
The goal is the provision of free and good quality Internet access anytime and anywhere inside the
community. We study general systems of users with different contribution and consumption profiles
and show that when our reputation-based allocation scheme is applied, mobile users enjoy a QoS
Internet connection from their community in proportion to their cooperation level; the more greedy
for community resources users are, the more contributive they should be to satisfy their needs. Our
allocation scheme is further implemented in 802.11 APs and clients with no modifications at existing
standards at the MAC or network layers and experimental results present that the throughputs of the
community members are in proportion to their reputations for any channel conditions, type of traffic
sent or received, and number of competing clients.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Cooperation, as a critical issue, in P2P Communication
Networks
A dramatic increase in the usage of the internet has been witnessed in the recent years, with peer-
to-peer (p2p) networks becoming a new prevalent architecture for diverse applications and services,
including content storage and sharing (file-sharing, content distribution, backup storage), resources’
exchange (grids) and communication (voice, instant messages), just as a few examples.
The p2p network paradigm is essentially about distributively performing processing, bandwidth,
storage or human-resource intensive tasks between end-users who simultaneously act as clients and
servers, without the necessity of an expensive dedicated infrastructure of central service providers.
The effectiveness of existing p2p systems, however, relies on the cooperation of the users and
the contributions of their resources. Several studies, though, have shown that most of the users of
p2p systems are incited to consume resources without contributing any. This is a social phenomenon
reported as “tragedy of the commons” [3] that most of the users are reluctant to cooperate, and only
a small number of them are willing to share their resources. The same phenomenon is known as
1
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“free riding” in the context of file sharing systems, like BitTorrent, Gnutella, Napster and Kazaa.
In Gnutella, for example, it was reported in 2000 [4] that 70% of all users do not share files and
nearly 50% of all file requests are satisfied by the top 1% of sharing nodes. In 2005, a new report [5]
indicated that 85% of Gnutella users are free riders.
Free riding leads to the degradation of the system performance, as not all peers’ needs can be
satisfied. The few peers that volunteer to provide their services are not necessarily those who have the
desirable ones, and eventually act like centralized servers. Thus, peers become susceptible to denial
of service attacks.
In order to alleviate free riding, many methods were proposed to enforce cooperation among
users, like pricing-based schemes [6], game theoretical methods [7–9], and trust and reputation based
methods [1, 10–12].
Credit-based approaches treat file sharing and other resources offering as a service that can be
priced with a virtual or real currency, which is used to regulate the various transactions between the
users. However, virtual banks (trust authorities) are needed to deal with the transactions, which in case
of non-fixed infrastructures, like peer-to-peer networks is not applicable. If however, the role of the
virtual bank is distributed among nodes [6], significant communication and infrastructure overhead
is induced and authentication issues become critical. Moreover micro-payment schemes may deter
users from participating, as highlighted in [13].
Game theoretical methods, on the other hand, increase the complexity of the networks and usually
games need to be played repeatedly between users in order to have the desired effects. However,
the churn of nodes causes a lot of difficulties in the repetition of such games between the same
users. Moreover, game methods presuppose that all nodes in the system are fully aware of system
information. In [7], for example, it is considered that all peers know the bandwidth capacity and
contributions of each other peer in the network. In [14] peers determine whether they will join a peer-
to-peer network if their estimated benefit exceeds a threshold. However, that benefit is determined by
a presumed preexisting knowledge of the significance to them of all the other peer’s contributions.
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On one hand, the need of trusted virtual banks to regulate the transactions in credit-based schemes
and on the other hand, the fact that game theoretical methods rely on unrealistic assumptions that all
peers have the exact information of the entire game, including private information of the other peers
like their bandwidth capacities, necessitated the use of simpler and more practical methods to foster
users to cooperate, like reputation-based systems.
1.2 Reputation as an Efficient Means to Foster Coopera-
tion
Trust and Reputation systems have been extensively investigated in p2p systems to distinguish and
avoid malicious peers by applying suitable provider selection mechanisms [15–17]. These mecha-
nisms, though, do not provide incentives for cooperation, since malicious peers have no repercus-
sions and they can still savor the available resources of the network, while non-malicious peers are
not motivated to improve their contributions.
Acknowledging such concerns, recent work in reputation systems [1, 10–12] provides simple
incentive mechanisms to enforce collaboration between peers by controlling not only the provider
selection policy but also the client selection policy. Reputed, thus contributive, peers are rewarded by
receiving preferential treatment, while misbehaving peers are punished by not being served. However,
most of the aforementioned work does not consider quality of service issues. Nodes are simply
distinguished to altruistic and egotistic according to whether they provide services or not, while the
different quality of service offered and received or the different capabilities and needs of the peers are
not considered.
More specifically, schemes [1,10–12] explicitly define a reputation metric and take binary alloca-
tion decisions (not serve or serve a peer by offering him all the available resources) and therefore are
limited to categorize cooperative and non cooperative peers, while being incapable of differentiating
cooperative peers in terms of the different QoS they offer. In this way, they fail to motivate coopera-
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tive peers to improve their provided QoS. Moreover, the peers’ particular demands are not considered
in the allocation decision, while it is assumed that the capabilities of the servers are always enough to
satisfy the most reputed peer’s demands.
Aforementioned shortcomings motivated us to propose a reputation-based allocation policy to
decide about the different levels of offered resources to different users, in contrast to just decide
whether to serve one peer or not, and to account for their different needs (expressed service demands).
In section 3.3.2 we define our reputation-based resource allocation policy, RA, which determines the
portion of the available resources offered to each competing peer depending on his reputation and his
resource demands, while in section 3.3.3 we propose an enhanced policy, called ERA, which further
considers the request generation profiles of the peers in the allocation decision. The benefits of our
allocation policies become more obvious by the comparison results we provide of RA and ERA with
scheme in [1] in Chapter 3.
From our knowledge, there is no previous work to determine the quality of service offered to com-
peting peers based on a reputation metric. There are several papers, though, that propose bandwidth
allocation policies in p2p systems based on an implicit contribution level of the users. In [18] a token
stealing algorithm based on a token-bucket model is proposed for p2p streaming systems, according
to which each peer reserves a portion of his capacity to repay his neighbors for the packets they have
uploaded. However, this mechanism does not apply for the individual needs of the competing peers.
In [7] and [9] a peer’s tendency to contribute is represented by the “contribution value”, while in
[19] “ranking” is a metric of the behavior of a peer. Allocation decisions are based on those; however
these are used as abstract ideas and it is not explained how they are measured and kept, rather they
are given random values so that proposed policies can be evaluated. In our approach and evaluation,
on the contrary, we propose and explicitly define a reputation metric which is dynamically updated
and affected by the allocation decisions taken by the peers as the system evolves, corresponding to a
more realistic system.
Furthermore, our ERA policy accounts for the different heterogeneous request generation pro-
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files, in contrast to aforementioned policies, so that it can differentiate peers not only based on their
contributions levels but also on their consumption profiles; greedy users can no longer exploit the
network by absorbing much more resources than other similar contributive ones.
In this thesis, we propose a novel reputation metric and an update mechanism in order to dy-
namically capture the contributions of a peer in the transactions he engages. Reputation in previous
schemes is usually defined as a function of the number of times a given peer helped another one,
where “help” may correspond to offered files, CPU cycles, etc. For example, in [1] reputation is
extracted by the ratings (binary values) about the outcome of a given transaction. In [12], reputation
is defined as a function of satisfied uploads and downloads. In [2], the reputation of a given peer for
a certain type of service is a function of the number of times he offered this service.
Our reputation metric is novel because it reflects the satisfaction in terms of QoS offered by the
given peer, in contrast to just a function of the number of served requests. This is an important
difference since a reputed user in our scheme is one that not only provides his help (e.g., offer a file
or not) but also provides a high QoS in order to satisfy his requesters’ demands (e.g., upload a file
with high speed). In this way we can distinguish peers in terms of different capabilities/contribution
levels in contrast to the binary categorization to altruistic (contributors/ reciprocative) and egotistic
(free riders/selfish) peers. Following our approach and distinguishing users in more layers (in terms of
different QoS offered), we can motivate them to improve their contributions and thus their reputation
and perceived QoS.
There is also work [2, 11] that defines the reputation of a peer as a function of the total amount
of provided and received resources. However, corresponding metrics fail to capture the tendency of
a peer to satisfy the particular needs of his requesters. The notion of satisfaction is very important,
since the same amount of resources may be of different importance to different peers and has dif-
ferent significance at different times of the day, e.g., during congested periods a medium QoS can
be considered more satisfying than in less congested ones. Most of the times, it is really difficult to
determine the different levels of satisfaction of various peers, because of their different criteria for
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judging a service. However, by considering the peers’ reported demands in our allocation decisions,
we can account for their different degrees of satisfaction.
Summarizing, on one hand we propose a novel reputation metric capturing the ability of one
peer to satisfy the demands of other peers, a reputation update mechanism to track the behavior of a
peer dynamically, reputation-based resource allocation policies to determine the portion of the avail-
able resource offered to each competing peer and on the other hand, we propose a reputation-based
server selection policy to help peers select among the more reputed/contributive servers and avoid
misbehaving (non contributive) ones. The combination of our policies leads to bonds between peers
of similar capabilities and needs. Proposed policies have low complexity and the only information
that is needed to pass from one peer to another is the requested amount of service. Although simple
enough, our policies were designed to consider many important issues, like peers of different capa-
bility and consumption profiles, newcomers, strategic and misbehaving peers. As far as we know, no
previous work has attempted to encompass all the above under a common design framework. Some
existing policies do not account for peers of different capability profiles ( [1, 2, 8, 10, 12, 20]), some
do not account for peers of different request generation profiles ( [1, 7, 9]) and some do not account
for peers of different demands ( [1, 2, 8, 10–12, 20]).
1.3 Local versus Global Reputation Systems
Reputation-based incentives schemes can be categorized in two groups, one that use global reputations
based on voting/ratings of others peers and one that use local reputations based only on the opinion of
the peer that has been involved in a transaction. Work in [1,8,10] is based on the existence of a global
reputation system, which is responsible (i) to collect the ratings of the peers for their transactions, (ii)
to calculate the reputations of all the peers based on these ratings and (iii) inform the others about
these reputations. In all these papers it is considered that peers send reports about their transactions to
some specified peers that are responsible to calculate the reputation of a particular peer according to a
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DHT mechanism. However, it is not guaranteed that peers will say the truth about their transactions.
Analogous questions about the truthful feedback of nodes arise also in ad hoc networks, as reported
in [21, 22].
Although recommendations and votes to determine one’s reputation can speed up peers’ percep-
tion of the network, there should be mechanisms to guarantee the trustworthiness/sincerity of the peers
who vote in order for the reputation-based system to be efficient. Work in [23] proposes a mechanism
to motivate peers to truthfully report their exchanges. According to [23], both transacting peers have
to report the result of their transaction to the respective peers that are responsible for calculating and
maintaining their reputation values. If their reports contradict, they will be both punished and the
rating’s feedback will be disregarded. Moreover, if only one of the peers sends his rating, both peers
will be punished. Peers under punishment do not transact with others during their punishment pe-
riod, while their ratings for such transactions are not taken into account. The problem with proposed
mechanism is that unaware peers may be punished because another peer reported a fake transaction
with them (that never really happened), which is very unfair. What’s more, peers have always to ask
which ones are punished in order not to ask service from them, increasing the overhead.
In general, it is very difficult in voting and rating sharing schemes not only to guarantee the
trustworthiness of the peers who vote and share their ratings but also the trustworthiness of the peers
who are responsible to collect the ratings and report peers’ reputations. Such peers may lie for their
own benefit, since they are part of the system. Furthermore, if these responsible peers exit the network,
they must transfer their information to another neighboring peer and inform the network about this
change. The whole procedure adds a lot of complexity to the system.
On the other hand, use of local reputations can significantly relieve the system from network load
and complexity. Local reputation / information systems have been used in many practical systems as
peer-to-peer streaming systems [18,24] or p2p grid networks [11], where they have been proved to be
efficient for resource allocation decisions.
In our work we use local reputations to, first of all, avoid the load from communication exchanges
Institutional Repository - Library & Information Centre - University of Thessaly
09/12/2017 03:02:41 EET - 137.108.70.7
8 Chapter 1
due to recommendations, as well as other possible problems like misreporting, reputation pollution
and collusion which appear in reputation rating and voting systems like the ones used in [1,10,15,16].
Furthermore, by using local reputations, a peer gives preferential treatment to the ones that have
been generous and helpful to him in the past and not to all the generally cooperative peers. In certain
systems, this could help him to recognize and favor the appropriate traders for him. In a file sharing
system (e.g., BitTorrent), for example, high capacity peers are better off by trading with other high
capacity peers, while low capacity peers can be equally satisfied when trading either with other low
capacity or high capacity peers (their small capacity may not be enough to sustain the upload rate
of a higher capacity peer, constraining them to download content in a lower rate) [25]. Therefore, a
low capacity peer who is considered as “low reputed” by high capacity peers, may be a good trader
and considered as “high reputed” for some other low capacity peers. In this thesis, we exhibit how
peers under our local reputation-based framework form coalitions according to their capabilities and
demands, improving their performance.
Based on this local reputation-based framework and principles that we initially designed to foster
cooperation in single service systems, i.e., systems where only one resource is being exchanged (e.g.,
bandwidth in file sharing systems), we propose extensions and modifications for various different
setups highlighted in the following sections.
1.4 Reputation-based Exchange in Multiple Services Envi-
ronments
Multiple Services systems, like p2p grids, where more than one services/resources are being ex-
changed between end-users, pose different challenges to the establishment of a cooperation scheme
than the ones faced in single service systems. First of all, it is necessary to form a common exchange
framework to determine the transactions between peers with different capabilities and need for dif-
ferent resources, like memory, CPU, storage capacity, bandwidth, etc. Some peers may have storage
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capabilities and CPU needs and some other peers may be processing powerful and have storage needs.
An efficient framework should lead these these groups of peers to cooperate in order to improve their
performance.
This common framework, under which different services are exchanged, introduces a complex
economy, as peers may value services differently, according to their needs and subjective criteria. It
has been proposed [26] that one single unit could be used for all computing resources, the so called
“computon”, the price of which would follow supply and demand. However, till now no successful
effort has been made to define “computon”. On the other hand, several market-based resource alloca-
tion systems [27,28] have been proposed for distributed computing infrastructures, like Planetlab [29]
or computational grids [30] to regulate the transactions. Market models, though, require a trusted au-
thentication infrastructure to authenticate bids, report resource capabilities and preferences and verify
account balances. These necessities complicate the system and make it impractical.
In order to provide an efficient framework for transactions between different services and at the
same time foster cooperation among users, we propose to use the notion of reputation as the “ex-
change currency” between different services. We define the local reputation vector of a peer which
consists of his local reputations in providing each service of the system, while we extend our repu-
tation based allocation policy RA to consider the reputation vectors of the competing peers and the
service evaluation profile of the server, forming the RA-MS policy. Under RA-MS, the allocated
resources to each competing peer depend on the weighted sum of the peer’s reputations in provid-
ing each service of the system, where the weights are the corresponding values of the services, as
estimated by the server. In this way the server tends to favor collaborative peers who best satisfy
his requests in the services he values more, creating bonds with them. Our allocation policy along
with our adapted to multiple services environments server selection policy lead to the formation of
coalitions between users who mutually benefit by transacting and exchanging their resources, as can
be seen from our simulation studies.
Apart from the market-based model, the only studies, as far as we know, that deal with the ex-
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change of multiple services are [2] and [20] which base on reciprocity mechanisms and are described
in detail in section 2.5. However, both schemes face the same limitations. The individual peers’
demands and capabilities are not considered in the allocation decisions, rather it is considered that
the capabilities of the peers are always enough to satisfy the demands of their requesters. Moreover,
they do not use a reputation-based server selection policy in order to avoid requesting service from
misbehaving peers and last, they do not investigate the possible formation of peers’ coalitions.
Our scheme is evaluated, via simulations, under various setups of peers with different contribu-
tion, consumption and service evaluation profiles, newcomers and misbehaving peers, and present
how it outperforms previous work [2] over multiple services environments to boost cooperation
among peers and improve their performance.
1.5 Cooperation in Single Capacity-Limited Link Systems
As single capacity-limited link systems (SC) we define systems where the access technology does not
separate upstream and downstream flows, like in wireless or non-wireless connections to the backbone
network through a local hub with an Ethernet-like protocol. Examples of such access technologies
include WiFi, WiMAX, Ehternet LANs, etc.
As we have already pointed out, many methods have been used in the literature to motivate users
of a file sharing system to cooperate. Aforementioned work, though, implies that each peer in the
system has separate capacities for his own needs (e.g., download capacity) and the needs of the other
peers (e.g., upload capacity), as in the case of ADSL connections to the backbone network. However,
in systems where the access technology does not separate upstream and downstream flows, each peer
acting simultaneously as a client and as a server has to share his capacity-limited link that connects
him to the network between his own and other peers’ needs.
These systems differ from those examined in [1,10,15,16,18–20,25,31], in that the contributions
(uploads) of each peer have a direct negative impact on his download performance. Therefore, each
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peer would rather exploit his full capacity only for his own downloads, in order to maximize his utility.
It is apparent that appropriate incentives are needed to motivate peers to cooperate and contribute their
resources in such p2p systems, since if each peer acted selfishly the system would collapse.
The incentives used in previous work [1,10,15,16,18–20,25,31] cannot be effective or even apply
to single link capacity peers, as we explain in the following. Schemes in [1, 8, 10, 20] do not reckon
quality of service issues; the different quality of service offered and received or the different upload
capacities and needs of the peers are not considered in the allocation decisions. These schemes take
as granted that the capacities of the peers are enough to satisfy a given peer (the most reputed) at a
given period. Therefore, the incentives used in this work cannot apply to SC peers who have to decide
how to allocate their limited capacity among incoming and outgoing flows according to their own and
other peers’ demands.
On the other hand, schemes in [7,19,32,33] propose bandwidth allocation policies based on peers’
contribution levels. These policies regulate the allocation solely of the upload capacity of the peers,
since it is considered that the peers’ download capacity is infinite or at least enough to accommodate
their demands. If these policies, though, were to apply for SC peers, the latter should somehow
incorporate their own demands in their bandwidth allocation decisions which should be bounded by
their total link capacity. Clearly, there is no obvious way how to do this, maintaining the incentives
for cooperation.
The most relevant work, to our knowledge, that studies incentive mechanisms for systems of peers
who share their single access link both for uploading and downloading files is [34], which, though, is
imposed to several restrictions, discussed in section 2.3.
In order to motivate peers to cooperate under such systems, we propose a novel capacity adap-
tation algorithm and rational strategies to work along with our reputation-based framework. The
capacity adaptation algorithm is performed by each peer and works rationally seeking to maximize
the peer’s benefit by trading off the capacity that the peer will dedicate for uploading in order to in-
crease his reputation and therefore his revenue and the capacity he will dedicate for his downloads.
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Our simulation studies have shown that our proposed policies lead rational peers to cooperation while
promoting fairness, as peers receive resources in proportion to their contributions, while outperform-
ing existing work in this area [34] in which the slowest link becomes the bottleneck of a heterogeneous
system of different link capacity peers. In the contrary, no such bottleneck appears when our policies
are used, improving the performance of the system.
1.6 Reputation-based Cooperation in BitTorrent
BitTorrent (BT) is a popular peer-to-peer content distribution protocol, designed for bulk data transfer.
It enables scalable and efficient content replication by exploiting the upload capacity of the download-
ing peers. The basic idea in BitTorrent is to divide a single large file into equal-sized pieces and deliver
them in a non-linear way. The set of peers attempting to download the file do so by connecting to
several other peers simultaneously and download in parallel different pieces of the file from multiple
peers.
In order to confront free-riding effect, BitTorrent uses a tit-for-tat (TFT) strategy to determine
which peers to upload data to. However, several studies [25, 31, 35, 36] exhibited that BT’s recipro-
cation policy (i) fails to prevent unfairness across peers in terms of volume of content served, (ii) is
vulnerable to strategic clients and (iii) fails to shield the system from misbehavior. That is why there
were several studies that proposed improvements over it [31, 35, 37–39].
However, proposed incentive mechanisms for BitTorrent-like networks do not motivate peers who
already downloaded their files (seeds) to stay in the system and keep on contributing resources to other
peers. Our reputation-based allocation scheme can prompt such peers to remain and contribute in the
system, as we will see in Chapter 6, with the profit of improving their performance in their future
transactions by gaining reputation. The presence of seeds in the system have proved to be a crucial
factor in the success of BT [40] and so far no previous work has successfully provided incentives for
seeds. Furthermore, the gains of our reputation system does not only affect the long term interactions
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among peers but also the short term. Peers select whom and how to serve based on competing peers’
reputations, instead of performing optimistic unchokes, which are considered to be one of the main
reasons of unfairness in BT [36, 41]. That is why our framework outperforms BT reciprocation
mechanism in terms of fairness, as the simulation study of Chapter 6 indicates.
Finally, neither BitTorrent nor the proposed improvements over it [24, 31, 35, 37–39, 42], support
an algorithm to dynamically determine how peers over single capacity-limited link systems should
allocate their capacity among their uplink and downlink streams. Therefore BT peers’ performance
is critically based on their arbitrary decisions as we will see in section 6.3.3. In order to improve
BT performance under single capacity-limited link systems, we propose two extensions over it. The
one that cannot be hacked by a software uses our capacity adaptation algorithm combined with the
reciprocity-based incentive mechanism of BitTorrent. As we will see in section 6.3.3, our capacity
adaptation algorithm improves the performance of BT under such systems, especially when combined
with our reputation-based framework, instead of the reciprocation mechanism of BitTorrent.
1.7 Reputation-based Internet Sharing in Wireless Neigh-
borhood Community Networks
The vision of fourth generation (4G) networks is ubiquitous wireless access, anytime, anywhere.
Towards this vision Wireless Mesh Networks (WMNs) have emerged to confront the various short-
comings of cellular networks (GSM/GPRS), providing a cheaper solution for higher data rates and
with no special spectrum licences. In recent years a growing number of WiFi hotspots has been estab-
lished in airports, hotels and cafes to offer Internet connectivity. Mesh networks provide the means to
inexpensively and simply link all these hotspots to cover entire municipalities. Several municipalities,
like Philadelphia and San Francisco, already provide metropolitan wireless access through hotspots
to connect their citizens and offer public services.
Apart these commercial efforts, though, which are centrally managed and may charge for the ser-
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vice, there are also several initiatives building wide area wireless networks which are implemented
and managed by volunteers. The participation of end users in the network formation is highly ben-
eficial as it can reduce the costs and increase the network coverage. Such networks are known as
Wireless Community Networks (WCNs) and include several cities (e.g. NYCWireless, SeattleWire-
less, Southampton Open Wireless Network, Athens Wireless, etc), as well as universities (e.g. MIT’s
Roofnet, etc).
The most promising service of all these projects is the potential provision of Internet access to
members of the community carrying Wi-Fi enabled devices. This could be realized, if community
users were willing to share the Internet access bandwidth of their Wi-Fi access points (APs) with
other community members. Nevertheless, it is crucial to motivate users to cooperate and share their
Internet connection, as there are intrinsic factors to discourage them from participating. Firstly, the
sharing of the Internet connection with other users would reduce the owner’s perceived quality of
service (QoS) and secondly, the negative effect of exposure to radiation and possible security attacks
would lead many users to close their AP as soon as they stop using it. Therefore, it is crucial to
provide users with the appropriate incentives to cooperate and share their Internet connection, in
order to maintain an Internet sharing community.
Interestingly, there are several commercial companies which make profit of the Internet sharing
scenario. FON [43] is an example of a one-hop Internet sharing community. FON users just have to
buy and activate in their home a specialized Wi-Fi router to share the broadband Internet service and
in return gain free WiFi access at FON Spots worldwide; however, there are no mechanisms to solve
the asymmetry issues in potential contribution and consumption and there are no QoS guarantees.
Broadband provider Speakeasy introduced WiFi NetShare [44] to allow Speakeasy subscribers to
easily (and legally) extend their broadband connectivity to their neighbors via WiFi, while reducing
their monthly broadband bill. Finally, Skyrove [45] users can plug a Skyrove router into their network
and offer Internet service to anyone who buy credits online; in return, they receive monthly payments
based on the usage of their hotspot.
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In contrast to aforementioned commercial companies which use a centralized payment or reci-
procity based approach to motivate users to contribute their Internet connection, in this thesis we
propose simple distributed reputation-based incentive mechanisms to foster cooperation among users
of an internet sharing community. The objective of such a community is to both provide free and good
quality Internet access to its users anywhere inside it, and protect their home connection resources
by letting them the allocation control. Our policies guarantee that the better QoS internet connection
users offer to their community members, the better QoS connection they enjoy, when they are mobile
inside their community. This work focuses on neighborhood wireless communities which have been
recently argued [52] to provide a strong candidate solution for creating and efficiently operating the
underlying network and provides an ideal framework for the design of our policies.
Thereafter, the goal is to implement our internet sharing policy in IEEE 801.11 APs and clients,
with no modifications at existing standards at the MAC or network layer. However, the unreliable na-
ture of the wireless medium constitutes a difficult task to provide QoS in wireless networks. 802.11e
standard can coordinate the channel access within a based station by implementing four queues with
different access characteristics for each class of following services: BK (Background), BE (Best Ef-
fort), VI (Video) and VO (Voice). However, the QoS provisioning is done based only on the traffic
characteristics of the existing streams and cannot differentiate different stations. Work in [47] resolves
this issue by using a second prioritization level on top of the one that is implemented in IEEE 802.11e,
defining priorities for different groups of associated stations; however, it is designed to differentiate
only two groups of users. Both 802.11e and [47] control the AIFS (inter frame period to consider
the medium idle) and the CWmin (minimum contention window size), but not the specific allocated
bandwidth to each station according to his priority.
In order to control the specific amount of bandwidth offered to each competing user according to
his reputation, based on current 802.11 protocol, we use Hierarchical Token Bucket (HTB) tool [48].
We, therefore, implement our reputation-based allocation policy based on HTB, which we call R-
HTB. HTB is is a class based queue discipline, located in the IP layer, to control how the packets
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are delivered to MAC layer. In R-HTB the algorithm that determines the order and times that the
packets are queued and dequeued is determined by our reputation-based allocation policy. In section
7.4 we provide indicative experimental results both in UTH testbed and individual ORBIT nodes,
which show that the throughputs of the competing users are proportional to their reputations for any
channel conditions, type of traffic and number of clients.
1.8 Outline of this Dissertation
The rest of the dissertation is organized as follows:
In Chapter 2 we describe previous cooperation enforcement and reputation-based schemes for
various different setups and case studies that we examine in this thesis.
In Chapter 3 we present our reputation-based polices for systems of peers who share one single
service, like bandwidth in file sharing systems, and provide comparison results with related work.
Part of the work described in Chapter 3 is also published in [32, 49].
In Chapter 4 we extend our reputation-based framework for systems of peers who exchange mul-
tiple services (e.g., p2p grids), and compare our scheme with previous work over such systems. Part
of this work is also published in [49, 50].
In Chapter 5 we propose extensions over our framework for systems of peers who use their
capacity-limited access link both for their upstream and downstream connections. We will refer to
these systems as single capacity-limited link systems. Part of this work is also published in [51].
In Chapter 6 we examine the popular file sharing application BitTorrent, as a case study for our
proposed reputation based framework. We further present the performance gains both for systems of
peers with ADSL-type connections and for single capacity-limited link systems, by comparing with
the current BitTorrent incentive mechanism. Part of this work is also published in [51].
In Chapter 7, following the principles of our reputation-based framework, we propose an internet
sharing scheme for wireless neighborhood communities, evaluated via simulations. We further imple-
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ment proposed scheme and present experimental results both in UTH testbed and individual ORBIT
nodes. Part of this work is also published in [52, 53].
In each of chapters 3-7, we (i) highlight the contributions and outline of the chapter, (ii) introduce
the different problems posed by the individual system that is examined in the chapter, (ii) present our
policies and their performance gains over previous work and last, (iv) conclude the chapter.
Finally, we conclude the dissertation in Chapter 8.
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Related Work
In this section we describe previous cooperation enforcement and reputation-based schemes for vari-
ous different setups and case studies that we examine in this thesis.
2.1 Single Service Systems
As we already highlighted in the introduction, we can distinguish previously related work in two
main categories. In the first category there are those reputation-based schemes that explicitly define
a reputation metric and take binary allocation decisions (serve or not to serve a peer), ignoring QoS
issues [1,10–12], and in the second category the are those policies which differentiate peers according
to their contribution levels [7, 9, 18, 19]; however, the latter do not determine how the “contribution
level” will be measured and kept, rather “contribution levels” are used as abstract ideas and given
random values in order to be evaluated. In the following, we delve into more details in the most
representative schemes.
Scheme in [1] is a representative reputation-based work that calculates reputations as a function of
binary service ratings (success-failure). More specifically, each peer’s reputation equals the fraction
of the weighted number of his successful service provisions over the weighted total number of his
18
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service provisions. The weight of each service provision is a negative exponential function of the
elapsed time. We note that the particular scheme uses global reputations, which are calculated based
on the ratings of all peers of the p2p system, which are assumed to be truthful. The allocation decision
uses the following rule: among the peers k that request the same service from a particular server j, the
probability for a specific requester i to be selected equals Ri/∑k Rk, where Ri is the global reputation
of peer i. Authors examine three provider/server selection policies. In the first policy, peers select
the one with the highest reputation, in the second policy, peers select one whose performance level
is comparable to theirs, and in the third policy peers select one that is not in their Black list which
consists of peers with reputation value below a certain threshold.
Their simulation study considers peers that are divided in two types: altruistic and egotistic. Al-
truistic peers provide services successfully with probability 0.9, accounting for other unpredictable
factors, like network congestion, while egotistic peers with probability 0.1. These probabilities re-
main constant during simulation time, accounting for fixed strategies. Authors also consider milking
strategies, according to which peers with high reputation decide to misbehave in the end of their life
in the system and dynamic strategies, according to which a peer increases or decreases his probability
of providing a service according to the utility that he receives from the system during a predefined
service period. The results of their simulations in Java conclude that the higher performing peers have
the highest success ratio even when the peer population is renewed with a high rate.
Scheme in [10] considers a content sharing system. Each node monitors his success rate, which is
the percentage of his content and transport of content requests that has been satisfied by other nodes.
If a given node’s success rate is above a desired level for a certain period of time, then the node will
decrease his willingness to serve probability. When a node A receives a request from node B for
content, initially he will consider this request based on his current willingness to serve probability. If
this probability is high enough, node A will determine whether he will serve node B or not. Above
decision is taken based on comparison with two benchmark nodes whose reputations are determined
by a predefined set of nodes. Periodically, the set of nodes and two benchmark nodes are updated.
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One of the two benchmark nodes has a high usage reputation (a lot of his content requests have
been satisfied by other nodes) and the other one has a high service reputation (has served a lot of
other nodes). If B has a higher usage reputation than the first benchmark node and smaller service
reputation than the second benchmark node, he is denied service.
Authors of [10] evaluate the performance of their scheme by simulating a p2p system of 128
nodes, each constantly making content requests to other nodes. They simulate 10000 transactions per
round and C value changes every 100 rounds. These simulations have shown that peers adapt their
willingness to serve probability in order to find a minimum level of services they need to provide,
while still being able to receive services provided by others. The amount of resources consumed and
provided is not considered in their decisions. Moreover, no multiple requests for the same service are
considered at a given time slot. Both models of [10] and [1] do not consider quality of service issues;
a node either serves his requester by providing him the file, or rejects his request.
In [9] a distributed resource allocation protocol is proposed, which is called RBM-IU, based on
which the download bandwidth offered by a server to his requesters is determined by the latter’s
bandwidth biddings and contribution levels. The theoretical analysis of this algorithm proves that the
proposed allocation scheme is Pareto optimal and provides incentives for cooperation, as the peers
who have the highest contribution per unit resource request among all other competing peers will
receive the highest utility. This work does not consider a specific metric to define the contribution
level, but it rather considers an abstract idea of it. It is further considered that the information about
the contribution levels of all peers can be found by a centralized auditing authority, which is aware of
all realized transactions in the system.
Paper [19] considers a resource allocation and admission control mechanism for p2p networks. It
is assumed that each user is characterized by his ranking, which reflects his contribution level. The
higher his ranking is, the worse his contribution level. However, neither “ranking” nor its adaptation
to peers’ dynamic behavior are explicitly defined, rather “ranking” is used as an abstract idea and
given random values in order for the scheme to be numerically evaluated. It is taken as granted
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that users are aware of all other users’ rankings in the system (e.g., by a trusted third party). The
model consists of a single server and multiple competing peers. Each competing peer expresses
both his demands for good quality service (target resources) and his minimum needs in bandwidth to
sustain the service (minimum acceptable quality). The server will initially examine the requests of the
competing peers and see whether his capacity is enough to accommodate their target resources or at
least their minimum resource requirements. If, however, his capacity is not enough not even for their
minimum requirements, he denies service to peers with rankings above a certain threshold, which is
a function of all competing peers’ rankings. Thereafter, the server allocates his available capacity
among remaining competing users, following an allocation policy that is proved to achieve max min
fairness. Some numerical examples are presented for the case of one server accommodating four
competing peers with known rankings. The allocation decisions are exhibited showing that higher
ranking peers achieve worse service than the other ones.
2.2 Multiple Services Systems
In order to regulate the transactions in multiple services environments, several market-based resource
allocation systems [?, 27, 28] have been proposed for distributed computing infrastructures. One
such representative scheme has been proposed by the authors in [?]. Proposed model consists of m
users and n machines. Each machine (its computational capacity) can be continuously divided for
allocation to multiple users. Each user places a bid to each machine, the price of which is determined
by the total bids placed. Finally each peer receives the ratio of his bid to the sum of bids for that
resource. It is considered that each user has different and relatively independent preferences for
different machines. Users are selfish and seek to maximize their own utility by solving an optimization
problem. Analytical results exhibit that the scheme converges to a Nash equilibrium under which
efficiency and fairness is provided to the system. Fairness is evaluated through the measures of utility
uniformity and envy-freeness.
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One serious disadvantage of proposed model is that users need to send and receive O(n) messages
every time because they must be aware of the total bids on each host in order to solve the optimization
problem. Furthermore, proposed scheme does not give incentives for cooperation, as users’ own
contributions (machines) are not considered in the allocation scheme. Actually, users are independent
from machines in this work. It would be very interesting to consider users owning machines and
schemes to prioritize service to those, who contribute the more machines in the system.
In general, market models require a trusted authentication infrastructure to authenticate bids, re-
port resource capabilities and preferences and verify account balances. These necessities complicate
the system and make it impractical. More practical systems [2, 20] rely on reciprocity-based mecha-
nisms to regulate the transactions and encourage cooperation between users.
Work in [20] examines a reciprocity-based mechanism to promote cooperation between peers who
have different expertise in providing several types of resources. A simulation study is performed and
in each iteration, the peers randomly issue a request in an area of which they are not experts and ask
other peers for help. Peers then decide to help or not depending on their strategies and their expertise.
An agent cannot help in an area in which it is not an expert. It is assumed that when an expert helps
a non-expert incurs a cost of 10 and the non-expert saves a cost of 1000. Inside the network there are
both selfish and reciprocative peers. Selfish peers do not serve other peers’ requests. A reciprocative
peer is going to serve a requester if his expected utility from the interaction with him is positive. The
expected utility is judged by the previous interactions with the same peer. A reputation mechanism
is also proposed in order to help peers take interaction decisions in the early stage of their lifetime,
when they do not know the behavior of the others. The simulation results have shown that under
proposed framework reciprocative users’ wealth (number of requests satisfied) is much better than
the one of selfish users. This study does not consider the various capabilities or demands of all peers,
rather it is considered that the capabilities of the peers are always enough to satisfy the demands of
their requesters.
In [2] a reciprocation-based economy is studied for multiple services in p2p grids. Peers’ resource
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requirements are combinations of two different basic services (e.g., processing power and storage).
Peers can either be collaborative or free riders. Simulations proceed in turns and at each turn a
peer can be either in consuming or in non-consuming state with some probability. When not in
consuming state, collaborative peers donate the use of their spare resources, while free riders go idle.
Two allocation policies are proposed: PosInt that relies on knowledge of all peer’s service evaluation
profiles and, thus, is not applicable in real systems, and ExtNetFav where peers are totally unaware of
other peers’ service evaluation profiles. In [2] instead of using reputations, they use a metric called
cost balance. Each peer keeps a record of this number for each other peer with which it interacts,
which is calculated as follows: Before two peers have ever interacted, the cost balance is set to zero.
If peer A offers requested service to peer B, A decreases his cost balance with interactions with B
by the cost of donating particular service (if cost balance falls below zero, it is set to zero) and B
increases his cost balance with his own cost of donating the particular service. As far as the allocation
policy is concerned, a provider selects to serve at a given turn the candidate peer with the highest cost
balance. As far as the server selection policy is concerned, peers at a given turn select all the servers
in a random order, seeking someone to serve them.
Both [2] and [20] face the same limitations. The individual peers’ demands and capabilities are
not considered in the allocation decisions, rather it is considered that the capabilities of the peers
are always enough to satisfy the demands of their requesters. Moreover, they do not apply a proper
reputation/trust-based server selection policy in order to avoid requesting service from misbehaving
peers and last, they do not investigate the possible formation of peers’ coalitions.
2.3 Single Capacity-Limited Link (SC) Systems
Single capacity-limited link systems have been previously studied in [34]. This work implicitly pro-
vides incentives for cooperation by setting auctions in which peers buy and sell to each other their
access link capacity. Two request generating strategies are proposed that determine the bandwidth
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rate that each peer will request. Proposed strategies are combined with two different auction types
which determine the rate that is given to the requester, as soon as his demands are smaller than those
of the currently served peer; otherwise the requester is not served. The numerical results showed that
the combination of their Greedy Rational request strategy with a second price auction lead users to
the optimal operation of the network, in which peers offer half of their capacity for uploading and
they use the rest for downloading.
The model in [34], though, is restricted to the case of every peer performing at most one download
and one upload at a time. Moreover, the study is only limited to a homogeneous system of peers with
the same capacity. As the authors admit, in the general case of heterogeneous links, their theorem
indicates that the slowest link will be the bottleneck of the system. This is a serious drawback of
the proposed scheme, as even powerful peers with high capacity will not be able to download with a
rate higher than min{Ci
i∈N
}/2, where Ci is the link capacity of peer i and N is the set of all peers in the
system. This limitation is not present when our policies are used, which exhibit that peers will receive
resources in proportion to their contributions even in heterogeneous systems of peers with different
capacities and request generation profiles. We further consider the general case of multiple uploads
and downloads.
Other work in SC systems include [54] which proposes an optimization framework into reputation
mechanisms for single capacity-limited link p2p systems. A separate utility maximization problem
is solved by each peer, who allocates a portion of his link bandwidth to his own downloads and the
remaining bandwidth for serving incoming requests by other peers. The optimization is carried out
under a constraint on the level of dissatisfaction the peer intends to cause by not fulfilling others’
requests. Proposed scheme is evaluated in a toy system of 5 peers and exhibit the peers’ tension to
obtain utility in accordance to their intention to dissatisfy others.
Another utility optimization framework for single capacity-limited link systems is proposed in
[55] where peers of different utilities functions are investigated. However, the objective of this frame-
work is the socially welfare, by identifying a socially optimal operating point in terms of bandwidth
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allocation and therefore it seeks to solve a different problem than the one investigated in this thesis.
2.4 BitTorrent
BitTorrent (BT) was created in 2001 by Bram Cohen who also developed the first BT implementation,
the official BT client. Since then, BT has gained a tremendous popularity among content distribution
community. There is a vast amount of work that has studied BT either analytically or via experiments
and extensive simulations.
The first analytical study of BitTorrent was given by [56] where the authors considered a simple
fluid model to conclude that the scalability and efficiency of the protocol are very good. An inter-
esting point that they found is that although there is no Nash equilibrium point for a system of peers
with heterogeneous upload capacities, there does exist one in which peers upload their total physical
capacity, when the network consists of groups of peers who have the same uploading and download-
ing capacities. Although this model provides valuable insight, it is based on unrealistic assumptions,
such as that all participants share global system knowledge (uploading rates) and that the pieces are
uniformly distributed among peers. Moreover, experimental study of [57] exhibited that the arrival,
abort, and departure processes of downloaders do not follow a Poisson distribution as considered in
this analysis. Finally, several important BT parameters have not been considered, such as the peer set
and active set sizes.
Another very interesting analytical study that followed is the one in [58] which presents the fun-
damental trade-off between performance and fairness of BT peers. It is argued that the improvement
on fairness among peers comes at a cost of overall performance. Once again, the applicability of this
model in real scenarios is dubious since several unrealistic assumptions are made, like the assumption
that all peers of the same type (same uploading and downloading capacities) get the same uploading
and downloading rates at any time.
Work in [59] was among the first experimental ones which used the logs of a tracker as well as one
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instrumented client, participating in a very popular torrent, the 1.77GB Linux RedHat 9 distribution,
for its 5 months of activity. Experimental results exhibited a significant variation in the download rates
of the various participating peers and showed that the upload and download throughputs of peers are
not correlated, providing the first hints for unfairness in BitTorrent.
One of the most recent experimental studies was from Legout et al [40] which took place on Plan-
etlab by monitoring all peers participating in a torrent. An interesting finding of theirs is that the initial
seed upload capacity is critical to the performance of the system. When the seed is well-provisioned,
peers are clustered according to their upload capacity and higher capacity peers download faster.
On the other hand, when the initial seed is underprovisioned, clustering is no longer the case while
most peers download at approximately the same time irrespective of their upload capacity, indicating
unfairness in the system.
Work in [25] was the first study which addressed the fairness weaknesses of BitTorrent’s TFT
reciprocation policy. A thorough simulation study of theirs, considering real world traces, exhibited
that BT’s reciprocation policy fails to prevent unfairness across peers in terms of volume of content
served. This becomes more evident in heterogenous settings where high bandwidth peers receive
much less resources than low bandwidth ones. Another interesting point of their investigation is that
fairness is balanced in the system when the tracker groups the peers according to their capacities, such
as high capacity peers connect to other high capacity ones and lower capacity with lower capacity
ones; in this way the uplink capacity of the high capacity peers is much better utilized. However,
this concept is based on the assumption that peers will truthfully report their upload capacities to the
tracker as soon as they connect to it, which can not be guaranteed.
Another work in [36] open questioned the widely held belief till then that “incentives build robust-
ness in BitTorrent” [56,60,61]. They found out that the success of BitTorrent relies on the significant
altruism of participating peers and exhibited how their modified BiTorrent client, called BitTyrant,
can strategically game BitTorrent and significantly improve its download performance for the same
level of upload contribution and degrade the performance of other BT clients. BitTyrant can accom-
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plish this by dynamically adapting both the uplink capacity and the active set size, while preferentially
selecting peers according to their contributions, instead of randomly optimistically unchoking them.
There were several other studies that investigated strategic clients in BT. Work in [62] investigated
three exploits over BT clients, i.e., a) download only from seeds, b) download only from the fastest
peers and c) advertise false pieces. They showed that although these kind of strategic peers can
improve their performance, BitTorrent is quite robust against these exploits. Work of [63] proposed
another BT strategic peer which can significantly improve his performance by allowed to open much
more connections than the official client and by using random piece selection policy in order to ensure
that an unchoke period is never left unused; however the effect such peers could have in the system
performance is not explored.
A following work of Carra et al [64] has studied, in publicly available simulator GPS [65], the
performance of BitTyrant [36] and demonstrated that although its existence in a BT system can have a
surprisingly positive impact on the content distribution process, the system’s performance deteriorates
when many such peers appear. In the same setting, a new released version of the mainline BT has
been tested which presents a significant performance improvement in terms of download times, due
to an allowed large number of active connections for high capacity peers.
The performance improvement of peers who have a larger than normal view of a BitTorrent
swarm and maintain much more connections, has also been pointed by work in [41]. Their modi-
fied freeriding BT client who, on one hand, does not share any pieces of the file and, on the other
hand, uses more connections than the default in mainline BT, succeeds in significantly improving his
downloading completion time. More specifically, these free riders outperform compliant clients on
average, except when free-riders dominate the swarm, in which case both compliant and free-riders
incur substantial performance degradation.
From all aforementioned studies, it is clear that BT is vulnerable to strategic clients and fails to
shield the system from misbehavior. Responsible for these deficiencies of BT protocol was mainly
considered to be the reciprocation strategy of BitTorrent [31, 37, 41, 42, 62, 63]; on one hand, the
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optimistic unchoke policy and on the other hand, the incapability to find the right match, allow low
capacity peers to gain more than they invest, compared to high capacity peers. For this reason, there
were several studies that proposed improvements over it. One of these proposals was from Eger
et al [31]. Their proposed reciprocity mechanism was inspired by their previous resource pricing
mechanism introduced in [66], according to which a peer adjusts his bandwidth rates to his various
customers based on the amount of bandwidth he receives from them, which is used as the pricing
information. It is proved that the equilibrium in the steady state is a Nash equilibrium where each
peer uses his full upload capacity, and downloads from a specific peer with the same rate that he
uploads, preserving fairness.
Simulation studies are also conducted in order to evaluate the performance of the proposed
scheme, although the authors do not explain how they bootstrap the system. An overlay topology
is constructed according to the original BT implementation. Several probability functions are used to
model the BT behavior, like the probability that a specific peer ID is returned by the tracker. The block
selection algorithm is omitted and it is assumed that connected peers are always interested in blocks
of each other. Based on these assumptions, the performance of BT TFT mechanism is compared with
the performance of the proposed policy. It is generally shown that the proposed policy exhibits a fairer
allocation of resources than the reciprocation mechanism of BT with which peers with small upload
capacities receive considerably more than what they contribute, compared to others. Especially when
peers have a small number of connections, download rates vary considerably. The algorithm, though,
is restricted to peers that did not complete the download already. Seeds cannot perform this algorithm
and still lack incentives to contribute resources in the network.
Jun et al. [37] is among other works that argue that the BT choking algorithm is susceptible to
free-riding and proposed a new incentive mechanism based on the iterated prisoner’s dilemma. Peers
take allocation decisions, which prove to be more robust than current TFT mechanism of BT, based
on a “deficit” defined as the upload amount minus the download amount for a given link. However,
their experimental study considers only free riders who contribute much less than others and do not
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examine cases of misbehaving peers who provide bogus blocks or try to exploit the system in a
different way.
Similar to [37], Sherman et al. [38] use a deficit counter which represents the amount of data their
modified FairTorrent client owes to another one. FairTorrent clients decide whom to upload the next
data block based on such deficit counters. Their results demonstrate that FairTorrent provides up to
two orders of magnitude better fairness; however, seeders still lack incentives for cooperation.
A recent study of Li et al [39] argues that free riding effect on BitTorrent is mainly due to the
altruistic behavior of seeds and not so much due to the BT reciprocation policy. They proposed a seed
allocation policy according to which seeds favor only the most cooperating peers in order to mitigate
free riding. However, this study is based on the truthfull reporting of neighboring peers about their
downloading rates from the competing requesters of seeds, which may not be the case in a real system
of antagonistic peers.
Work in [35], on the other hand, revealed through extensive trace analysis and modeling that the
severe fluctuations in the peers’ download performance is due to the exponentially peer arrival rate.
However, they showed that multi torrent collaborations can alleviate these effects and provide strong
motivation for peers who have already downloaded a file to stay in the system and exchange it with
a new file they are interested in. Nevertheless, still this policy cannot motivate a seed to remain and
contribute in the system if he is no longer interested in another file, while a reputation mechanism
could boost the reputation of a such a peer who could use it in his future requests to improve his
performance.
Work in [24] is the first attempt to incorporate a reputation mechanism in BitTorrent in order to
motivate peers to remain in the system and contribute their resources as soon as they have downloaded
a file. Upload and download statistics are used to to compute a local reputation for each peer, based
on which peers decide whom to assign upload slots. Peers are distinguished to freeriders who im-
mediately leave the swarm after completing their download and sharers who share every downloaded
file for 10 hours after completion. However, in practice a freerider is not only a peer who disconnects
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as soon as he completes download but also provides bogus blocks and has a low sharing ratio even
when he is connected to the swarm. The policies in this work do not shield the system from this kind
of behavior. Moreover, only homogenous settings of peers with the same pairs of upload-download
capacities are considered and the results are not so satisfactory, since although the performance of
freeriders deteriorates, so does the performance of the sharers.
In order to confront free-riding in BitTorrent, work in [42] proposed a trust management system
for BT according to which each peer (including seeds) decides which peers to unchoke according to
their global trust level which depends both on the contribution level of the peers and their behaviors
(whether they upload bogus blocks). Their simulation study in GPS [65] shows that their policies
improve the fairness ratio (number of blocks uploaded over those downloaded by each peer) compared
to BT, as soon as peers can obtain the global trust values of the other peers from the tracker. The global
trust values are computed by the tracker by using the local opinion of 4 randomly chosen peers. In
this way, though, their policy is susceptible to false reporting from misbehaving peers. Moreover,it
induces a severe communication overhead, as the tracker should communicate at regular intervals with
4 peers for the trust reports for each peer in the system and with all peers to inform them about the
trust levels of others. Furthermore, if seeds are also using the proposed allocation policy, as hinted by
the authors, they would cease servicing peers as soon as the total number of blocks they downloaded
from them minus the total number of blocks they uploaded to them falls below a certain threshold.
This tactic, though, would deter seeds from contributing their resources, instead of motivating them.
Finally, work in [67] considers resource allocation policies for BT peers which improve peers’
download rates in cooperative settings of peers who seek to reach a common goal, e.g., P2P clients
of an organization who participate and cooperate in a private torrent that is set up by a system ad-
ministrator to disseminate a software update or a new application. This work is totally different
than aforementioned papers whose focus is how to enforce peers to cooperate inside an antagonistic
framework.
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2.5 Wireless Internet Sharing Community Networks
Trust and Reputation systems have been extensively investigated in file sharing systems to foster co-
operation among users and improve their performance as we saw in previous sections. However, the
Internet sharing context is new and reputation mechanisms haven’t been tested under such settings
yet. Among the work in most related settings is the one in [68], which proposes a reputation-based
scheme to motivate cooperation among different Wireless Internet Service Providers (WISPs) in order
to provide seamless roaming provision for their users. Proposed mechanism is controlled by a Trusted
Central Authority which signs the reputation records of the WISPs. Mobile nodes use these records
along with other information (i.e., requested prices and advertised QoS) to decide to which neigh-
boring WISP to associate with and pays for the service using a credit-based micropayment scheme.
Reputations are only used to choose the appropriate provider and not to determine the QoS offered
to competing users asking for connection, which is the main focus of our approach. Moreover, in
contrast to this work, we seek to foster cooperation among users without the need of a centralized
authority or micropayment schemes.
In [69] the owners of the APs in a WCN are motivated to allow mobile users to access their
home WLAN/DSL connection by the existence of a reciprocity mechanism. It is considered that
WCN participants divide into teams of few tens of members each and the members of the same team
must know and trust each other and have a leader. Members sign digital receipts when they consume
service from another team. The receipts form a receipt graph, which is used as input to the reciprocity
algorithm that identifies contributing teams using network flow techniques. The receipts are stored
either in a central server, or they are distributed among multiple team servers with a gossiping protocol
and are used in order to decide whether to grant service in a given requester or not.
The aforementioned described work, as a first attempt to stimulate participation in a WCN, faces
some limitations. Firstly, it is based on the unrealistic assumption that the aggregate team consump-
tion rates are homogeneous. Secondly, it is considered that the cost for a contributor to share his
Internet connection is the same, irrespective of the duration of the service and the QoS offered. Our
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scheme, on the other hand, considers users of different consumption profiles, while the duration and
QoS of offered services are important cost factors considered in the allocation decisions. More impor-
tantly, it does not examine whether users receive resources in proportion to their contributions. The
reciprocity algorithm solely determines whether a given requester will be grant an Internet connection
or not, and not the specific QoS that he will receive.
An extended work [70] seeks to handle this issue by proposing an enhancement on the reciprocity
mechanism; however, it is still based on the unrealistic assumptions of [69] and the scheme is not eval-
uated in order to examine whether better contributors indeed receive a better QoS when connecting
to other AP owners in the WCN. The fact that it does not consider the different consumption profiles
of the users, may lead some users to receive unfairly much more resources than some others. Last,
users of different cooperation levels are not modeled, in order to test their performance in a dynamic
scheme.
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Reputation-based Framework for P2P
Single Service (SS) Systems
3.1 Introduction
This chapter refers to systems of peers who share a single computing resource, defined as service, like
bandwidth in file sharing systems (e.g., BitTorrent, Gnutella), or storage in distributed information
storage systems (e.g., Freenet), etc. As we already stated in chapter 1, a reputation-based scheme
seems the most appropriate mechanism to motivate users of such systems to cooperate.
The main contributions of this chapter can be summarized as follows:
a) we propose a novel reputation metric and update mechanism such that it gradually exposes the
cooperation level of each peer in terms of the quality of service it provides and dynamically
adapts to possible peer’s behavior variations,
b) we propose an overall allocation framework according to which each peer independently de-
cides how to allocate his available resources. Reputation-based allocation policies are followed
(RA and ERA), based on which each peer determines the quality of service that he will offer to
33
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each one of his requesters according to their reputations, resource demands and request gener-
ation profiles. In a real implementation this could be realized by placing different amounts of
data in the socket buffers of the TCP connections or by using more sophisticated traffic control
to schedule the traffic directly at the queue of the network interface card [48]. Our proposed
allocation scheme can be implemented in a distributed manner at each peer independently of
the others and the only information that is passed from one peer to another is the requested
amount of resources,
c) We propose a reputation-based server selection policy (RS) to help peers select among the most
reputed/contributive servers and avoid misbehaving (non contributive) ones and finally,
d) we evaluate our scheme via simulations to various setups of peers with different contribution
and consumption profiles, newcomers, misbehaving and strategic peers, and present the per-
formance gains compared to previous work.
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 3.2 describes the considered model
and section 3.3 presents the proposed reputation-based exchange framework for one service, its ro-
bustness over various attacks and potential application scenarios. In section 3.4 we discuss the perfor-
mance evaluation details and in section 3.5 we exhibit the results for the single service case, providing
comparison results with related work. Finally, section 3.6 concludes the chapter.
3.2 Model Description
We consider a p2p network of N peers who provide and consume a particular service. We consider
that the service is bandwidth for content sharing. Each peer i can provide bandwidth with differ-
ent capability, according to the upload capacity uCi (measured in bits per second) of the access link
with which he is connected to the Backbone Network. Capabilities of peers not need to be global
information in our system, but considered private/hidden information, which is revealed through the
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Figure 3.1: Network Model.
reputation mechanism. We consider that the capacity of the backbone network is enough to accom-
modate all the traffic between the peers. This assumption is quite realistic as previous studies have
shown that the utilization in the core of the network is low [13]. We assume that the physical up-
load capacity of each peer is the bottleneck in the network, while the download capacity dCi of each
peer i is sufficient to accommodate every incoming flow. This is a quite reasonable assumption as
the download capacity is usually much higher than the upload capacity of the peers, (e.g., in ADSL
connections). The network model is depicted in Fig. 3.1. In the rest of this chapter we will refer to
the upload capacity of a peer i as his bandwidth capacity or capability and we denote it by Ci.
We consider that our system progresses in periods of fixed time units. At each period each peer
i generates gi requests and directs them to other peers. In each one of his requests he reports his
demands (in terms of bandwidth), expressed by Dpi j where j denotes the server for the given request
of peer i and p denotes the period in which the request took place. The bandwidth requested by i could
be for any kind of content/files which are considered available by any other than i peer in the system,
but provided with different quality according to their capabilities and availability. The demands of
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peer i are uniformly distributed between [minDi,maxDi] , according to each peer’s demand profile.
A peer may report different demands in each one of his requests.
Peers act both as servers and clients simultaneously. A peer as a client may select the servers to
which he will direct his requests either arbitrarily or based on some attributes that indicate the quality
of service he may expect, as we will see in the sequel. At each period, peers collect the requests that
have been directed to them and allocate their available upload capacity among their requesters.
The service is not granted for more than a period, in order to give the chance for other peers to
access the link. At each period peers redirect their requests to the same or possibly other servers aim-
ing at improving their received quality of service. The periodic readjustment of the peers’ strategies
is also adopted in other file sharing systems like BitTorrent protocol [71], as we describe in detail in
chapter 6.
3.3 Reputation-based Policies for SS systems
3.3.1 Reputation System
In this section we describe the reputation system that we propose. Each peer keeps a reputation value
for each one of his transacting peers, based on the amount of resources that he receives from each one
of them. In particular, if in a given period p a peer i demands a certain amount of service Dpi j from a
peer j and finally receives an amount of xpi j ≤ Dpi j during this period, then the ratio xpi j/Dpi j represents
how much peer j satisfied his needs in this period and accounts for j’s reputation in the eyes of peer i.
This represents the subjective (local) reputation of peer j to i. At each new transaction with the same
server the local reputation of the server to the peer is recalculated. So, the reputation of peer j to any
peer i at a given period p is given by:
Rpi j =
1
Reqpi j
∑
t∈T pi j
xti j
Dti j
, (3.1)
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where Reqpi j is the total number of i’s past bandwidth requests from peer j till period p and T
p
i j denotes
the set of the specific periods in which peer i requested service from peer j, till period p. In a similar
way, each peer in the system calculates the local reputation of all other peers. The reputation of each
peer can take any value from 0 to 1 and expresses the average satisfaction in terms of quality of service
that he has offered.
Please note that the reputation of a given peer reflects the average satisfaction, in terms of quality
of service, he offers to his requesters, as opposed to previous work [1,10–12], where the reputation is
calculated as a function of binary ratings (success or failure of a service request). This is an important
difference, since a reputed user in our scheme is one that not only provides his help (e.g., upload a
file) but also provides a high QoS in order to satisfy his requesters’ demands (e.g., upload a file with
the requested speed). In this way we can distinguish peers of different capabilities in satisfying the
various service requests.
We consider that new peers in the system are awarded an initial small reputation in order to have
the chance to receive some resources from the network. If newcomers prove to be collaborative
enough, their reputation will quickly increase, permitting them to receive more resources. We have
seen from our simulations that a history of 10 past and most recent transactions is enough to evaluate
one’s local reputation. More specifically, we performed simulation experiments with different peers’
populations and profiles and saw that a 10-log most recent history was the smallest log achieving
similar performance with the whole history log, irrespective of the system parameters used, as soon
as peers don’t vary their behavior. Therefore, each time a peer i completes 10 transactions with
any other peer j, he starts replacing the oldest rating transactions with newer ones, always keeping a
history of, at the most, 10 past transactions with each peer j, maintaining the overhead low. Moreover,
in this way the system removes age-bias and quickly adapts to peer behavior changes, e.g., when peers
strategically vary their contributions through time.
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3.3.2 Reputation-based Allocation Policy (RA)
Suppose that a peer j receives in a given period p, n requests for bandwidth and that his upload
capacity is C j. We use an identifier vector I = {I1, ...In}, each element of which represents a specific
requester of peer j at period p with demands expressed by DpIi j, i ∈ {1, ..,n}. Then, we propose that
j will allocate his upload capacity C j among the n competing peers by following the maximization
problem:
max
n
∑
i=1
RpjIi
xpIi j
DpIi j
,
s.t.
n
∑
i=1
xpIi j ≤C j and x
p
Ii j ≤ D
p
Ii j ∀i, (3.2)
where RpjIi represents the local reputation of peer Ii to j at period p, and x
p
Ii j represents the allocated
resource of peer j to peer Ii during period p. We will refer to this policy as RA.
In case that only one peer is competing for the available resources of a server, the server will
completely satisfy the peer’s demands, unless peer’s reputation is below a certain threshold, set by
the system to mark misbehavior. In this case, the competing peer does not receive any resource, as a
punishment for his zero contributions.
We thought of this allocation policy because its benefits are twofold. Firstly, it shares the available
resources in a way to give more resources to more reputed peers, and secondly, it tries to maximize
the satisfactions of the competing peers. The notion of satisfaction is very important, since the same
amount of resources may be of different importance to different peers and has different significance
in different times of the day, e.g., during congested periods a medium QoS can be considered more
satisfying than in less congested ones. Peers have different criteria in judging a service; however, by
using their reported demands, we can account for their different degrees of satisfaction.
Both the objective function and the constraints in the maximization problem (3.2) are linear1, so
1We also experimented with a non-linear policy, i.e., max
n
∑
i=1
RpjIi log(
xpIi j
DpIi j
+1) with the same constrains as in
(3.2); we preferred the simpler linear one, as both policies perform equally well when our proposed reputation
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the solution can be easily found by sorting peers in decreasing order according to their reputation
to demands ratio RpjIi/D
p
Ii j. The server will satisfy the needs of competing peers starting from the
first one in the order satisfying all his demands, as soon as they do not exceed server’s maximum
upload capacity and continuing with the rest of peers till all resources are exhausted or all peers
are completely satisfied. If two or more peers have the same reputation to demands ratio and the
residual capacity of the server j is not enough to accommodate all of their demands, it will be equally
split among them, unless this portion exceeds the demands of some of them and thus the residual is
allocated to the others.
Applying RA, peers with the highest ratio RpjIi/D
p
Ii j will be prioritized. So, it becomes obvious
that peers do not have any incentive to request more than their real needs, aiming at receiving better
service. On the other hand, peers do not have an incentive to ask for less than they need, because they
will not be able to get more than what they asked for. Nevertheless, if they are reputed enough, even
their higher demands will be satisfied, depending on the server’s capabilities and availability (e.g., if
no other equal or more reputed peers request for service at that moment).
It is obvious from the solution of (3.2) that for C j <
n
∑
i=1
DIi j and for any two competing peers i
and k with
Rpji
Dpi j
<
Rpjk
Dpk j
, their satisfaction ratios from their bandwidth requests will satisfy
xpi j
Dpi j
<
xpk j
Dpk j
.
This statement proves that when the resources of a given server j cannot satisfy the demands of
all the competing peers, the ones with the highest contribution level per unit resource request will
perceive the highest satisfaction. This final point clearly shows that the proposed allocation policy
provides incentives for cooperation and contributions. Actually, the higher demands a peer has, the
more contributive/reputed he has to be, in order to satisfy them in a loaded network. As an example,
consider 3 peers A, B and C who request service from peer D with CD = 6Mb/s. Their demands
are DAD = 3Mb/s,DBD = 5Mb/S,DCD = 5Mb/s and their local reputations are RDA = 0.3,RDB =
0.5,RDC = 1. Most reputed peer C will be fully satisfied, receiving 5Mb/s, while peers A and B will
each receive 0.5Mb/s.
system is used.
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The benefits of RA policy are also exhibited through the simulation results of section 3.5. The
main results exhibit the correlation between the contribution levels, reputations and satisfactions of
the peers. Peers can only receive resources in proportion to their contributions; thus misbehaving (non
contributive) peers cannot receive any resources (section 3.5.1) and strategic peers fail to maximize
their obtained resources when they do not offer a proportional amount of resources to the network
(section 3.5.4). Our simulation results further exhibit the performance stability of the system in the
presence of newly arriving peers (section 3.5.2) and the formation of coalitions between peers of
similar capabilities and needs (section 3.5.3).
3.3.3 Enhanced Reputation-based Allocation Policy (ERA)
Although RA policy is suitable for systems of peers with similar request generation profiles, it fails
to be fair when there are peers who produce many more requests than others, in order to exploit the
network. Such peers should be properly handled, so as not to absorb most of the resources of the
system, in cost of other collaborative users. The following allocation policy (ERA) is proposed to
cope with this case. According to ERA policy, peer j will share his capacity C j to n competing peers
by solving:
max
n
∑
i=1
[
(
ReqpjIi
ReqpIi j
)a×RpjIi
]
xpIi j
DpIi j
,
s.t.
n
∑
i=1
xpIi j ≤C j and x
p
Ii j ≤ D
p
Ii j ∀i, (3.3)
where ReqpjIi is the total number of requests that peer j has sent to each peer Ii till period p. For
any new peer in the system, these variables are set to 1 and change through time. Variable a can be
adjusted by the mechanism designer to balance the fairness in the p2p system. The bigger a is, the
more restrictive the policy is for the high rate peers.
With ERA policy we provide better quality of service to those peers to whom we have sent more
requests than what they have sent to us, in order to somehow repay them. Note that this policy is of
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the interest of both high rate and low rate peers. On one hand, high rate peers will have the chance to
compensate peers who have satisfied a great amount of their requests, and thus hope for more future
collaboration with these peers, and on the other hand, low rate peers will be able to restrict the excess
requests of high rate peers, satisfying even other collaborative peers, whom they need.
The solution of (3.3) can be easily found by following a similar procedure with the one in (3.2),
indicating that high rate peers need to be more contributive than low rate peers, in order to satisfy
their requests in a loaded network. This is also exhibited through the simulation results of section
3.5.5.
3.3.4 Reputation-based Server Selection Policy (RS)
In this section we describe a reputation-based server selection policy in order to help peers avoid
requesting service from misbehaving (non contributive) ones. When a peer enters the system for the
first time, he does not have information about the behaviors and the capabilities of the other peers.
However, we assume that he is aware of his potential servers through an underlying service discovery
mechanism. In our study, we consider that all peers are potential servers for each other. So, for a short
period of time, which we call “acquaintance duration”, new peers direct their requests to all peers with
equal probability (random selection policy), till they obtain an overview of the network. Similarly,
preexisted peers in the system will use the random selection policy among their old providers and
new peers in the system during time duration equal to the acquaintance duration in order to test the
behavior of the newcomers. After this time duration, the probability with which a peer i directs his
request to a peer j at a given period p, is directly proportional to j’s local reputation to i, as:
ppi j = R
p
i j/ ∑
k∈Spi
Rpik, (3.4)
where Spi is the set of all peer i’s transacting peers till period p. A similar policy is used in [1]
and [16], where though corresponding probability is proportional to a global reputation and not a
Institutional Repository - Library & Information Centre - University of Thessaly
09/12/2017 03:02:41 EET - 137.108.70.7
42 Chapter 3
local one. As we already explained in a previous section, by using local reputations peers tend to
select the appropriate traders for them, according to their particular needs.
We would like to clarify that peers treat anyone with whom they did not have previous transactions
as a newcomer. Therefore, peers get to know newcomers, as soon as the latter sends requests to them.
At that time, newcomers are considered as potential servers for future peers’ requests.
3.3.5 Robustness of proposed scheme over various attacks
Misbehaving (non-cooperative) peers
Misbehaving peers are peers who do not contribute any resources to the system, seeking, however,
to consume as much resources as possible. Our scheme incorporates the appropriate mechanisms to
disclosure such peers from the system. As stated in section 3.3.1 all newcomers are given an initial
small reputation, InitRep, in order to bootstrap the system and let them prove their cooperation.
However, if such peers are misbehaving and do not contribute any resources, their initial reputation
will quickly decrease, as can be seen from the reputation update mechanism presented in the same
section. Actually, after a single transaction of a peer X with a misbehaving one, the latter’s local
reputation to X will be half his initial one (i.e., (InitRep+0)/2) and will even more decrease at each
new transaction (InitRep+0+0)/3, etc. Therefore, the chances of misbehaving peers with such low
reputations to receive service compared to contributive or even newly arriving peers are small, as
shown in section 3.3.2. Moreover, according to our policies, as soon as peers’ reputation falls below
the misbehavior threshold, which is set smaller than InitRep, they will be denied service, even when
they are the sole competitors for it. On the other hand, according to our reputation-based server
selection scheme, peers direct their requests to the most reputed ones; thus, after the acquaintance
duration period, misbehaving peers will no longer be selected as servers (or selected with a minor
probability). In this way, misbehaving peers are blocked both from the allocation and server selection
decisions. The efficiency of our policies over misbehaving peers can also be seen from the evaluation
results of sections 3.5.1 and 4.5.6.
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Whitewashing and sybil attacks
Under both Sybil and whitewashing attacks, peers create many pseudonymous entities in order to
exploit the network. Sybil attack is common in global reputation systems which are based on peers’
votes. By creating many pseudonymous entities, a peer can provide a large number of positive votes
for himself cheating the others. In our work, peers calculate local reputations relying only on their own
experience, and thus Sybil attack cannot affect them. Under whitewashing attack, misbehaving peers
switch among different identities in order to improve their performance. As explained previously,
as soon as misbehaving peers are revealed, they are blocked from the system. To start over again,
misbehaving peers may rejoin the system with a new identity. However, in our system the newcomers’
reputation is very small to be competed with the reputation of already existing contributive peers.
Thus, misbehaving peers are not able to benefit by rejoining with new identities. Newcomers really
have to prove themselves as contributive peers in order to improve their initial reputation and savor
the acknowledgment (contributions) of the rest of the peers. The performance of whitewashers can
be seen in section 3.5.2.
Strategic peers
Strategic peers are peers who seek to maximize their satisfaction from the network with the least
possible contributions. They are usually peers who start misbehaving as soon as they reach a high
reputation in the system. Since proposed reputations are calculated based on the log of only the
10 most recent transactions with a given peer, the high established reputation of strategic peers will
soon reach very small values if they stop cooperating. Actually, even one unsatisfied request from a
strategic peer will affect his local reputation with weight 1/10 and significantly decrease it. If more
unsatisfied transactions occur, the reputation will further decrease, reaching zero after 10 concur-
rent unsatisfied transactions. With our scheme in place, peers have to constantly cooperate in order
to maintain high reputations. Our proposed local reputation calculation mechanism, based only on
recent transactions, enable reputations to adapt very fast to possible changes in the network. The
performance of various strategic peers is exhibited in section 3.5.4.
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3.3.6 Application Scenarios
Our proposed reputation-based allocation scheme can be easily applied to p2p-like systems to moti-
vate cooperation, since it does not require any centralized components, trusted third parties, commu-
nication overhead due to voting about one’s reputation, e-banking systems or computational complex
algorithms. It is implemented in a distributed manner at each peer independently of the others and
the only information that is passed from one peer to another is the requested amount of resources.
Peers are totally unaware of any system information like the capability and consumption profiles of
all other peers, which is actually the case in real systems. The only thing that peers need to know
is the IP addresses of the peers who claim to provide the requested service, which is supported by
popular p2p systems. For example, Gnutella [5] uses Gnutella Web Caches among other features to-
wards this goal, while BitTorrent uses trackers keeping track of all peers associated with a requested
file. Our allocation framework could fit in file sharing systems like Gnutella and BitTorrent to control
the amount of bandwidth offered to competing peers, in order to ensure cooperation among them and
shield the system from free riders. In Gnutella, for example, peers could direct their file requests to
potential servers following our reputation based server selection policy, and would express their de-
mands in terms of desired download bandwidth; then servers would decide the amount of bandwidth
offered to them, following our reputation-based allocation policies. BitTorrent defers than other file
sharing systems in that peers, who download the same files at a given time, “group together” and
exchange blocks of files. In chapter 7 we explain how our scheme can be incorporated in BitTorrent,
to overcome well-known deficiencies of its current reciprocation mechanism.
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3.4 Performance Evaluation
3.4.1 Simulation Model
We have developed an event-driven simulator in C++ to evaluate the performance of our policies. We
simulate a p2p network of 100 peers who share bandwidth for file sharing and have different upload
capacities and varying demands for bandwidth. Peers generate bandwidth requests according to their
consumption profiles and direct them to other peers either randomly or following our proposed server
selection policy. Peers, acting as servers, allocate their available upload capacity to their requesters,
following our proposed allocation policies. Over this model we inquire the efficacy of our policies
for the case of one single service (bandwidth) being exchanged in the system. The performance of
the system scales even to larger overlay networks; however in larger networks the convergence time
of the reputations increases.
All peers start with a small initial reputation of 0.07 in order to bootstrap the system. As we saw
from our simulation results, the system reaches the same steady state as with any initial reputation
values for each peer; however a small initial reputation value for newcomers, as 0.07, speeds up the
disclosure of misbehaving peers as we will see in the following sections. Overall reputation threshold
(called misbehavior threshold), below which a peer is denied service, even when he is the only one
competing for resources is set to 0.01. Acquaintance duration time is set to 100 periods, while the
total simulation time is 1000 periods, unless otherwise stated. The remaining simulation parameters
vary and are determined in each of the following sections.
3.4.2 Comparison with other schemes
In order to exhibit the benefits of our proposed allocation framework for the single service case, we
make comparison results with other related schemes, briefly described in the following subsections.
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Scheme in [1]
Scheme in [1] is a representative reputation-based work that calculates reputations as a function of
binary service ratings (success-failure). More specifically, each peer’s reputation equals the fraction
of the weighted number of his successful service provisions over the weighted total number of his
service provisions. The weight of each service provision is a negative exponential function of the
elapsed time. In order to map this binary description to our model we explain that if the allocated
resources to a given requester are greater than zero, the service provision to this requester is consid-
ered successful (rating = 1), otherwise, unsuccessful (rating = 0). We note that particular scheme uses
global reputations which are calculated based on the ratings of all peers of the p2p system, which
are assumed to be truthful. The allocation decision uses the following rule: among the peers k that
request the same service from a particular server j, the probability for a specific requester i to be
selected equals Ri/∑k Rk, where Ri is the global reputation of peer i. This selection is translated to
our model as follows; the selected requester will be offered resources equal to his expressed demands
as soon as they do not exceed the server’s capacity, otherwise, he will receive resources equal to the
server’s capacity. It is necessary to make these mappings from model in [1] to our model, because
the model in [1] does not account for peers of different capabilities and demands. Described scheme
will be denoted as BRR in the figures of this chapter standing for Binary-Rating Reputation-based
scheme.
The following alternative allocation policies share similarities with RA and are described below
for the case of n requests directed to peer j at period p. Their performance is exhibited in section
3.5.1 in comparison with the performance of RA.
Maximize the quality of service:
Under this policy a server allocates his upload capacity by using a progressive filling algorithm. He
increases all competing peers’ bandwidth at the same rate of 1/n until one or several competing peers
hit their limits (demands). Then, the algorithm continues to increase the bandwidth of the remaining
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peers at the same rate as soon as all peers hit their limits or the upload capacity of the server is fully
utilized. This policy will be denoted as max(x) in the figures of this chapter.
Maximize the satisfactions of the peers:
This policy maximizes
n
∑
i=1
(xpIi j/D
p
Ii j), under the constraints
n
∑
i=1
xpIi j ≤C j and x
p
Ii j ≤D
p
Ii j∀i. The solution
can be found in a similar way as the solution of (3.3). In this way the policy seeks to maximize the
satisfactions of all competing peers. This policy will be denoted as max(x/D) in the figures of this
chapter.
Maximize the quality of service based on the reputations of the peers:
This policy maximizes
n
∑
i=1
RpjIix
p
Ii j, under the following constraints
n
∑
i=1
xpIi j ≤ C j and x
p
Ii j ≤ D
p
Ii j∀i. It
gives more resources to more reputed peers. This policy will be denoted as max (Rx) in the figures of
this chapter.
3.4.3 Performance Metrics
As we already stated in the introduction, one of the goals of our proposed policies is to motivate peers
to cooperate and improve their contribution level by guaranteing that their satisfaction from their
services’ requests will be proportional to their contributions. Therefore, in order to examine whether
the contributions of the peers in the system are correlated with the satisfaction they obtain from it, we
define the global reputation and average satisfaction of a peer as follows.
The average contribution level of a peer is reflected on his global reputation in the network. The
global reputation of peer i at a given period p is given by averaging the individual opinions of every
other peer in the N-peers system for the given peer i at period p (local reputations), i.e.,
GRpi = ∑
∀ j 6=i
Rpji/(N−1), (3.5)
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The global reputation of a peer actually reflects his capability and cooperation, as captured by the
whole system (aggregate of peers). We clarify that under our scheme global reputations are only used
for performance analysis; peers keep and use only local reputations.
We further calculate the average satisfaction St pi of each peer i in the system. The average satisfac-
tion of peer i until period p, is given by summing his satisfaction ratios in each one of his transactions
with all other peers and averaging over the total number of his requests till period p.
3.5 Simulation Results
3.5.1 Peers with Different Capabilities and Misbehaving Peers
In Fig.3.2 we consider peers who wish to dedicate different bandwidth capacities for uploading either
because their bandwidth capabilities or their willingness to offer are different, and compare RA with
BRR. So, in a network of 100 peers, 20% dedicate 7 Mb/s, 20% 6 Mb/s, 20% 5 Mb/s, 20% 4 Mb/s and
20% 3 Mb/s for bandwidth uploading. We consider that all peers’ demands vary uniformly between
1 and 7 Mb/s during simulation time. Each peer generates 3 requests per period and requests are
directed with equal probability to each one of the rest of the peers (random server selection policy).
We see that with RA the reputations of the peers are proportional to their capacities (dedicated
upload bandwidth), and moreover their satisfactions are proportional to their reputations. However,
BRR cannot differentiate peers according to their contribution levels and all cooperative peers have
the same reputation (as defined in BRR scheme), and satisfaction.
In Fig.3.3 the lower capacity (3 & 4 Mb/s) peers of the experimental case exhibited in Fig.3.2
are now misbehaving by not contributing any resources to the network (0 Mb/s) and constitute 40 %
of the total number of the peers in the system. In Fig.3.3a we can see that misbehaving peers do not
succeed in gaining anything from the system (their satisfaction ratio is almost zero); however, they
succeed in deteriorating the performance of the other peers who, unaware of the misbehavior, send
them requests. The performance of contributive peers can significantly improve (45% improvement)
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Figure 3.2: Global Reputations and Av. Satisfactions of different capacity peers.
if they use the reputation-based server selection policy.
In Fig.3.3b we see the satisfaction ratios of each category of peers when the various allocation
policies described in section 3.4.2 are used, combined with the reputation-based server selection pol-
icy. It is clear that only our proposed allocation scheme RA, and max(Rx) achieve service differentia-
tion according to the contributions of the peers. Our policy, though, achieves much better satisfaction
ratios than max(Rx) for the same available bandwidth in the system. BRR scheme, although refrains
misbehaving peers from exploiting the system, it cannot differentiate collaborative peers. In the same
figure we can see the performance of two other policies, RA-BR and CS-QR. The first one is the
combination of our allocation policy RA with the Binary Rating-based reputation metric of scheme
in [1], while the second one is the combination of the Client Selection policy of scheme in [1] with
our proposed Quality-based Reputation metric. As we can see, the combined use of our reputation
metric and proposed allocation policy is the best among all other policies.
We further evaluated our scheme for different populations N of 103-106 peers and the conclu-
sions of the analysis remained the same. In each one of these populations the satisfactions of peers
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Figure 3.3: Av.Satisfaction of different capacity peers for 40% misbehaving peers and different (a)
server selection and (b) allocation policies.
reached the same steady state with a convergence time in the order of N2. However, even after only
1000 rounds, for all aforementioned populations the service differentiation is succeeded. The only
difference is that the average satisfactions of peers are a bit lower than the ones of the steady state.
For very large populations, peers delay in “getting to know” each other and thus delay in identifying
their partners. In reality, though, each one of the peers would collaborate with only a subset of the
total population at a given duration of time according to its specific service requests or the number
of peers who happen to be online at the particular duration time. Therefore, in practice, peers get to
know their partners at different time periods. This case is simulated in the following section where
new peers enter the system at different time periods.
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Figure 3.4: Average Satisfaction of newcomers and stable peers of different capacities for (a) no
misbehaving peers and (b) 40% misbehaving peers in the system.
3.5.2 NewComers & Whitewashers
In this section we examine the performance of the RA policy, when peers periodically leave and join
the network. As in the previous section, peers are categorized according to their upload capacity;
20% of them dedicate 7 Mb/s, 20% 6 Mb/s, 20% 5 Mb/s, 20% 4 Mb/s and 20% 3 Mb/s for bandwidth
uploading and all peers generate 3 requests per period. However, every 200 periods 50% of each
category (capacity) peers leave the system and are replaced by new identity peers of the same capacity
with those who left. In this way, we maintain the same analogy of capacity peers in the system and
better investigate the performance of the system compared to the static one, where no arrivals or
departures occur. All peers use our reputation-based allocation and server selection policies (RA and
RS).
In Fig.3.4a we see the average satisfactions of the newcomers and the stable peers (the ones who
remain in the system) with capacities 7 and 3 Mb/s, as the system evolves in periods. For distinctness
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reasons, we did not exhibit the performance of the other capacity peers in the same graph since the
same conclusions apply for them, as well. We can see that the performance of the permanent peers
is not affected by the presence of the newcomers, while the newcomers’ performance is very close to
the one of the steady state, despite their short life in the system.
Next, we consider that lower capacity peers (3 & 4 Mb/s) are misbehaving (contributing 0 re-
sources) and, as above, every 200 periods 50% of each category peers are replaced by new identity
peers of the same capacities. New identity misbehaving peers may be whitewashers who have left the
network and appeared with new identities in order to exploit the system. However, as we see from
Fig. 3.4b neither stable misbehaving peers nor new identity misbehaving peers can take advantage of
the system; their satisfaction ratio is almost zero.
The performance of the stable 7 Mb/s capacity peers is not influenced by the presence of newly
arriving misbehaving and other peers. Moreover, the newcomers of 7 Mb/s capacity can almost
achieve the performance of the steady state in the end of their lives in the system. As we already noted,
new peers stay for 200 periods in the network. During their acquaintance duration (100 periods), they
direct their requests with equal probability among all others and their average satisfaction till the
end of this acquaintance duration is only 0.51 as we see from Fig.3.4b, due to the presence of the
misbehaving peers. After the acquaintance duration, new peers start directing their requests to their
most reputed servers and thus in the end of their lives in the system (after more 100 periods) they
manage to improve their satisfaction ratio to 0.61. If they stayed in the network for a longer time,
their performance would even more improve to reach the one of the steady state.
3.5.3 Formation of Cooperation Groups (Coalitions)
Next, we consider that 50% of peers have both 7 Mb/s capabilities and demands (strong peers) in each
one of their requests and 50% of peers have 3 Mb/s capabilities and demands (weak peers). All peers
generate 3 requests per period and they use the RA policy. In Fig.3.5a we see that high capacity peers
get 6.7 Mb/s on average during a period, while low capacity peers get only 3.23 Mb/s. If, however,
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Figure 3.5: (a) Av. Received Bandwidth per period for high and low capacity peers (b) Percentage
of requests directed from and to each category of peers.
low capacity peers had high demands of 7 Mb/s, their average bandwidth in a period would only be
2.53 Mb/s, while the average bandwidth in a period for high capacity peers would be 6.9 Mb/s (please
refer to Fig.3.5a). Low capacity peers are punished for their excess demands. They should be able
to provide a proportional service to what they ask for, because in possible competition with higher
capacity peers they lose.
In Fig.3.5b we see that peers were self organized in two coalitions; the one of the strong peers
and the other of the week peers. The highest percentage of the requests of strong peers was directed
to strong peers, while the highest percentage of the requests of weak peers was directed to weak
peers. Strong peers can accommodate the high demands of strong peers and that is why strong peers
direct their requests to other strong peers. On the other hand, weak peers when competing with strong
peers, lose (get what remains from strong peers). Thus, they prefer to send their requests to other
weak peers (weak peers have higher local reputation to them). It is very important that although peers
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are unaware of the capabilities of the other peers, they efficiently recognize the appropriate traders
with whom they can improve their utility and are self-organized in coalitions. We have also detected
these coalitions in all other cases of heterogeneous (capacity and demands) peers. In Fig.3.5b we see
that still some requests are directed to opposite groups; this is mainly due to the acquaintance duration
time, under which peers send their requests randomly to one another.
3.5.4 Strategic Peers
In this section we consider that peers are strategic, i.e., they seek to maximize their satisfaction with
the least possible contributions. All peers have the same upload capabilities of 7 Mb/s and peers’
demands vary uniformly between 1 and 7 Mb/s. As we already saw, by using the proposed allocation
policy RA, the average satisfaction ratio of a given peer is proportional to his global reputation.
Therefore, a peer knows that as soon as his average satisfaction ratio reaches a certain high value, his
global reputation is high enough and thus he can take advantage of it to start misbehaving.
We investigate two possible scenarios. In the first one, each time a peer reaches a certain average
satisfaction ratio (threshold) he progressively decreases his dedicated capacity for uploading (here we
consider that the capacity is decreased by steps of 1 Mb/s). Once his average satisfaction ratio falls
down this threshold, he progressively increases his capacity till its maximum value (determined by
the peer’s physical upload capacity), or till he perceives the desired average satisfaction ratio (in this
case he starts, once again, decreasing his dedicated capacity). We will refer to this scenario as the
progressive strategy.
In the second scenario, once a peer’s average satisfaction ratio reaches the specified threshold,
he does not offer any bandwidth at all; however once his average satisfaction ratio falls down the
threshold he starts collaborating again by contributing his maximum upload capacity. We will refer
to this scenario as the steep strategy. In both scenarios, peers start contributing their whole capacity
and dynamically adjust their contributions according to their perceived satisfaction ratio.
In Fig.3.6 we see the average satisfaction of altruistic and strategic peers for different percentage
Institutional Repository - Library & Information Centre - University of Thessaly
09/12/2017 03:02:41 EET - 137.108.70.7
3.5. Simulation Results 55
 0.5
 0.52
 0.54
 0.56
 0.58
 0.6
 0.62
 0.64
 0.66
 0.68
 0.7
0% 10% 50% 100%
A
v
. 
S
a
ti
s
fa
c
ti
o
n
Percentage of Strategic Peers
Altruistic Peers
Strategic Peers
(a)
 0.5
 0.52
 0.54
 0.56
 0.58
 0.6
 0.62
 0.64
 0.66
 0.68
 0.7
0% 10% 50% 100%
A
v
. 
S
a
ti
s
fa
c
ti
o
n
Percentage of Strategic Peers
Altruistic Peers
Strategic Peers
(b)
Figure 3.6: Average Satisfaction for different percentage of strategic peers when the latter adopt (a)
the progressive strategy or (b) the steep strategy.
of strategic peers in the system when (a) the progressive and (b) the steep strategy are adopted by the
strategic peers. We refer to peers who contribute their maximum upload capacity during their lifetime
in the network as altruistic and to peers who vary their upload capacity as strategic ones. We further
consider that the satisfaction threshold under which peers start misbehaving is 60%.
From Fig.3.6 it is obvious that altruistic peers gain a much better satisfaction ratio than strategic
peers, even when the latter constitute the half portion of the network. If all peers were altruistic
(case 0% in Fig.3.6), their average satisfaction ratio would be 17,5% and 19,1% greater than if they
were all progressive strategic and steep strategic peers (case 100% in Fig.3.6), respectively. It is
further remarkable to observe that the average satisfaction of the strategic peers does not exceed their
satisfaction threshold (60%), indicating that peers indeed cannot receive more resources than what
they have contributed to the network.
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Table 3.1: Performance of HR and LR Peers for Different Policies.
HR Cap:7Mb/s AvBand/Req (Mb/s) AvBand/prd (Mb/s) AvSatisf
LR Cap:7Mb/s HR LR HR LR HR LR
BRR 2.15 1.90 8.60 3.80 0.33 0.31
RA 2.19 1.94 8.76 3.88 0.69 0.64
ERA (a=1) 1.70 2.90 6.80 5.80 0.57 0.82
ERA (a=2) 1.56 3.19 6.24 6.38 0.51 0.87
3.5.5 Peers with Heterogeneous Request Generation Rates
In this section we investigate a system of 100 peers with heterogeneous request generation rates. All
peers have the same upload capacity of 7 Mb/s and their demands are uniformly distributed between
1 and 7 Mb/s during simulation time. However, 50% of the peers are high rate (HR) peers generating
4 requests per period, while 50% of them are lower rate (LR) peers generating 2 requests per period.
In Table 3.1 we can see the average bandwidth per request, the average bandwidth per period and the
average satisfaction of the high rate and the low rate peers, when policies BRR, RA and ERA with
a = 1 or a = 2 are used by all peers.
We note that with BRR and RA, HR and LR peers gain almost the same average bandwidth per
request and that HR peers gain almost twice as much bandwidth per period as LR peers (as they
produce twice as much requests per period as LR peers). These policies are not fair for LR peers and
actually motivate peers to produce a lot of requests in the system to improve their performance, in
cost of other contributive peers. In order to cope with this case we use ERA. It is remarkable that by
using ERA with a= 1, HR peers have a smaller average bandwidth per request than LR peers, leading
to just a slight more bandwidth per period than LR peers. ERA with a = 2 is even more restrictive for
HR peers, leading to the same average bandwidth per period for both HR and LR peers.
In Table 3.2 we consider that (a) HR peers have a capacity of 7 Mb/s while LR peers have a
capacity of 3 MB/s and that (b) HR peers have a capacity of 3 Mb/s while LR peers have a capacity of
7 Mb/s. We can see that when high rate peers are the strong capacity ones, even with ERA and a = 2
they receive better service per period than lower capacity ones since they provide more resources
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Table 3.2: Performance of HR and LR Peers for Different Policies and Capacities.
HR Cap:7Mb/s AvBand/Req (Mb/s) AvBand/prd (Mb/s) AvSatisf
LR Cap:3Mb/s HR LR HR LR HR LR
BRR 1.60 1.52 6.40 3.04 0.23 0.23
RA 1.80 1.10 7.20 2.20 0.60 0.43
ERA (a=1) 1.53 1.63 6.12 3.26 0.54 0.56
ERA (a=2) 1.31 2.05 5.25 4.11 0.48 0.64
HR Cap:3Mb/s AvBand/Req (Mb/s) AvBand/prd (Mb/s) AvSatisf
LR Cap:7Mb/s HR LR HR LR HR LR
BRR 1.44 1.39 5.76 2.78 0.21 0.21
RA 1.43 1.83 5.71 3.66 0.51 0.61
ERA (a=1) 1.08 2.52 4.33 5.04 0.39 0.74
ERA(a=2) 1.04 2.60 4.17 5.20 0.36 0.76
than them. On the other hand, when HR peers are the low capacity ones, their performance is much
restricted by ERA policies. It is like punishing weak peers for their excess requests, since they are
not able to provide the relative services to the system.
These results reveal the fairness of the enhanced proposed allocation policy, which guarantees
that peers will be able to receive resources in proportion to their contributions. We further reach
the same conclusion for any other cases of request rates, peer populations and capabilities that we
examined. When the request rates of all peers are the same, ERA is almost identical with RA. We say
“almost” because when the reputation-based server selection policy is used, ERA slightly favors the
most reputed peers since most of the requests are directed there.
3.6 Summary
In this chapter we presented a reputation-based framework to fairly regulate the exchange of one ser-
vice in p2p like systems of peers with different contribution and consumption profiles. We observed
that the proposed policies shield the system from (a) misbehaving peers and whitewashers, (b) strate-
gic peers who seek to maximize their satisfaction with the least possible effort/contributions and (c)
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peers who generate much more requests than the others without contributing a proportional amount
of resources. The aforementioned peers neither can exploit the system nor can harm the performance
of the other peers. In fact, peers can only receive resources in proportion to their contributions; the
higher demands and the more requests a peer has, the more resources he will have to contribute in
order to satisfy his needs in a loaded network. Moreover, we presented how our policies greatly out-
perform previous representative reputation scheme which cannot differentiate peers according to their
contribution levels, but solely binary categorize them in altruistic and egotistic. Under such schemes,
all cooperative peers, irrespective of the QoS they offer, have the same reputation and finally perceived
satisfaction from their requests, lacking incentives to improve their contributions.
Peers benefit by using our proposed policies as they tend to favor/satisfy those peers, who have
been more contributive to them, and with whom more future collaboration is expected. Consequently,
peers of similar capabilities and needs are dynamically self grouped, in order to improve their per-
ceived satisfaction from the network. The proposed allocation scheme is adaptive to network changes
(e.g., peer arrivals and departures) and can be implemented in a distributed manner at each peer inde-
pendently of the others. The only information that is passed from one peer to another is the requested
amount of resources.
Part of the work described in this chapter has been published in the following journal and confer-
ence proceedings:
* A.Satsiou, L.Tassiulas, Dynamic Cooperation Enforcement through Trust-based Allocation
Policies, in Proc. of the 4th EURO-NGI International Conference on Next Generation Internet
Networks, Krakow, Poland, 28-30 April 2008.
* A.Satsiou, L.Tassiulas, Trust-Based Exchange of Services to Motivate Cooperation in P2P Net-
works, accepted for publication in Peer-to-Peer Networking and Applications Journal, Springer.
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Reputation-Based Framework for P2P
Multiple Services (MS) Systems
4.1 Introduction
Chapter 3 and related work reported in section 2.1 are focused in the case that one single service is
exchanged in the network (e.g., processing power [11], bandwidth [9], etc). However, many peers
may be weak in providing a certain service and although they are cooperative enough they cannot
increase their reputation, and thus their revenue, because of their low capability in providing this
particular service. In a multiple services network, users can benefit by exchanging different kind of
services according to their needs and capabilities.
In this chapter we extend our reputation-based policies introduced in chapter 3 to apply to systems
where more than one services may be exchanged and to overcome the various difficulties arisen in
such systems, as already underlined in section 1.4. The goal is to foster cooperation and help peers
recognize and transact with other peers with whom they can mutually benefit.
The main contributions of this chapter can be summarized as follows:
59
Institutional Repository - Library & Information Centre - University of Thessaly
09/12/2017 03:02:41 EET - 137.108.70.7
60 Chapter 4
a) we propose a reputation vector consisting of the reputations of the peers in providing each
system service, based on which allocation decisions are taken,
b) we extend our allocation policies to form RA-MS and ERA-MS in order to incorporate the
reputation vectors of the competing peers, as well as the service evaluation profile of the server
in the allocation decisions,
c) we adapt our server selection policy to multiple services systems (RS-MS) and finally,
c) we evaluate our scheme via simulations to various setups of peers with different contribution,
consumption and service evaluation profiles, newcomers and misbehaving peers, and present
the performance gains compared to related work [2] in multiple services systems.
The remainder of chapter 4 is organized as follows. Section 4.2 presents the system model and
section 4.3 describes the proposed reputation-based exchange framework for multiple services, and
potential application scenarios. In section 4.4 we discuss the performance evaluation details and in
section 4.5 we exhibit the results, providing comparison results with related work in multiple services
systems. Finally, section 4.6 summarizes this chapter.
4.2 Model Description
We consider a p2p network of N peers who provide and consume multiple computing resources,
defined as services. Services being exchanged could be processing power, storage, bandwidth, etc.
Each peer in the system has different capabilities in providing each service of the system, expressed
by his capability profile. For S services in the system, the capability profile of a peer i is Ci =
{Ci1, ....,CiS}, where Cis represents the capability of peer i in providing service s.
Each peer is further characterized by his service value profile Vi = {Vi1, ..., ViS}, where Vis rep-
resents the value put from peer i on a unit of service s, according to peer i’s particular needs or other
subjective criteria, like the importance of one service compared to the importance of another one.
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Hence, we consider that each time a peer i donates a unit of service s, he incurs a cost of Vis, whilst
each time he receives a unit of resource s, he has a profit of Vis. Several possibilities are considered for
the distribution of the values of peers for the various services; they are either (a) all equal to 1, or (b)
randomly chosen in [0,1], or (c) correlated with the capabilities of peers in providing the correspond-
ing services. Last case is considered under the concept that if a peer is weak in providing a certain
service, he incurs a high cost in donating it and a high profit in receiving it. It is like peers value the
various services of the system based on their own supply and demand. This is reasonable, given that
peers mostly need services that they cannot produce by themselves, as in p2p grids. However, there
may be systems where peers are weak in providing services which they do not need; thus these ser-
vices’ values are low to the corresponding peers. Hence, the most general case is (b), where each peer
is requested to value the services he provides and requests with a value between 0 and 1, according
to his own criteria. Service value and capability profiles do not need to be global information, but are
somehow revealed by the reputation and allocation mechanisms, as we will see in the sequel.
Finally, each peer has his own consumption profile Mi = {{Di1,Gi1}, ..., {DiS,GiS}}, where Dis
represents the average demands of peer i for service m and Gis represents the average request genera-
tion rate of peer i for service s. The demands of peer i for service s are uniformly distributed between
[minDis,maxDis], according to the particular needs of each peer i for service s.
We consider that our system progresses in periods. In each period, each peer i generates gi
requests. Each one of the gi requests is for a service s with probability pis, such that gi× pis = Gis. In
each one of his requests, peer i reports his demands for the requested service s which can be certain
bandwidth, storage, CPU cycles, etc, for Bag-Of-Tasks [72] or other applications and are expressed
by Dpi js, where j denotes the server for the given request and p the period during which the request
took place. As explained in chapter 3 peers act both as servers and clients simultaneously. A peer
as a client selects the server to which he will direct his request either randomly or based on some
attributes that indicate the quality of service he may expect from the requested service. A peer as a
server collects at every period the requests that have been directed to him and allocates his available
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resources according to one of the proposed allocation policies. The service is not granted for more
than a period, in order to give the chance for other peers to access it. Every new period, peers redirect
their requests to the same or possibly other servers aiming at improving their received quality of
service. In case of long-running applications peers should engage in continuous periods of resource
competition.
4.3 Reputation-based Policies for MS systems
4.3.1 Reputation vector
In this section we describe the reputation vector we propose for MS systems. Each peer i keeps a
reputation vector consisting of the local reputations of all other peers for all the services provided in
the system, i.e., Rpi = {Rpi js,∀ j,s}, where Rpi js represents the local reputation of peer j to peer i for
service s at a given period p, and is calculated as follows: if in a given period p, a peer i demands a
certain amount of service s, Dpi js, from a peer j and finally receives an amount of x
p
i js ≤ Dpi js during
this period, then the ratio xpi js/D
p
i js represents how much peer j satisfied his needs for service s in this
period. Then, he can calculate the local reputation of peer j in providing service s at a given period p
by following the formula:
Rpi js =
1
Reqpi js
∑
t∈T pi js
xti js
Dti js
, (4.1)
where Reqpi js is the total number of i’s past bandwidth requests from peer j for service s till period
p and T pi js denotes the set of the specific periods in which peer i requested service s from peer j, till
period p. In the same way, the reputation of any peer is calculated.
Each peer i further keeps a vector with the overall local reputations of all other peers R̂pi =
{R̂pi j,∀ j}. The overall reputation of peer j to peer i at a given period p, R̂pi j, is given by averaging the
satisfaction ratios of peer i from all his service requests from server j till period p. Overall reputation
reflects the general tendency of a peer to satisfy his requesters, irrespective of the requested services;
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whenever it falls down a threshold, called misbehavior threshold, peer is considered to misbehave.
New peers in the system are awarded an initial small reputation for each service, higher than the
misbehavior threshold, in order to have the chance to receive some resources. If they prove to be
collaborative enough, their reputation will increase, permitting them to improve their performance.
As for the SS systems studied in chapter 3, we have seen that a history of 10 past and most recent
transactions for a given service is enough to evaluate one’s local reputation for the particular service.
Therefore, each time a peer i completes 10 transactions with peer j for service s, he starts replacing
the oldest rating transactions/satisfaction ratios with newer ones, always keeping a history/log of, at
the most, 10 most recent transactions with peer j and service s, keeping the overhead low. If the log
has fewer inputs (e.g., due to limited interactions with peer j for service s), reputations are calculated
based only on those. In order to clarify these issues, we describe the following example. Suppose that
there are 2 services provided in the system, s1 and s2. If peer i has the following recent log for peer j in
providing service s1, (0.1,0.3,0,0.6,0.4,0,0,1,0,0), and the following log for service s2 (0,0.1,0.2,0.1),
he calculates the local reputation of peer j for s1 as (0.1+0.3+0+0.6+0.4+0+0+1+0+0)/10=
2.4/10= 0.24 and the local reputation of peer j for s2 as (0+0.1+0.2+0.1)/4= 0.4/4= 0.1. Peer
i can also calculate the local overall reputation of peer j as (2.4+0.4)/14 = 0.2.
4.3.2 Reputation-based Allocation Policy for MS systems (RA-MS)
In this section we consider that peers may exchange more than one services. We extend the RA
policy for multiple services p2p systems, regarding the peers’ service evaluation profiles. Suppose
that a peer j receives in a given period p, n requests for a given service s and his capacity for service s
is C js. We use the vector I= {I1, ...In} for representing the different requesters of peer j with demands
expressed by DpIi js, i ∈ {1, ..,n}. Then, we propose that peer j will allocate C js in order to solve the
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maximization problem:
max
n
∑
i=1
S
∑
m=1
(Vjm×RpjIim)
xpIi js
DpIi js
s.t.
n
∑
i=1
xpIi js ≤C js and x
p
Ii js ≤ D
p
Ii js∀i, (4.2)
where xpIi js represents the allocated resource of peer j to peer Ii for service s during period p.
In practice, each peer values a service with different criteria. According to this service valuation
each peer should be able to recognize and favor those who better provide him with the most valuable
services. Towards this goal, under RA-MS each server multiplies his requesters’ reputations for a
given service with the value of the service, as estimated by himself. The allocated resources to each
competing peer depend on the weighted sum of the peer’s reputations in providing each service of the
system, where the weights are the corresponding values of the services, as estimated by the server. By
weighting reputations in the allocation decision, the server j provides more resources to those peers
who have offered him more satisfaction (captured by their reputations) in the services he values more,
in order to repay them and foster their bond.
Indeed, the simulation results of section 4.5 show that the utilities of peers progressively improve
throughout their lifetime in the system, indicating the formation of bonds (coalitions) between peers
who mutually benefit by their transactions, when (a) all peers of the system have homogeneous service
value profiles (section 4.5.1), (b) peers have random service value profiles (section 4.5.2), (c) their
service value profiles are correlated with their capability profiles (section 4.5.3) and finally, (d) their
service value profiles change through time (section 4.5.5).
As in RA, in case that only one peer is competing for the available resources of a server for a given
service, the server will completely satisfy his demands, unless peer’s overall reputation is below the
misbehavior threshold. The solution of (4.2) can be found following the same procedure as in RA.
Similarly, it can be proved that peers with the highest weighted reputation per unit resource request
will receive the highest satisfaction.
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4.3.3 Enhanced Reputation-based Allocation Policy for MS systems (ERA-
MS)
ERA policy can also be extended for the multiple services case by applying (4.3). Peer j will share
his available resources to Ii competing peers for service s by solving:
max
n
∑
i=1
S
∑
m=1
[
(
ReqpjIim
ReqpIi jm
)a×Vjm×RpjIim
]
xpIi js
DpIi js
,
s.t
n
∑
i=1
xpIi js ≤C js and x
p
Ii js ≤ D
p
Ii js∀i, (4.3)
where ReqpjIim is the total number of requests for service m that peer j has sent to peer Ii till period p.
Compared to RA-MS, under ERA-MS each requester’s reputation is further weighted by the ratio
of the server’s load (number of requests) served by the requester over the requester’s load served by
the server. The simulation results of section 4.5.7 demonstrate the benefits of ERA-MS compared to
RA-MS in systems of peers with heterogeneous request generation profiles.
4.3.4 Reputation-based Server Selection Policy for MS systems (RS-
MS)
In a similar way as in SS systems after the acquaintance duration, the probability with which a peer
i directs his request to a peer j for a service s at a given period p is directly proportional to peer j’s
local reputation to i, for service s, as
ppi js = R
p
i js/ ∑
k∈Spi
Rpiks, (4.4)
where Spi is the set of all peer i’s transacting peers till period p.
Service discovery issues are out of the scope of this dissertation but we rather consider that an
underlying resource discovery mechanism, like NodeWiz [73] would be responsible to inform new-
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comers about their potential servers. A NodeWiz network consists of peers responsible to store ad-
verts from service providers and answer to client queries. What service requesters and providers need
to know is solely the address of one peer of the NodeWiz network, to which they will submit queries
and advertise their own services. A query answer will contain a subset of those peers who match
the request specification. Service requesters can then use our policies to recognize among suggested
servers, the appropriate partners with whom they can improve their utility from the system, according
to their capability, consumption and service evaluation profiles. The only information that they need
to obtain from the system is the IP addresses of the peers who claim to provide the requested services,
neither their reputations nor their profiles, which may be falsely advertised in the service discovery
mechanism.
4.3.5 Application Scenarios
Our extended framework for multiple services systems can be used in p2p grids, like OurGrid [74],
which support Bag-of-Tasks (BoT) applications. BoT [72] are parallel applications whose tasks do
not communicate among themselves during execution; thus, the failure of one task does not affect
another. Our policies can be applied to control the allocation of multiple services for the execution of
tasks, such as processing power, disk space and data transfers in order to improve the cooperation and
performance of peers. Service discovery issues (i.e., the IP addresses of suggested servers for a given
service request) in grids can be supported by NodeWiz [73]. In section 4.5, we provide comparison
results of our policies with a reciprocity scheme proposed for multiple services exchange in OurGrid.
Furthermore, there are several recent research and commercial efforts towards enabling peer-to-
peer communities of users sharing Internet access through their wireless access points for mobile
use [43, 75]. The cooperation between the existed wireless access points in a close proximity neigh-
borhood could lead to the formation of wireless neighborhood communities [52]. These communities
can provide even other kind of services to its users, like additional network capacity (e.g., for content
distribution or games), the sharing of other resources such as storage (e.g., for backup services) and
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content (file sharing or caching). Our scheme could fit in such kind of communities to ensure that
the underlying network is formed among trusted and contributive users and control the exchange of
different kind of services (from the network to the application layer); however, the investigation of
these issues are left for future work.
4.4 Performance Evaluation
4.4.1 Simulation Model
We have developed an event-driven simulator in C++ to evaluate the performance of our policies over
a system with two different services being exchanged. We simulate a p2p network of 100 peers with
different capability, service value and consumption profiles, as detailed described in each subsection.
We have also tested our policies in much bigger networks and report our results.
In both parts of our analysis all peers start with a small initial reputation for each service of 0.07
in order to bootstrap the system. Overall reputation threshold (called misbehavior threshold), below
which a peer is denied service, even when he is the only one competing for resources is set to 0.01.
Acquaintance duration time is set to 100 periods, while the total simulation time is 1000 periods,
unless otherwise stated. The remaining simulation parameters vary and are determined in each of the
following sections.
4.4.2 Comparison with other schemes
In order to exhibit the benefits of our proposed allocation framework for the multiple services case,
we make comparison results with another related scheme. In the following we briefly describe it and
discuss how it corresponds to our model.
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Scheme in [2]
The scheme in [2], similarly with RA-MS, takes into consideration the service evaluation profiles of
the peers represented by their service cost and utility functions. Two allocation policies are proposed:
PosInt that relies on knowledge of all peer’s service evaluation profiles and, thus, is not applicable
in real systems, and ExtNetFav with which we compare our scheme, as in both of them (our scheme
and ExtNetFav) peers are totally unaware of other peers’ service evaluation profiles. In [2] instead of
using reputations, they use a metric called cost balance. Each peer keeps a record of this number for
each other peer with which it interacts, which is calculated as follows: Before two peers have ever
interacted, the cost balance is set to zero. If peer A offers requested service to peer B, A decreases his
cost balance with interactions with B by the cost of donating particular service (if cost balance falls
below zero, it is set to zero) and B increases his cost balance with his own cost of donating the partic-
ular service. As far as the allocation policy is concerned, a provider selects to serve at a given period
the candidate peer with the highest cost balance. As far as the server selection policy is concerned,
peers at a given period select all the servers in a random order, seeking someone to serve them. In
our model, we consider that every unsuccessful trial leads to an unsatisfied request. In order to have
a direct comparison with our scheme, we consider that peers using ExtNetFav generate the same
number of service requests per period, as with RA-MS, and direct them to randomly chosen servers.
Described scheme will be denoted as ENF in the figures of this chapter, standing for ExtNetFav.
It is important to note that our model under which ENF and RA-MS are compared in this chapter,
is a more demanding model than the one considered in [2]. First, [2] evaluates ENF in a system of
peers with the same capability profiles, assuming that the capabilities of a given server are enough
to satisfy any requesters’ demands. However, the peers’ satisfactions in our model depend on their
heterogeneous capability and consumption profiles. ENF scheme is oblivious to peers’ demands
and therefore the peers’ satisfactions under this scheme are expected to be lower than with RA-
MS. Second, in [2] it is considered that at a given period peers select all servers in a random order.
Therefore, the chance of an unsatisfied request during a period in this model is much less than in
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our model, where peers generate on average a specific number of service requests per period directed
to specific peers. Under our policies, these specific peers are expected to be the appropriate servers
for the given requests, following our reputation-based server selection policy. However, this is not
the case for ENF, where servers are selected randomly. Third, [2] assumes that peers can be either
consumers or providers with a certain probability at a given period, while in our model peers can be
consumers and producers at the same time (e.g., providing service type A and consuming service type
B). Finally, [2] considers that the utility of a peer receiving a unit of a given service is greater than the
cost of donating it to someone else, while our model considers a more demanding scenario according
to which the cost of donating a unit of a given service is equal to the profit of obtaining it and equal
to its value for the corresponding peer.
4.4.3 Performance Metrics
As for the SS systems, the goals of our proposed policies for MS systems is to motivate peers to co-
operate and improve their contribution level by guaranteing that their satisfaction from their services’
requests will be proportional to their contributions. Towards this goal we define the global reputation
and average satisfaction vectors.
The global reputation vector of a peer i at a period p is given by GRpi = {GRpi1, ...GRpiS}, where
GRpis = ∑∀ j 6=i
Rpjis/ (N − 1) , i.e., the global reputation of peer i for service s and period p is taken
by averaging the individual opinions of every other peer j in the system for peer i and service s
(local reputations) at period p. The global reputation of a peer actually reflects his capability and
cooperation, as captured by the whole system (aggregate of peers). We clarify that under our scheme,
global reputations are only used for performance analysis; peers keep and use only local reputations.
We further calculate the average satisfaction vector Stpi = {St pi1, ...,St piS} of each peer i in the
system. The average satisfaction of peer i for service s until period p, St pis, is given by summing his
satisfaction ratios in each one of his transactions with all other peers for service s and averaging over
the total number of his requests for service s till period p.
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Another goal of our policies for MS systems is to help peers find the appropriate partners with
whom they can mutually benefit and improve their utility from the network, by exchanging different
kind of services. We define the utility of peer i at a given period p, U pi , as follows:
U pi =
S
∑
s=1
[
Vis× RT
p
is −RF pis
RT pis +RF
p
is
]
/
S
∑
s=1
Vis (4.5)
where, RF pis and RT
p
is are the average resources per period offered and obtained respectively by a
given peer i for each service s till period p, measured in the units of each service. We divide by
RT pis +RF
p
is in order to weigh units of different services. The utility of a peer represents his net benefit
by exchanging services in the system, given his own valuations for the various services.
Last, we define another metric, inspired by work in [2], to test the system under severe misbehav-
ior. The average net benefit of a cooperative peer should be higher than that of a misbehaving one in
the system who does not contribute any resources, i.e.,
∑
i∈C
S
∑
s=1
(Vis× (RTis−RFis))/ |C|
−∑
j∈B
S
∑
s=1
(Vjs×RTjs)/ |B|> 0⇒
MI =
∑
i∈C
S
∑
s=1
(Vis×RFis)
∑
i∈C
S
∑
s=1
(Vis×RTis)− |C||B| ∑
j∈B
S
∑
s=1
(Vjs×RTjs)
< 1 (4.6)
where C, B, are the set of collaborative and misbehaving peers respectively and MI stands for
Misbehavior Indicator and expresses how well the system marginalizes misbehaving peers. MI must
be positive and smaller than 1 in order for the system to block misbehaving peers. More specifically,
the smaller MI is from 1, the better the marginalization of misbehaving peers.
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Table 4.1: Capabilities of each category peers.
Category i 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Ci1 9 8 7 6 5 4 3 2 1 0
Ci2(×102) 0 5 6 7 8 9 10 11 12 13
4.5 Simulation Results for the Multiple Services Case
In this section we present the results from the analysis of a system where two different services are
being exchanged, as it is the most simple case and easily presented. We further experimented with
different cases of more than two services being exchanged in the system, and the conclusions of the
analysis remained the same.
In our first experiment we consider that the 100 peers of the system are separated in 10 categories
of 10 peers. Peers of the same category have the same capabilities in providing each service. In Table
4.1 we see the capabilities of peers in each category i for service 1 and service 2 (Cis, s = (1,2)).
Variable i represents a given category. Peers of category 1 can provide the best service 1 but no
service 2, while peers of category 10 provide the best service 2 among other peers but no service
1. The rest of the peers provide one service better than the other or provide both services equally
well compared with all other peers’ capabilities (e.g., peers of category 6). We consider that all peers
have the same consumption profile, i.e., demands of all peers take values with equal probability in
the set {1,2,3,4,5,6,7} for service 1 and in the set {1,3,5,7,9,10,11,13}×102 for service 2 and each
peer produces 3 requests per period for service 1 or 2 with equal probability, unless otherwise stated.
Service 1 could be bandwidth, for example, measured in Mb/s, while service 2 could be CPU cycles.
We just use a case of different units to test the performance of our system which, though, works for
any kind of services measured in any units.
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Table 4.2: RA-MS Performance metrics of all categories peers for Vi = {1,1}∀i.
Cat. i GRi1 GRi2 Sti1 Sti2 ri1 ri2 Ui
1 0.77 0.01 0.58 0.60 17.9 0.30 0.40
2 0.74 0.57 0.72 0.75 16.0 7.60 0.10
3 0.74 0.62 0.71 0.77 15.1 8.50 0.10
4 0.71 0.63 0.74 0.76 12.0 10.0 0.10
5 0.68 0.66 0.73 0.73 9.70 8.90 0.05
6 0.65 0.67 0.75 0.74 9.10 11.0 0.10
7 0.55 0.66 0.74 0.67 8.20 12.5 0.09
8 0.45 0.72 0.68 0.72 7.90 14.2 0.16
9 0.31 0.72 0.67 0.65 4.60 13.3 0.19
10 0.00 0.74 0.55 0.59 0.50 13.6 0.40
4.5.1 Homogeneous Service Value Profiles (HSP)
In Table 4.2 we see the various performance metrics in the steady state, when all categories have the
same value profile, i.e., Vi = {1,1}∀i. Variables ri1, ri2 are the average percentage of requests directed
to peers of category i for service 1 and 2 respectively. The following tables exhibit the average values
of the various performance metrics over all peers of a given category. We see that the reputation of
each category for each service is in proportion to the category’s capability in providing the service.
This shows that the reputation vectors satisfactorily capture the capabilities of the peers. The above
can also be shown from ri1, ri2 metrics. We see that the highest percentage of requests for service 1 is
directed to the first category of peers who can best provide it.
In Table 4.2 we further see that peers have exchanged different type of services in the system as
although category 1 peers cannot provide service 2, their satisfaction from requests for this service
is good since they exchanged it with service 1, indicated by GR11. Moreover, the average utilities of
all peers are positive, i.e, peers benefit by their transactions. In general, Sti2 > Sti1; this is due to the
fact that the supply for service 2 is more than for service 1 compared to the corresponding demands
in this case study.
In Table 4.3 we see the performance metrics when ENF scheme is applied, apart from global rep-
utations which are not defined in this scheme (ENF uses the concept of cost balance). By comparing
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Table 4.3: ENF Performance metrics of all categories peers for Vi = {1,1}∀i.
Cat. i Sti1 Sti2 ri1 ri2 Ui
1 0.39 0.49 0.10 0.10 0.27
2 0.39 0.48 0.10 0.10 -0.15
3 0.42 0.48 0.10 0.10 -0.15
4 0.44 0.48 0.10 0.10 -0.15
5 0.42 0.47 0.10 0.10 -0.15
6 0.45 0.48 0.10 0.10 -0.17
7 0.48 0.47 0.10 0.10 -0.06
8 0.47 0.50 0.10 0.10 -0.01
9 0.48 0.50 0.10 0.10 0.08
10 0.46 0.49 0.10 0.10 0.27
the performance metrics in the two tables we can see that both the satisfactions and utilities of peers
are higher in our scheme. While we evaluated the two schemes under the same scenario, RA-MS
seems to make a better allocation of the system resources.
In Fig.4.1 we further see the dynamics of RA-MS metrics for category 1 peers, as the system
evolves in periods. After the first 100 periods (acquaintance duration), peers start selecting their
servers based on their reputation, according to the reputation-based server selection policy. We see
that the utility and the satisfactions of the peers progressively increase after the initial 100 periods,
indicating that peers form coalitions which benefit their transactions.
4.5.2 Random Service Value Profiles (RSP)
In Table 4.4a we see the average satisfactions of all categories’ peers for randomly chosen service
values for RA-MS and ENF schemes and in Fig.4.2a and Fig.4.2b the utilities of all categories’ peers
as the system evolves in periods for RA-MS and ENF, respectively. For RA-MS it is very interesting
to see that, although initially in the system many peers have negative utilities, after the acquaintance
duration time the utility of all categories increase. Fig.4.2a shows that although the utility of category
8 increases, it still remains negative. This most probably happens because category 8 peers put a very
small value on the service that they are weak in producing it compared to the very high value they
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Figure 4.1: Performance metrics for category 1 peers as the system evolves.
put on the service that they are strong (which is quite unusual, as highlighted in section 4.2). From
eq.(4.5) it is obvious that these peers will have negative utility, unless they could be able to choose
among many more peers with a higher capability than theirs in providing service 2. The important
conclusion of this analysis is that proposed policies help peers in recognizing trading partners with
whom they can all benefit from their cooperation and improve their utility from the network. The
maximum utility that a peer can gain, depends on the service value profiles of all the peers and the
available resources of the system. When ENF scheme is used, the utilities of all peers are lower than
those in RA-MS even in the early peers’ transactions. Actually, most of them are negative, revealing
the peers’ failure to transact with the appropriate partners. Our simulations have shown that the same
conclusions also apply for different cases of peers’ demands, capabilities and network load.
4.5.3 Service Value Profiles Correlated With Capability Profiles (CSP)
Table 4.4b, Fig.4.2c and Fig.4.2d show the results for the case that the service values are related to the
service capabilities, i.e., categories 1-4 peers put a double value on service 2, which they are weak in
producing it, categories 7-10 put a double value on service 1, which they are weak in producing it and
category 5 and 6 put equal values on both services, which they can equally well provide. Once more
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Table 4.4: Satisfactions for (a) RSP and (b) CSP for RA-MS and ENF policies.
(a)
Cat. Sti1 Sti2 Sti1 Sti2 Vi1 Vi2
i RA-MS RA-MS ENF ENF
1 0.45 0.49 0.32 0.39 0,99 0,38
2 0.68 0.70 0.34 0.40 0,38 0,37
3 0.69 0.72 0.33 0.4 0,33 0,45
4 0.67 0.72 0.33 0.41 0,31 0,96
5 0.71 0.71 0.31 0.41 0,29 0,94
6 0.66 0.73 0.33 0.42 0,10 0,80
7 0.71 0.72 0.33 0.42 0,09 0,71
8 0.70 0.72 0.34 0.42 0,06 0,94
9 0.70 0.69 0.35 0.42 0,26 0,47
10 0.62 0.67 0.36 0.4 0,50 0,44
(b)
Cat. Sti,1 Sti,2 Sti,1 Sti,2 Vi,1 Vi,2
i RA-MS RA-MS ENF ENF
1 0.49 0.63 0.30 0.41 1 2
2 0.65 0.76 0.30 0.39 1 2
3 0.68 0.76 0.36 0.38 1 2
4 0.66 0.76 0.36 0.39 1 2
5 0.69 0.71 0.33 0.40 1 1
6 0.72 0.71 0.36 0.39 1 1
7 0.73 0.67 0.38 0.38 2 1
8 0.70 0.67 0.38 0.39 2 1
9 0.67 0.63 0.39 0.39 2 1
10 0.61 0.55 0.38 0.37 2 1
we can see from the comparison of related figures that the utilities of all categories peers are highly
improved when our scheme is used instead of ENF, indicating that with our policies we can achieve a
more efficient allocation of the system’s resources.
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Figure 4.2: Utilities of all categories peers for (a) RA-MS and RSP, (b) ENF and RSP, (c) RA-MS and
CSP and (d) ENF and CSP.
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Table 4.5: Utilities of each category of peers for different populations
Cat. i
RSP CSP
N = 102 N = 106 N = 102 N = 106
1 0.03 0.18 0.55 0.63
2 0.03 0.02 0.14 0.08
3 0.08 0.04 0.11 0.05
4 0.08 0.03 0.08 0.02
5 0.05 0.01 0.05 0.01
6 0.05 -0.01 0.07 0.01
7 0.01 -0.03 0.13 0.08
8 -0.02 -0.01 0.20 0.14
9 0.13 0.12 0.30 0.30
10 0.47 0.47 0.57 0.64
4.5.4 Peers’ Utilities in Bigger Populations
We were interested in examining the performance of the system and the formation of coalitions in
much bigger peers’ populations. Therefore, we performed experiments with a population of 106
peers splitting in the 10 equal size categories of Table 4.1, and used the same system parameters as
we did for the population of 100 peers. In Table 4.5 we can see the utilities of all category peers
after 1000 rounds both for the case of RSP examined in section 4.5.2 and the case of CSP examined
in section 4.5.3 for the two populations. Interestingly, we can see that even in such big populations,
peers succeed in finding the appropriate partners for them in order to benefit from the system (positive
utilities). For the RSP case, some peers’ categories (6,7,8) have very small negative values of utilities
close to 0. As we already reported in section 4.5.2, this is due to the fact that these peers put a very
small value on the service that they are weak in producing it compared to the very high value they put
on the service that they are strong. For the CSP case all categories peers have positive utilities and
it is notable that peers who are the strongest in providing a certain service receive the highest utility
among others. This is even more pronounced in the bigger population.
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Table 4.6: Dynamic service value profiles.
Cat. i Vi1 Vi2 Vi1 Vi2
500th prd 500th prd
1 0.19 0.43 0.04 0.96
2 0.96 0.92 0.88 0.42
3 0.15 0.48 0.45 0.36
4 0.76 0.47 0.43 0.86
5 0.31 0.74 0.97 0.00
6 0.51 0.71 0.57 0.01
7 0.78 0.30 0.21 0.72
8 0.92 0.10 0.52 0.81
9 0.25 0.70 0.30 0.82
10 0.25 0.67 0.63 0.59
4.5.5 Dynamic Service Value Profiles
In previous sections we showed that under RA-MS peers with different service evaluation and capa-
bility profiles tend to form coalitions in order to improve their utility. In this section we would like to
see how these coalitions are dynamically reformatted when the peers’ evaluations of the services vary
through time. We consider the extreme case that all peers change their service evaluation in the 500th
period and we see how fast peers adapt to this change. In the beginning of the simulation time, the
service evaluation profiles of all category peers have been selected randomly and can be seen in the
first two columns of Table 4.6. From the 500th period and beyond, the new service evaluation profiles
of the peers, which have also been randomly selected, can be seen in the next two columns of Table
4.6.
In Fig.4.3 we can see the utility of all category peers as the time evolves. It is indicative that
after the service reevaluation in the 500th period, peers’ utilities adapt to the new network conditions.
Just 100 periods were enough for peers’ utilities to reach the new steady state of the system. We can
further see that category 1 peers benefit by changing their service value profile. Actually after the
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Figure 4.3: Utilities of all categories peers for dynamic service value profiles.
500th period they give an even higher value to the service that they cannot produce by themselves,
thus they tend to even more favor peers who can produce it. Not all category peers seem to benefit
from the new service evaluation establishment. As we have already underlined in previous sections,
peers’ benefit of the system further depends on the capabilities and service evaluation of the other
peers in the system. Our policies help peers to recognize and trade with partners with whom they can
mutually benefit. If no such partners exist in the network, the peers’ utilities can not be very high.
4.5.6 Performance of Misbehaving Peers
Next, we consider another category consisted of misbehaving peers, category 0. Category 0 consists
of 50% of the total peers in a system of 200 peers. That is, 100 peers are collaborative, splitting in
each one of the 10 categories of table 4.1 and the rest 100 peers belong to category 0 and misbehave.
For simplicity, all service values were set to 1. In Fig.4.4, it is remarkable that although satisfactions
of misbehaving peers for each service converge to 0, misbehavior indicator MI is initially very high,
because several cooperative peers lose utility by sending their requests to misbehaving peers. How-
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Figure 4.4: Performance of misbehaving peers.
ever, after the acquaintance duration, MI systematically improves, reaching the value of 0.5. This
indicates that misbehaving peers are blocked by proposed policies, even when they constitute 50 % of
the total population. We also note that when we evaluated the performance of ENF under this scenario
we observed that in every simulation run, indicator MI had significant varying negative values, around
-20. Although the satisfactions of misbehaving peers were considerably low, they were slightly better
than those of cooperative peers, 0.27 versus 0.23. Misbehaving peers, under this scheme, succeed in
exploiting the network. Actually, as admitted by the authors of [2] themselves, when the number of
misbehaving peers is high and the peers’ request generation profile is low, peers under ENF have a
high probability of participating in interactions that will not be profitable. We believe that this is due
to two main factors: the random selection of providers and the lack of a mechanism to deny service
to misbehaving peers, even when these are the sole competitors for a resource. The divergence of our
conclusions than those in [2] for ENF about the marginalization of misbehaving peers arise from the
fact that we evaluate their scheme under a more demanding model than the one used in [2], as we
explain in detail in section 4.4.2.
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Table 4.7: Average received resources per period for HR and LR peers
Average Resources/prd
Service 1 Service 2
(×102)
HR LR HR LR
ENF 7.78 3.52 14.5 6.71
RA-MS 7.83 3.57 14.6 6.74
ERA-MS (α=1) 5.93 5.40 11.4 9.96
ERA-MS (α=2) 5.72 5.66 10.3 10.5
4.5.7 Heterogeneous Request Generation Profiles
Till now we have considered that all peers have the same request generation profile. Next, as we did
for the single service case we examine a system of peers with different request generation rates. In
Table 4.7 we consider 100 peers, 50 % of which are low rate (LR) peers generating 2 requests per
period and 50 % of which are higher rate peers (HR) generating 4 requests per period with equal
probability for each service. All peers have the same capability profile C = {7,13× 102}, the same
demand profile D = {7,13× 102} and all service values are set to 1. We investigate the average
received resources per period for each service when ENF, RA-MS and ERA-MS are used. When
ENF or RA-MS is used, HR peers receive twice more resources on average per period than LR peers,
while ERA-MS restricts the behavior of HR peers. For a = 2 both HR and LR peers receive almost
the same amount of resources per period. ERA-MS provides a fairer treatment to peers, as equally
cooperative peers receive almost the same amount of resources in a loaded network. ERA-MS could
be particular helpful in case of peers trying to exploit the network by generating a huge amount of
requests for the various services. It is notable to see that under this scenario which considers peers
of homogeneous capability, demand and service evaluation profiles, ENF performs almost identically
with RA-MS.
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4.6 Summary
In this chapter we extended the reputation-based framework, presented in chapter 3, to fairly regulate
the exchange of multiple services in p2p like systems of peers with different contribution, consump-
tion and service evaluation profiles. Our simulation studies show that our framework outperforms
previous work and leads peers to cooperation and self-organization in coalitions in order to improve
their utility. Peers’ utilities progressively improve, after the acquaintance period, irrespective of the
peers’ service values and capability profiles. This indicates the clever formation of coalitions be-
tween peers, who mutually benefit by exchanging different type of services. Peers form coalitions
autonomously, following the proposed policies, without knowing one another’s service capabilities
and evaluation profiles. Moreover, cooperation is enforced, as more contributive peers can better
satisfy their needs, while misbehavior is blocked.
Part of the work described in this chapter has been published in the following journal and confer-
ence proceedings:
* A.Satsiou, L.Tassiulas, A Trust-Based Exchange Framework for Multiple Services in P2P Sys-
tems, in Proc. of the 7th IEEE International Conference on P2P Computing, Galway, Ireland,
2-5 September 2007.
* A.Satsiou, L.Tassiulas, Trust-Based Exchange of Services to Motivate Cooperation in P2P Net-
works, accepted for publication in Peer-to-Peer Networking and Applications Journal, Springer.
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Reputation-based Framework for P2P
Single Capacity-Limited Link (SC)
Systems
5.1 Introduction
In this chapter we give the appropriate incentives for cooperation in systems of peers who use a single
capacity-limited access link both for uploading and downloading content. For brevity’s sake, we will
refer to these kind of systems as single capacity-limited link systems (SC). The main contributions of
this chapter can be summarized as follows:
a) we propose an overall allocation framework according to which each peer independently de-
cides how to allocate his available resources. On one hand, the reputation-based allocation
policies described in chapter 3 are followed, based on which each peer determines the quality
of service that he will offer to each one of his requesters according to their reputations and
demands. On the other hand, a novel capacity adaptation algorithm and rational strategies are
83
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proposed, based on which peers, being aware of the reputation system’s existence, dynamically
adapt the capacity that they dedicate for uploading and downloading in order to improve their
utility. The allocation scheme is combined with our reputation-based server selection policy,
described in section 3.3.4 to help peers select among the more reputed/contributive servers and
avoid misbehaving (non contributive) ones,
b) we evaluate our scheme via simulations to general setups of loaded file sharing networks even
for cases of heterogeneous peers and multiple uploads/downloads, exploring the fairness and
efficiency properties of our policies and demonstrating a much better performance than previ-
ous work in this area [34].
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows: Section 5.2 describes the system model.
In section 5.3 we propose a capacity allocation algorithm for rational peers along with three possible
peers’ request strategies and in section 5.4 we present the performance evaluation of our proposed
policies in general setups of p2p networks. Finally section 5.5 concludes the chapter.
5.2 Model Description
We study a p2p network of N peers, who provide and consume bandwidth for content sharing. Peers
act both as servers and clients simultaneously. We consider that the access technology does not
provide strict separation between upstream and downstream flows; therefore peers have to share their
link capacity between their uplink and downlink connections. Examples of such access technologies
include WiFi, WiMAX, Ehternet LANs, etc. There are implementation tools [77] which can be
used to appropriately adjust the uplink and downlink bandwidth for each connected user without
modifications in the access protocol, but these issues are out of the scope of this chapter and are
investigated for wireless networks in chapter 7.
We consider that each peer i is connected to the Backbone Network through an access link with
capacity Ci (measured in b/s), reflecting his available bandwidth for uploading and downloading con-
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Figure 5.1: Network Model for Single Capacity-limited Link Systems.
tent. The capacity of the backbone network is regarded sufficient to accommodate all the traffic
between the peers. The network model is depicted in Fig.5.1.
Our focus in this chapter is how to dynamically allocate in a distributed way the resources (band-
width in this case) of the p2p community among their members in a way to provide fairness and
efficiency in the system by guaranteeing that peers will be able to receive resources in proportion
to their contributions, and that all available resources will be fully exploited. These issues are more
meaningful in heavy loaded networks, where peers fight for resources. In light loaded networks,
where the available resources exceed the needs of the peers, there is no obvious necessity for incen-
tive mechanisms to force peers to contribute their resources, although in some cases peers may wish to
free ride for other reasons (e.g., uploading media files is illegal in some countries). In the latter cases,
our policies can be applied to ensure that peers will only be able to receive resources in proportion to
their contributions, motivating them to cooperate at least as much as it is needed to satisfy their own
needs. However, here we model an overloaded network as in [34], where there are always requests
for downloading and content to be downloaded, i.e., a peer community where an infinite number of
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chunks of the same file are shared, where we can investigate the efficiency of our proposed policies
in the worst possible conditions (overloaded networks). Content segmentation into chunks or content
discovery issues are out of our scope, but we rather consider that chunks can be found by any other
than the requester peer in the system.
We consider that our system progresses in periods of a fixed number of time units. Each peer
decides about the capacity that he will dedicate in a given period p for uploading to others (we will
refer to it as upload capacity in the rest of the chapter),uCpi , and the capacity that he will use for his
own needs (we will refer to it as download capacity in the rest of the chapter), dCpi . It is obvious that
uCpi +
dCpi = Ci for any p and i. We model rational peers who aim at maximizing their utility (the
amount of resources that they receive) by strategically adjusting their capacities. In the beginning of
each period each peer i connects to gi different servers simultaneously in order to receive chunks of
the file. Variable gi represents the request generation profile of each peer i; peers with higher g try to
receive more resources than other peers, during a period p.
In each one of his connections peer i reports his demands (in terms of bandwidth) for the given
request. The peers acting as servers will allocate their resources among competing peers according
to their reputations and demands, following one of our allocation policies. The service is not granted
for more than a period, in order to give the chance to other peers to access the link. Every new period,
peers redirect their requests to the same or possibly other servers aiming at improving their received
quality of service.
The combination of our proposed policies and strategies can form a resource allocation protocol
incorporated in a client/server application software. The framework of the proposed protocol can be
briefly described in the following steps for a random period p.
• Step 1: At the beginning of a period p, each peer i decides where to send his gi requests
(randomly or according to our reputation-based server selection policy described in section
3.3.4) and the amount of bandwidth he will request from each one of his servers under Basic,
Greedy or Adaptive strategy described in the following section. During his first download
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period in the system, a peer sets dCpi =Ci and
uCpi = 0. This corresponds to either newcomers,
i.e., peers who joined the system for the first time in order to download something or old peers
who were idle for some time (not downloading) and decided to begin downloading again. We
will refer to both newcomers and such old peers as “beginners”.
• Step 2: Each peer i allocates his current upload capacity uCpi over the peers’ requests that were
directed to him. If the peer is a beginner, he does not serve any request (uCpi = 0). Allocation
is performed through RA or ERA described in sections 3.3.2 and 3.3.3 respectively.
• Step 3: At the end of the period p each peer i calculates the reputation of his servers based on
the service he received from them during this period and he adjusts the capacities uCp+1i and
dCp+1i for the next period p+1, based on the capacity allocation strategy described in Algorithm
1.
Our model considers duplex connections, as it determines how a peer allocates his physical capac-
ity among his downlink and uplink streams which take place simultaneously. A more sophisticated
model could be built upon ours to further consider the bandwidth that is consumed by the acknowl-
edgments for the TCP uplink and downlink traffic. However, since this is much smaller than the actual
traffic, it is expected to have low impact on the performance of our policies.
For ease of reference, a list of notation used in this chapter is given in Table 5.1.
5.3 Rational Strategies
5.3.1 Capacity Allocation Strategy
We consider that each peer in the network seeks to maximize his utility, i.e., the amount of resources
he receives from the network. Therefore, each “beginner” will initially dedicate his whole capacity
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Table 5.1: Notation and Variable Definitions
Notation Definition
N Number of peers in the network
Ci Link capacity of peer i
dCpi Download capacity of peer i during period p
uCpi Upload capacity of peer i during period p
gi Number of requests per period of peer i
bi Capacity step of peer i
Rpi j Reputation of peer j in the eyes of peer i during period p
GRpi Global reputation of peer i during period p
Dpi j Bandwidth demands of peer i from peer j during period p
xpi j Allocated bandwidth to peer i from peer j during period p
Reqpi j Total number of requests from peer i to peer j till period p
Spi Set of transacting peers of peer i till period p
Bpi Total Bandwidth that peer i received during period p
a Variable in ERA policy to control high rate peers
only for his own needs (downloads). Under the presence of the proposed reputation system in the
network, though, the reputation of this peer will significantly fall, since he does not contribute any
resources to the network, and this will affect his performance. The existence of the reputation system
forces each peer to trade off his capacity among his upload streams, in order to increase his reputation
and thus his revenue, and his download streams.
We model rational peers who try to maximize their utility with the least possible contributions,
by progressively increasing their upload capacity till they obtain the quality of service they desire.
Therefore, if the bandwidth a given peer i receives during a period p (Bpi ) is smaller than the capacity
that he dedicates for downloading in the given period, it means that he needs to increase his coopera-
tion level in order to improve his reputation and be able to receive more resources from the network.
So, in this case peer i will increase his upload capacity by a constant bi as soon as it does not exceed
his total capacity and decrease the download capacity by the same constant bi. On the other hand,
if the peer receives as much bandwidth as his download capacity can afford, he will try to maximize
his utility by further increasing his download capacity by the constant bi for the next p+1 period, in
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cost of decreasing his upload capacity by the same constant bi. From our simulations, we saw that a
good trade-off between convergence rate and performance is succeeded in the system when each peer
i uses a bi in the order of Ci/10. Aforementioned algorithm is presented below.
Algorithm 1 Capacity Allocation Strategy for Peer i
if (Bpi <
dCpi ) AND (
uCpi <Ci−bi) then
uCp+1i =
uCpi +bi
else if (Bpi ==
dCpi ) AND (
uCpi ≥ bi) then
uCp+1i =
uCpi −bi
end if
dCp+1i =Ci− uCp+1i
Someone could argue here that a peer i may receive less bandwidth than his download capacity
in a period p, not because he is not cooperative enough but because of the existence of misbehaving
(non contributive) peers in the system. Therefore, he should not further increase his cooperation
level, i.e., his upload capacity. However, our reputation-based server selection policy refrains peers
from requesting service from misbehaving peers. Moreover, the latter cannot take advantage of the
increased cooperation level of high capacity peers, because of their low reputation, as we will see in
the sequel.
As soon as peers decide about their download capacity for a given period p, they determine their
demands from their servers according to one of the following strategies.
Basic Strategy (BS)
Under the basic strategy each peer i demands from each one of his servers in a given period p band-
width equal to dCpi /gi. Since peers split their demands uniformly between servers and are unaware of
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the other peers’ load, they may face the situation under which one of their servers cannot serve them
and another one could give them more than what they actually asked. Since servers do not allocate
more resources than the reported demands of the peers, peers may receive much less bandwidth than
what they could in a given period. In order to confront this problematic case, we propose the greedy
strategy described below.
Greedy Strategy (GS)
In the greedy strategy, each peer i requests from each one of his servers bandwidth equal to his total
current download capacity. In this way he increases the possibility of receiving more bandwidth from
an available and capable peer. If the upload capacity of a peer i is not fully exploited (because the
demands of the competing peers are less than his available upload capacity), he uses the residual ca-
pacity for downloading. However, even then, the peer’s available capacity for downloading may not
be high enough to accommodate incoming flows, e.g., when more than one servers offer bandwidth
equal to the requested one. We consider that as soon as the servers decide the portions of upload
capacity they will give to each one of their requesters at a given period p, they will reserve these
portions for their requesters’ needs for the specific period. If their requesters cannot absorb these re-
sources, they remain unexploited. Simulation results have shown that although the average bandwidth
received by each peer is increased compared to the basic strategy, a lot of bandwidth which has been
reserved for uploading is not utilized because it exceeds the download capacity of the requesters. If,
however, peers release the upload capacity committed for the certain needs of some requesters when
the latters’ download capacity cannot sustain it and use it for other requesters or their own needs, they
will make better exploitation of their resources. This is proposed in the adaptive strategy described
below.
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Adaptive Strategy (AS)
In the adaptive strategy as in the greedy strategy each peer i requests from each one of his servers
bandwidth equal to his total current download capacity; however we consider that a server can be
aware of the rate with which his requesters download data. Actually he can infer this information by
the rate with which the acknowledgments of the TCP flows arrive to him. So, if a server sends with
a rate of 6Mb/sec but the download capacity of peer i is only 4Mb/sec, then the server will receive
the acknowledgments of the sent packets with a rate of 4Mb/sec. Therefore, he decreases his rate
to peer i accordingly, and releases and spends the rest of his upload capacity to serve other peers
by using the proposed allocation policies considering the actual needs of the competing peers, or if
no other requesters exist he uses it for his own downloads. Ideally, we consider that one period is
sufficiently long for all peers to adapt their download and upload rates according to the current supply
and demand on all peers. This is an idealistic consideration; however we investigate this strategy in
order to compare it with the others.
We also note here that in case of gi = 1, all aforementioned strategies for peer i are equivalent.
5.4 Performance evaluation
5.4.1 Simulation Model
In order to evaluate the performance of our system, we simulate a p2p network of 100 peers. To
bootstrap the system, all peers start with an initial small reputation of 0.07. Reputation threshold,
below which a peer does not receive service, even when he is the only one competing for resources, is
0.01. Acquaintance duration under which new peers send their requests with equal probability to all
others, in order to have a global picture of the network is set to 50 periods. Simulation time was set
to 1000 periods. We consider that each peer i uses a constant bi equal to 0.5 Mb/s, when performing
the strategy of Algorithm 1.
Institutional Repository - Library & Information Centre - University of Thessaly
09/12/2017 03:02:41 EET - 137.108.70.7
92 Chapter 5
We run the system for different random initial reputation metrics for all peers and our simulation
results have shown that reputations quickly converge to the same steady state, as with any initial rep-
utation conditions and depend solely on the contributions of the peers. Similarly, we investigated the
system for different initial conditions for the upload and download capacities of all peers and saw that
each peer’s performance always reaches the same steady state which depends on the capacities of all
peers in the system. The performance of the system scales even to larger overlay networks; however
in larger networks the convergence time of the reputations and performance metrics increases.
We further note that for system of peers with homogeneous request generation profiles, RA policy
performs almost identically with ERA. We say “almost” because when the reputation-based server
selection policy is used, ERA slightly favors the most reputed peers, since most of the requests are
directed there. For this reason, in sections 5.4.4-5.4.6 where we study peers with the same request
generation profiles, we omit the performance of ERA policy.
In the following section we present some alternative schemes in order to highlight the benefits of
our policies in comparison to them.
5.4.2 Alternative Schemes
No Strategy (NS)
Under this scheme peers do not follow any particular strategy in determining their request demands
from the other peers. We consider that each peer i’s demands vary randomly between [1Mb/s, Ci
Mb/s]. Each peer uses his capacity to satisfy his own needs and offer the residual one (if any) to his
requesters.
Simple Allocation Policy (SA)
In order to evaluate the performance of our reputation-based allocation policies we compare them with
the simple policy, according to which a peer s allocates his upload capacity uCps to his n requesters at
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a given period p, solely by considering their request demands.
According to the simple allocation policy peer s allocates his upload capacity by using a progres-
sive filling algorithm and increasing all competing peers’ bandwidth at the same rate of 1/n until one
or several competing peers hit their limits (demands). Then he continues to increase the bandwidth of
the remaining peers at the same rate as soon as all peers hit their limits or his upload capacity is fully
utilized.
5.4.3 Performance Metrics
The average contribution level of a peer is reflected on his global reputation in the network as given by
eq.(3.5). We further calculate the average received and offered bandwidth per request and per period
for each peer, in order to evaluate the fairness and efficiency of our system. We consider that fairness
is accomplished in the system when peers consume resources in proportion to their contributions, and
efficiency is realized when all available resources are exploited in a loaded network.
5.4.4 Study of a Homogeneous System
In this section we consider a homogeneous system of peers who have the same capacity C and request
generation rate g and they send their requests to each one of the other peers of the system with equal
probability. In Fig.5.2 we can see the performance (average bandwidth per request) of different
combination of strategies and policies for different capacity peers. Each peer has a request generation
rate of 2 requests per period (g = 2). The BS/RA scenario stands for the combination of the basic
request strategy (BS) and the reputation based allocation policy (RA). In the same way all possible
scenarios are named.
As we can see from the results of Fig.5.2, the higher the capacity of all peers in the system,
the higher the average bandwidth they receive per request. It is obvious that our proposed policies
lead to the cooperation among peers and significantly improve the performance (average received
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Figure 5.2: Average received bandwidth per request for different capacity peers
bandwidth per request) of the system compared to a system of peers who do not follow any strategies
and reputation-based policies (e.g., NS/SA scheme). AS/RA scheme provides the best results in terms
of average received bandwidth per request, followed by GS/RA and BS/RA.
Next, we would like to delve into the fairness issues of the different aforementioned schemes. We,
thus, examine the average received and offered resources from peers and would like to see whether
they are correlated. In Fig.5.3 we exhibit the average bandwidth received and provided per period
for all schemes when the capacities of all peers are equal to 4 Mb/s and the request generation rate
of each peer is 2 requests per period. What we see is that by using BS/RA or AS/RA schemes, the
average bandwidth that peers receive and provide on average is almost the same, indicating fairness
in a homogeneous system. However, with BS/RA scheme not all of the resources are exploited, while
with AS/RA scheme, which adapts the upload and download rates according to the current supply and
demand on peers, we see that almost all resources are exploited. The ideal case would be a centralized
unit which would coordinate peers’ requests among them in a way to balance the load in the network
(each peer would have to serve the same number of requests every period). In our system, although
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Figure 5.3: Average received and provided bandwidth per period.
all policies are distributed and peers are unaware of the load conditions on the others, peers succeed
in reaching a cooperating point under which they provide as much resources as they offer and their
performance is very close to the optimal one (exploitation of all resources) even with the BS/RA
scheme. GS/RA scheme improves the quality of service received by peers compared to the BS/RA
scheme, but many offered resources cannot be exploited, since they are dedicated for peers whose
total capacity is currently occupied by other flows.
In Fig.5.3 we further see the performance of the schemes when peers, instead of using the rational
dynamic capacity allocation scheme of Algorithm 1, divide their capacity into two halves; one for
uploading and one for downloading (we use 1/2 next to the name of the scheme to indicate these
cases). The results reveal that the peers’ performance is almost the same either for BS/RA or BS/RA-
1/2 scheme. This indicates that rational users, under the presence of the reputation scheme, tend to
equally share their capacity among their upload and download streams as in case they were imposed
to do that (e.g., imposed by the software to use half of their capacity for uploading and half for
downloading.), implying that rational users tend to cooperate. In Fig.5.4 we see the evolution of the
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average received bandwidth per request through time for the aforementioned p2p system. In the early
steps of the system, the average received bandwidth differentiates from peer to peer but as the system
evolves, the average rate with which peers receive bandwidth converges to the same value for all the
peers of the homogeneous system.
In Fig.5.5 we examine a smaller community of 10 peers and we see the average received band-
width per request for different values of the request generation rate of all peers. For each generation
rate that we study we consider such capacities of peers as to satisfy C = 2g (Mb/s). In this way, each
peer should receive 1Mb/sec on average per request in the optimal steady state. The average received
bandwidth for the NS/SA scheme converges to zero. This was expected, as the higher the g, the bigger
the sum of peer’s demands and hence the less the capacity that is left for the needs of the other peers.
All reputation based schemes’ performance is slightly below the optimal one. This may be due to
the heterogeneity of the load on servers. Some peers may have too many requests to serve in a given
period and some may have none. The performance of peers is almost the optimal one in the case of
g = 9 and C = 18Mb/s, under which each peer has to serve 9 other peers every period and thus the
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Figure 5.5: Average received bandwidth per request for different couples of C and g.
load is stable and the same for all peers.
We note that the same conclusions apply for any homogeneous system (e.g., other cases of ca-
pacities, request generation profiles and populations of peers) but here we just exhibit some indicative
results.
5.4.5 Heterogeneous System
Here, we investigate a network of cooperative peers with different capabilities/link capacities. Some
of the peers are more powerful than others. In particular we study a network of 100 peers, where 20%
of them have a total capacity of 8Mb/s, 20% have one of 7Mb/s, 20% have one of 6Mb/s, 20% have
one of 5Mb/s and 20% have one of 4Mb/s. All peers have a request generation profile of 2 requests
per period. In Fig.5.6 and Fig.5.7 we can see the average received bandwidth per request and global
reputations of each category peers for the various schemes, respectively.
It is remarkable that the global reputations of peers are proportional to their capacities. Moreover,
the average received bandwidth per request by each category of peers is analogous to the global rep-
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Figure 5.6: Performance of different capacity peers in the network.
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Figure 5.7: Global reputation of different capacity peers in the network.
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utation of the category. This indicates that reputation on one hand correctly captures the capabilities
(capacities) of the different peers and on the other hand the reputation system performs satisfactorily,
as each peer receives bandwidth in proportion to his reputation.
From Fig.5.6 we see that by using the reputation-based schemes the higher capacity peers succeed
in receiving more resources from the network as they are the ones who contribute more resources in it.
Actually for BS/RA and AS/RA schemes, peers’ average received and provided bandwidth is the same
in the steady state (this is not exhibited in Fig.5.6). Higher capacity peers’ resources are not exploited
in this case study because of the inability of the other peers to offer and receive resources at the rate
that high capacity ones can accept and provide respectively. If more high capacity peers existed in
the heterogeneous network, their performance could be improved and the unexploited capacity would
be decreased (see in the sequel the discussion on Fig.5.8 and Fig.5.9). Under BS/SA scheme all
peers receive almost the same bandwidth irrespective of their contributions, as no reputation system
is regarded.
Finally, we see that the performance of our reputation-based schemes outperforms the one of [34]
according to which no peer can receive more than min{Ci
i∈N
}/2 bandwidth under a given period, and so
the slowest link becomes the bottleneck of the system. This is the equilibrium reached by work in [34]
for heterogeneous systems of peers who can perform at most one download and one upload at a given
period. The authors claim that this inefficiency could be eliminated by multiple uploads/downloads
but there is no obvious way how to extend their scheme for multiple uploads/downloads and this is part
of their ongoing work. As we see from Fig.5.6 the reputation-based schemes succeed in overcoming
this limit min{Ci
i∈N
}/2 = 4/2 = 2 Mb/s per period or 1 Mb/s per request and the performance of all
capacity peers depends on their contributions. We also experimented with different peer populations,
capacities and request generation profiles and saw that the reputation-based schemes always overcome
this limit.
The main conclusions of our experiments are that under the reputation-based schemes peers pro-
vide and receive resources in proportion to their capabilities. So, higher capacity peers offer and
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receive resources in higher rates than lower capacity ones. According to the proportion of high and
low capacity peers in the system, their performance improves or deteriorates and affects the capacity
that remains unexploited. As an illustration example we exhibit Fig.5.8 and Fig.5.9. We consider
different portions of the 8Mb/s capacity peers in the aforementioned peer system. In each scenario
that we examine, lower capacity peers are progressively replaced by 8Mb/s capacity peers. The case
20% corresponds to the scenario that we examined in this section; the case 40% indicates that the
20% 4Mb/s capacity peers are replaced by 8Mb/s capacity peers; the case 60% corresponds to the
case that 5Mb/s capacity peers are also replaced by 8Mb/s peers and so on. What we observe is that
as the percentage of the 8Mb/s capacity peers increase in the system, their performance is improved
(Fig.5.9) and their capacity that remains unexploited decreases (Fig.5.8).
If we further use the RS server selection policy described in section 3.3.4, the exhibited results
of this section are slightly better. The higher the difference between the capacities of the peers in
the heterogeneous system, the more effective the RS policy is for all capacity peers, as it helps them
choose among the more appropriate traders. One such example is demonstrated in Fig.5.10 where
we consider various scenarios of different capacity peers in the system. The case 8-0 corresponds to
a system consisting of 50% peers of 8Mb/s capacity and 50% of misbehaving peers (contributing 0
resources); the case 8-2 corresponds to a system of 50% peers with 8Mb/s capacity and 50% peers
with 2Mb/s capacity and so on. What we can see from this figure is that the higher the capacity
difference between the peers of the system (e.g., case 8-0), the greater the improvement of the 8Mb/s
peers’ performance, when the RS policy is used.
5.4.6 New-comers
In this section we exhibit the behavior of the system under the case of new peers periodically entering
and leaving the network. As in the previous section, we consider a network of 100 peers where
peers are categorized according to their total physical capacity; there are 5 equal-sized categories of
peers with 8,7,6,5 and 4Mb/s capacities. However, we consider that 50% of each category peers are
Institutional Repository - Library & Information Centre - University of Thessaly
09/12/2017 03:02:41 EET - 137.108.70.7
5.4. Performance evaluation 101
0.0
0.5
1.0
1.5
2.0
2.5
3.0
3.5
20% 40% 60% 80% 100%
U
ne
xp
lo
ite
d 
ca
pa
ci
ty
 (M
b/s
)
Percentage of 8 Mb/s capacity peers in the system
BS/RA
GS/RA
AS/RA
Figure 5.8: Unexploited capacity of 8Mb/s capacity peers for different portions of capacity peers.
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Figure 5.9: Performance of 8Mb/s capacity peers for different portions of capacity peers.
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Figure 5.10: Performance of 8Mb/s capacity peers coexisted with different capacity peers.
permanent in the system (stable), while the remaining 50% of each category (capacity) peers stay in
the network only for 100 periods and are replaced by new identity peers of the same capacity with
those who left every 100 periods. We use this case in order to keep the same analogy of capacity
peers in the system and better investigate the performance of the system compared to the static one
where no arrivals or departures occur.
In Fig.5.11 we can see the performance of the stable and new-comers of 8Mb/s and 4Mb/s ca-
pacity peers, when the BS/RA-RS scenario is used. The conclusions from the performance of the
other capacity peers and when the GS/RA-RS or AS/RA-RS strategies are used, remain the same.
What we see from Fig.5.11 is that the performance of the stable peers is not much influenced by the
presence of the new-comers, and on the other hand, new-comers’ behavior is very near to the one of
the stable peers of the same capacity, despite their short life in the network. This conclusion, which is
also supported by many different scenarios that we run, shows that new-comers adapt quickly to the
network and do not really affect the performance of the long-lived peers in the system.
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Figure 5.11: Performance of stable peers and new-comers.
5.4.7 Peers with different request generation profiles
In this section, we study a network of 4Mb/s capacity peers who generate requests with different rates.
In particular we consider a network of 100 peers, 50% of which are high rate (HR) peers generating 4
requests per period and 50 % of which are lower rate peers (LR) generating 2 requests per period. In
Table 5.2 we demonstrate the average received bandwidth per request and per period when different
strategies and allocation policies are used.
We can see that in general the average received bandwidth per request is lower for the high rate
peers than for the lower rate peers for all the schemes. This is due to the fact that high rate peers
reserve less capacity than the lower capacity ones for uploading in order to free more space for their
high number of download requests. In this way, their reputations and thus their performance fall.
However, due to their large number of requests they succeed in receiving more bandwidth per period
on average than the lower rate ones when BS/RA and AS/RA schemes are used, although all peers’
capabilities/capacities are the same. In this way some peers may wish to exploit the network by
generating much more requests than others without being able to provide the analogous resources to
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Table 5.2: Performance of HR and LR peers
HR Capacity : g = 4 Av. Band. / Req. Av. Band. / Period
LR Capacity : g = 2 HR LR HR LR
BS
RA 0.49 0.55 1.95 1.10
ERA (a = 1) 0.39 0.74 1.58 1.47
AS
RA 0.61 0.78 2.44 1.56
ERA (a = 1) 0.52 0.97 2.08 1.94
the network. In order to protect the system from such a selfish behavior, we use the ERA policy,
which restricts the excess requests of high rate peers. As we can see from Table 5.2, when the ERA
policy is used for a = 1, both high and low rate peers receive on average almost the same amount
of resources per period. Since they all have the same capabilities/capacities of 4Mb/s, they should
all be able to offer and receive resources in the same average rate during a period, irrespective of the
number of requests they generate; this is accomplished by ERA (a = 1) policy which balances the
performance of high and low rate peers, when combined with any of the BS or AS strategies.
5.5 Summary
In this chapter we presented a complete methodology for motivating peers to contribute their resources
in a loaded network where the capacity-limited access link of each peer is shared among his download
and upload streams. Our proposed allocation scheme can be implemented in a distributed manner at
each peer, without the necessity of any global information. We considered rational peers who seek
to maximize their utility with the least possible contributions and showed that under the presence of
our proposed reputation system they are inclined to cooperation. In the homogeneous scenario where
all peers have the same capacity and request generation rate, rational peers fast reach a cooperative
operating point under which they offer half of their capacity for their download and half for their
upload streams. In heterogeneous systems, utilization of all resources is not always possible since
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some of the higher capacity (powerful) peers’ resources may not be exploited because of the inability
of other peers to offer and receive resources at the rate that powerful peers can accept and provide
respectively. However, fairness is still guaranteed as peers receive resources in proportion to their
contributions. Proposed reputation-based allocation protocol significantly improves the performance
of peers under the related work in [34] over heterogeneous systems and even in more general systems
where parallel downloads and uploads take place and peers with different request generation profiles
exist.
Part of the work described in this chapter has been published in the following journal:
* A.Satsiou, L.Tassiulas, Reputation-based Resource Allocation in P2P Systems of Rational
Users, IEEE Transactions on Parallel and Distributed Systems, 21 (4), pp 466-479, April 2010.
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Reputation-based Framework over
BitTorrent-like (BT) systems
In this chapter we apply our reputation-based framework in a BitTorrent-like file sharing system and
we highlight the potential performance gains both for ADSL-type and single capacity-limited link
systems.
The main contributions of this chapter can be summarized as follows:
a) we present BitTorrent and its operation in detail,
b) we delve into BitTorrent’s limitations and explain how they could be transcended by our
reputation-based scheme,
c) we propose two extension algorithms for BitTorrent, in order to improve its performance in
single capacity-limited link systems and,
b) we simulate BitTorrent-like setups and present how our reputation-based framework outper-
form BT’s reciprocation mechanism both in p2p systems with ADSL-type connections and in
single capacity-limited link systems. More specifically, we present how our policies can shield
106
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BT’s performance from free riders, preserve fairness and provide incentives to seeds to remain
and contribute in the system
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. Section 6.1 presents BitTorrent and its
operation while section highlights the limitations of BT that can be transcended by our reputation-
based scheme. In section 6.3 we present the performance evaluation and performance gains over
BitTorrent both for the ADSL-type systems and the single capacity-limited link systems. Finally,
section 6.4 concludes the chapter.
6.1 Overview of BitTorrent
BitTorrent (BT) is a popular peer-to-peer content distribution protocol, designed for bulk data transfer.
It enables scalable and efficient content replication by exploiting the upload capacity of the download-
ing peers. The basic idea in BitTorrent is to divide a single large file into equal-sized pieces and deliver
them in a non-linear way. The set of peers attempting to download the file do so by connecting to
several other peers simultaneously and download in parallel different pieces of the file from multiple
peers.
6.1.1 Terminology
Although there is no standardized terminology for BitTorrent, we provide in this section the terms
which are widely used by the majority of the BT community and we further use in this dissertation.
• Torrent: A small file which contains metadata about one or more files, including their names,
sizes and SHA-1 hash values of all pieces in the files to verify their integrity. It also contains
the IP address and port number of a tracker that coordinates communication between the peers
that download the specified files. The torrent is downloaded from a web site.
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We also note that the term torrent is often used to refer to all files it describes and the set of
peers that cooperate to download them.
• Tracker: The tracker is a centralized entity that maintains a list of all peers currently par-
ticipating in the download of the same content and maintains statistics. Peers periodically
(typically every 30 minutes) report their state to the tracker as well as the amount of uploaded
and downloaded bytes. The tracker is responsible to return upon request a list of typically 50
peers to whom the requester could connect to download the desired file.
• Leecher and Seed: A BT peer can be either a leecher, i.e., a peer who does not have the entire
content and still downloads pieces of it, or a seed, i.e., a peer who has the entire content and
may upload it to others.
• Swarm: A swarm is the set of all peers (tracker, leechers and seeds) who participate in the
download of the same content using the BitTorrent protocol.
• Choked/Unchoked: An Unchoked peer refers to a peer who was selected for uploading con-
tent, while a choked peer refers to one who was denied service.
• Peer Set: The peer set of a given peer contains all the peers he knows, also known as his
neighbors.
• Active Set: The active set of a given peer contains all his unchoked neighbors.
6.1.2 BitTorrent Operation
A file in BitTorrent (BT) is divided in equal-sized pieces, and each piece is further divided in multiple
blocks (typically 32-256 KB) to enable pipelining of requests and mask the request-response latency.
A torrent is created by the content provider to include all the necessary information for the file. Each
peer P that wants to download a file, accesses well-known websites which act as global directories of
available files and downloads the torrent of interest. He then contacts the associated tracker, reported
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in the torrent, who is responsible to return the IP addresses/Ports of a random set of typically 50 peers
currently transferring pieces of the file(s) specified in the torrent. This set forms the initial peer set
of P, which can be later enhanced by new peers connecting directly to him. Peer P then attempts to
establish connections to 20-40 of his neighbors. Whenever the number of his neighbors fall below 20,
e.g., due to departure of peers, the node contacts the tracker to obtain a list of additional peers.
As soon as peer P connects to his neighbors, he exchanges bitfield messages with them, which
contain information about the pieces each peer has. In this way, peers can see whether they are
interested in pieces of each other. Moreover, peers send have messages to all of their neighbors in
order to inform them about a new piece that they downloaded. Based on this information peers use a
local rarest first (LFR) policy to decide which block to download. This policy is also known as local
rarest-first policy since the block decision is based on local information at each peer. According to
this policy, a peer seeks to download a block that is least replicated among his neighbors in order to
maximize the diversity of content in the system. Further more, once a single block has been requested,
the remaining blocks from that particular piece are also requested before blocks from any other piece.
In this way, complete pieces are obtained as quickly as possible.
An exception to the local rarest first policy is in the beginning of the download. At that time, the
peer has no piece to upload, so it’s important to get a complete piece as quickly as possible in order
to bootstrap himself. Rare pieces are hard to find, so they would be downloaded slower than pieces
which are present on multiple peers for which it’s possible to download blocks from different sources.
For this reason, new peers who start downloading, select a block at random until the first complete
piece is assembled, and then the strategy switches to the local rarest first.
Another exception to the local rarest first policy is in the end of the download and is called end
game mode, a policy to make the end of the down load faster. Once a peer has requested all blocks,
either received already or not, he starts the end game mode by requesting all not yet received blocks
from all the peers in his peer set. Each time he receives a block, he cancels all the remaining requests
for the specific block. End game mode has little impact on the overall performance of BitTorrent,
Institutional Repository - Library & Information Centre - University of Thessaly
09/12/2017 03:02:41 EET - 137.108.70.7
110 Chapter 6
since it is only used at the very end of the download.
In order to confront free-riding effect, BitTorrent uses a so called choking algorithm, which is
actually a tit-for-tat (TFT) strategy, to determine which neighbors to upload data. Each peer executes
the choking algorithm every ten seconds, according to which all its neighbors are ranked based on
their upload rate during the last 20s, and only the first a top peers are unchoked. BitTorrent further
uses an optimistic unchoke policy every thirty seconds, wherein each peer unchokes r randomly
chosen peers, regardless of their rank and keep them unchoked for thirty seconds. The set of the
unchoked peers is called the active set and its size is always limited to a+ r . Therefore, each time a
peer optimistically unchokes r peers, he chokes r other peers from his active set with the worst upload
rates, in order to keep the size of the active set constant. A peer uses optimistic unchokes, in order to
discover neighbors that might offer higher download rates than the peers it is currently downloading
from, and give the chance to new peers to download their first block and prove their collaboration
by reciprocating. In the basic version of BitTorrent and the most popular BitTorrent client, Azureus,
the default active set size a is equal to four and r is equal to one. The upload bandwidth of a peer is
allocated equally among all unchoked peers and is referred to as equal-split. The choking policy is
not only performed every 10 seconds, but also each time an unchoked and interested peer leaves the
peer set, or whenever an unchoked peer switches its interest state.
As far as seeds are concerned, since they do not download any pieces, they follow a different
choking strategy. According to most implementations, seeds unchoke the fastest downloaders ir-
respective of their contributions, in order to utilize the seed capacity in the best possible way and
maximize the efficiency of the content dissemination. BT version 4.0.0 introduces a modified seed
choking policy which favors those peers who were most recently unchoked in order to serve as many
peers as possible.
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6.2 Limitations of BitTorrent transcended by our reputation-
based scheme
Apart from work in [24] and [42] which present several shortcomings, as we already described in
section 2.4, there is no other work to propose a reputation-based allocation policy for BitTorrent.
The main strength of an appropriate reputation system over BitTorrent would first of all give the
appropriate incentives to peers who already downloaded their files (seeds) to remain in the system
and contribute their resources to others, in order to gain reputation for their future requests for other
files. The presence of seeds in the system have proved to be a crucial factor in the success of BT [40]
and so far no previous work has successfully provided incentives for seeds. Furthermore, the gains of
such a reputation system should not only affect the long term interactions among peers but also the
short term. Peers should rather select whom and how to serve based on competing peers’ reputations,
instead of performing optimistic unchokes, which are considered to be one of the main reasons of
unfairness in BT [36, 41].
Seeds should also consider the reputation of competing peers in their allocation decisions, shield-
ing BT from strategic peers. Currently, seeds upload to the fastest downloaders, leaving much open
space for various exploits [36,62]. With a reputation system applied, seeds can provide service differ-
entiation to their requesters according to their reputations and probabilities of reciprocation in future
requests; if, for example, they both participate in related torrents (e.g., Disney comics). Under this
way, seeds are strongly motivated to contribute their resources.
Our local reputation system would be very effective in BT communities of users who share com-
mon interests and have to subscribe in order to participate, like TvTorrents.COM which is all about
TV shows. BT communities have been studied by [11]. It is shown that although a sharing ratio
enforcement policy is used in many BT communities, free riding is still present. Such communities
prevent peers to gain access to new content if their sharing ratio falls below a certain threshold. How-
ever, the sharing ratio of a peer is evaluated based on reports from the respective peer; thus related
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software could be hacked to report fake uploading and downloading ratios. With our proposed lo-
cal reputation mechanism, on the other hand, BT communities could guarantee that all participating
peers cooperate and provide the right content without the need of a centralized control. Furthermore,
peers of the same community will more likely transact between them quite often, creating a sufficient
opinion for one another (local reputations) in order to make their allocation decisions.
What’s more, our reputation system can well apply in multi torrent collaborations [35] which
have been proved very promising in the overall BT performance. Peers can participate in multiple file
downloads and share their content based on the reputation metrics of the participants, which actually
reflect their general contribution levels and not just per torrent contributions. In this way, peers could
exchange blocks from different files and exchange decisions could be based on reputation metrics.
Apart from introducing an appropriate reputation system for BitTorrent, our work also notes that
all current BT implementations and proposed improvements over it assume a clear distinction between
the upload and the download capacity of the peers. More specifically, the download capacity is much
bigger than the upload capacity, as in ADSL connections, while the upload capacity is considered the
bottleneck in the connection.
If BitTorrent peers had to share a limited cumulative capacity both for uploading and downloading
data, as is the case in access technologies like WiFi, WiMAX and Ethernet LANS, they should de-
cide how to allocate their available physical capacity between their uplink and downlink connections.
Current implementations of BitTorrent do not support a capacity adaptation algorithm to help peers
dynamically decide about their download and upload capacity. The problem with that is that if all
peers acted rationally, they would rather use their whole capacity solely for downloading and the sys-
tem would collapse. Our capacity adaptation algorithm along with our reputation-based framework
can significantly improve the performance of peers in such BT setups as we will see in the sequel.
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6.3 Performance Evaluation
6.3.1 Simulating the BitTorrent-setting
We simulate the already described basic version of BitTorrent [60] and examine the system as soon
as a neighborhood of connected peers using the same torrent is set. It is reported from measurements
of BitTorrent systems that although there are several large swarms, the majority of the swarms are
very small and the average population of the swarms is only about 102 peers [35]. Here, we consider
a neighborhood of 50 connected peers, in compliance with the typical set of peers returned by the
tracker. All connected peers send requests for blocks of the file to one another. Since our focus is
in the evaluation of the allocation policy, we omit the block selection algorithm used in BitTorrent
and consider that the connected peers are always interested in blocks of each other. The system runs
in periods, where each period lasts for ten seconds. Each peer performs the choked algorithm every
10 seconds, and every 30 seconds it performs the optimistic unchoke algorithm, just as in the basic
version of BitTorrent.
In the following sections we provide comparison results of BitTorrent reciprocation strategy with
our proposed policies for systems of peers with ADSL-like connections, described in chapter 3 and
for single capacity-limited link systems, described in chapter 5.
6.3.2 Apllying RA and ERA to BT peers with ADSL-type connections
In this section we compare the performance of our policies, RA and ERA, with BitTorrent reciproca-
tion mechanism for systems of peers with ADSL-type connections. The default values used for the
initial reputations and misbehavior threshold are as defined in chapter 3. Simulations both for BT
peers and our reputation-aware peers were run for 100 periods, which proved to be enough to rep-
resent the steady state performance of the peers, and the acquaintance duration time for our policies
was set to 10 periods. Since the goal in BitTorrent is to maximize the average received bandwidth per
period in order to minimize the file’s download time, we consider that the peers’ demands under our
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reputation-aware scheme are set by the software equal to a flag indicating that they request the max-
imum possible bandwidth. Under this flag, Dti j, ∀i, j, t are set equal to 1 in the reputation calculation
formula (3.1), i.e., reputations are calculated based on the received amount of bandwidth. Finally,
under our policies we consider that the request generation profile of peers is set from the software
equal to 5, i.e., each peer sends 5 requests per period for blocks of files. This better complies with the
basic version of BitTorrent, where a server serves five peers per period.
A well-known problem of the BitTorrent’s reciprocation strategy is that peers can obtain some
resources even when they do not contribute anything in the system and this fosters misbehaving
activity [63]. Optimistic unchoke policy is considered to be one of the reasons for that [36]. To see
how our policies can overcome this deficiency of BT, we consider a scenario of 40% misbehaving
peers, 20% peers who dedicate 7Mb/s for uploading, 20% 6Mb/s and 20% 5Mb/s. In Fig.6.1 we can
see that when our policies are used (RA and ERA with parameter a=1), misbehaving peers cannot
receive any resources from the system, in contrast to BT policy. Furthermore, under BT , some peers
seem to contribute more resources (upload capacities) than those they obtain in a given period and
some less, indicating unfairness. Under our policies, though, peers contribute on average as much
resources as they obtain per period. Please note that the performance of ERA is close to RA, since the
request generation profiles of all peers are set by the software and are the same. The slight differences
are due to a higher amount of requests directed to more reputed peers, through our reputation-based
server selection scheme. However, under ERA, peers do not have any motivation to hamper the
software and generate more requests than the others, since they know that their performance will be
restricted.
Another well known deficiency of the memoryless reciprocation mechanism of BitTorrent is the
fact that it does not provide incentives for seeds (peers who have downloaded a file) to remain in the
system and contribute resources to others [35, 56]. Here, we show how our proposed scheme can
motivate peers who have already downloaded a file to remain and contribute in the system. We study
50 connected peers with physical capacities of 7Mb/s who download blocks of files. One of these
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Figure 6.1: Performance of misbehaving peers in a BT scenario.
peers, though, finishes downloading a file in period 100 but remains in the system and contributes
his upload capacity for another 100 periods. After this duration, i.e., in the 200th period, he starts
downloading once again (e.g., other files).
In Fig.6.2 we see the performance of the seed before and after his uploading 100 periods. With BT
and RA policies the seed’s performance is almost the same before and after his uploading periods;
thus he does not earn anything by remaining in the system and offering his total physical capacity
to others. On the other hand, when ERA is used, the seed’s performance is improved when he starts
downloading again and this improvement remains for many periods. This is due to the fact that during
the periods that the seed uploads to other peers, the number of requests directed to him compared to
the ones he has sent to others significantly increases; thus from eq.(3.3) it is obvious that he is going
to be given high priority in his future requests.
We note, however, that Fig.6.2 is only indicative of the motivation a seed can have to remain and
contribute in the system, since his actual gains depend on the frequency with which he transacts with
the same peers he was uploading to. In BT, for example, a new plugin could help peers select their
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Figure 6.2: Performance of seed.
neighbors among the ones who have the file of interest; a seed would select the ones he was uploading
to, in order to improve his performance.
6.3.3 Applying RA and ERA to BT peers with a single capacity-limited
access link
Limitations of BitTorrent-like systems and proposed extensions for SC systems
The work related to BitTorrent and several improvements over it [25, 31, 64] assumes a clear distinc-
tion between the upload and the download capacity of the peers. The download capacity is much
bigger than the upload capacity (as in ADSL connections), which is considered to be the bottleneck
in the connections.
If BT peers had to share a limited single-link capacity both for uploading and downloading data,
they should decide how to allocate it between their uplink and downlink connections. Current imple-
mentations of BT do not support a capacity adaptation algorithm to help peers dynamically alter their
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Figure 6.3: Performance of BitTorrent peers with 18Mb/s physical capacity.
download and upload capacities in order to improve their performance. The problem with that is that
if all peers acted rationally, they would rather use their whole capacity solely for downloading and
the system would collapse.
In order to make the above limitations more clear, we study a neighborhood of 50 connected BT
peers with the same link capacity of 18Mb/s. We consider that 20% of these peers decide to use
their whole capacity for downloading and zero for uploading (pair 18-0 in Fig.6.3), other 20% use
16Mb/s as their download capacity and 2Mb/s as their upload capacity (pair 16-2), other 20% use
the pair 12-6, 20% use the pair 10-8 and final 20% are fair by giving equal portions to their upload
and download capacities (pair 9-9). The upload and download limits can be set by a user through an
application program like the “speed scheduler” [78], a plugin for popular BT client, Azureus.
In Fig.6.3 we can see the average received bandwidth per period for each category of BT peers.
The results are disappointing, as for all category peers the average bandwidth they receive per period
is less than the half of their total physical capacity. Fig.6.3 is also representative of the well-known
unfairness issues in BitTorrent [25, 31, 35, 36]. Some peers contribute more resources than what they
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receive (e.g., peers with pair 10-8 contribute 8Mb/s each period and receive on average 6.8Mb/s per
period) and some others contribute less than what they receive (e.g., peers with pair 16-2). Even worst,
there are peers that although they do not contribute any resources (pair 18-0), succeed in receiving on
average 0,73Mb/s per period, which is certainly unfair.
Next, we propose two extensions over BitTorrent in order to improve its performance in single
capacity-limited link systems.
BT-fair From Fig.6.4 we see that peers are better off by offering half of their capacity for uploading
and half for downloading; thus we propose that peers are imposed by the software to use half of
their capacity for uploading and half for downloading. We call this scheme BT-fair. However,
peers who use this BT extension may wish to hacker the software, hoping to improve their
performance.
BT-alg We further propose BT-alg policy, which combines the current implementation of BT with
our capacity allocation strategy of Algorithm 1 described in chapter 5. Each BT client will
dynamically decide his upload and download capacities, by performing our capacity allocation
strategy every period, and he will then determine how to allocate his upload capacity among
his requesters, based on the BitTorrent’s reciprocation mechanism [60]. Our algorithm works
rationally, seeking to maximize the peer’s benefits and therefore BT-alg is less probable to be
hackered than BT-fair. In cases of excess resources available in the system, BT-alg in contrast
to BT-fair can allow peers to set their download rates higher than their half link capacity.
In Fig.6.4 we can see how the performance of the 18Mb/s capacity BT peers improves when
any of our proposed BT policies is used. While, in Fig.6.3 the average performance of all 18Mb/s
peers is only 4,8Mb/s due to their different spontaneous decisions on capacity allocation, this is
improved to 7.94Mb/s if they all use BT-alg to dynamically allocate their capacity between uplink and
downlink flows, and 8.17Mb/s if they all use BT-fair. Their performance can be even more improved
to 8.75Mb/s with any of our BS/RA-g49 and GS/RA-g49 policies or 8.9Mb/s with either AS/RA-g49
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Figure 6.4: Performance of 18Mb/s capacity peers for various proposed policies.
or AS/RA-g5 policy. The “g” indication next to our policies declares the request generation profile of
the peers, which can be determined by the protocol. In case of g49, a peer sends requests to all of his
neighbors and as a server he may serve during a period the maximum 49 peers, based on our policies.
The case of g5 better complies with the basic version of BitTorrent, where a server serves five peers
per period; thus, in the rest of our analysis we will consider that peers who follow our policies have a
request generation profile of g = 5.
Motivating seeders
As for the ADSL type systems we study the performance of the seeders for single capacity-limited
link systems, as well. We study 50 connected peers with physical capacities of 18Mb/s who download
blocks of files. However, we consider that one of these peers has finished downloading a file (seed)
in period 100 but remains in the system and uploads with his total physical capacity for a duration
of 500 periods. After this duration, i.e., in the 600th period, he starts downloading once again (e.g.,
other files).
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Figure 6.5: Performance of seed.
In Fig.6.5 we can see the performance of the seed before and after his uploading 500 periods.
We exhibit the performance of our GS/RA policy along with BT-fair policy, as these two have similar
performance in case of no seeds in the system (see Fig.6.3). ERA is the policy described in eq.(3.3)
with parameter a equal to 1. Definition (allR) stands for peers who calculate one’s reputation based
on the whole history of transactions with him, while definition (10R) stands for our default case,
according to which peers use the history of the 10 most recent transactions to calculate one’s reputa-
tion. We can see that when BT-fair is used, the seed’s performance is the same before and after his
uploading periods; thus he does not earn anything by remaining in the system and offering his total
physical capacity to others. On the other hand, when any of our exhibited policies is used, the seed’s
performance is improved when he starts downloading again and this improvement remains for many
more periods when any one of the GS/ERA schemes is used (either allR or 10R). This is due to the
fact that during the periods that the seed uploads to other peers, the number of requests directed to
him compared to the ones he has sent to others significantly increases; thus from eq.(3.3) it is obvious
that he is going to be given high priority in his future requests. Which of the aforementioned policies
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Figure 6.6: Performance of misbehaving peers.
is preferable, depends on the network designer’s perspectives (e.g., how much he wants to privilege
contributive seeds).
Deter Misbehavior
Here we consider that 50% of the 18Mb/s connected peers are misbehaving (do not contribute any
resources and do not follow any of ours or BT policies). What we see from Fig.6.6 is that when our
policies are used by the other peers, misbehaving peers cannot receive almost any resources from the
network in contrast to BT policies which cannot deter misbehavior and thus are more susceptible to
strategic clients, as also reported in [36, 63].
6.4 Summary
In this chapter, we adapted and evaluated our proposed reputation framework over BitTorent, both for
ADSL-type and single capacity-limited link systems. Our reputation-based policies exhibit significant
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advantages over BitTorrent reciprocation mechanism which fails to deter misbehaviour and motivate
seeds to remain and contribute in the system. Moreover, BitTorrent lacks of a dynamic capacity
allocation algorithm for single capacity-limited link systems to help them improve their performance.
We have shown that our capacity adaptation algorithm can improve the performance of BitTorrent
under such systems, especially when it is combined with our reputation-based framework.
Part of the work described in this chapter has been published in the following journals:
* A.Satsiou, L.Tassiulas, Trust-Based Exchange of Services to Motivate Cooperation in P2P Net-
works, accepted for publication in Peer-to-Peer Networking and Applications Journal, Springer.
* A.Satsiou, L.Tassiulas ”Reputation-based Resource Allocation in P2P Systems of Rational
Users”, IEEE Transactions on Parallel and Distributed Systems, 21 (4), pp 466-479, April
2010.
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Chapter 7
Reputation-based Internet Sharing in
Wireless Neighborhood Community
Networks
7.1 Introduction
In contrast to chapters 3-4 where users decide how to offer their available service capacity among
the competing peers, under the scenario considered in this chapter, each user is requested to share
his internet capacity among his own and other users’ traffic. Although at a first glance it looks like
the problem we faced in chapter 5 where peers take decisions on how to share their capacity among
their own and other peers’ needs, the latter one refers to file sharing systems like BitTorrent, where
peers act as servers and clients at the very same time. The internet sharing scenario introduces a
different problem which motivated us to propose a different reputation system than the one proposed
in previous chapters. Moreover, the implementation of a reputation-based allocation policy in existing
802.11 APs and clients, necessitate a careful and appropriate design.
123
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The main contributions of this chapter can be summarized as follows:
a) we propose a reputation metric to reflect the cooperation level of each user in the community,
in terms of the quality of service he provides. Reputation metrics dynamically adapt to possible
users’ cooperation variations,
b) we propose a reputation-based allocation framework according to which each user indepen-
dently decides how to allocate the available resources of his Internet connection among his
visiting requesters based on their reputations and consumption profiles, and how much he pri-
oritizes his own traffic over his visitors’,
c) we propose a reputation-based AP association/selection policy to help users associate with APs
belonging to the best community contributors, in order to improve their QoS,
d) we describe how we implement aforementioned allocation policy in IEEE 801.11 APs and
clients, with no modifications at existing standards at the MAC or network layer, introducing
R-HTB application,
e) we present indicative experimental results of the performance of R-HTB in UTH testbed and
individual ORBIT nodes,
f) we evaluate our scheme via extensive simulations in a community of users with different co-
operation and consumption profiles, exploring the fairness properties of our policies and over-
coming limitations of previous work in this area [69, 70].
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows: Section 7.2 describes the system model.
Our reputation based policies are described in 7.3, while our experimental and simulation results are
presented in sections 7.4 and 7.5, respectively. Finally section 7.6 concludes the chapter.
Institutional Repository - Library & Information Centre - University of Thessaly
09/12/2017 03:02:41 EET - 137.108.70.7
7.2. Model Description 125
Csize
N
s
iz
e
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 L
1L  
L
2 L
2 1L  
Figure 7.1: (a) Internet Sharing Community (b) Neighborhood Community Topology.
7.2 Model Description
We consider a one-hop Internet sharing (IS) community of L users who own an AP and a wired
connection to the Internet and share their available wired and wireless bandwidth among their com-
munity members, when the later are mobile in their vicinity (please refer to Fig.7.1(a)). We denote
the wired capacity of user u as Cwiredu and the wireless capacity of his connection at a given time
t as Cwirelesstu. The available wireless capacity of user u varies with time and depends on several
factors, like the channel conditions, the number of associated users and their link rate, MAC layer
impairments such as hidden terminals, etc. As we will see in our experiments in the testbed, the wire-
less capacity of a user’s AP at a given time can be estimated by summing the average throughputs of
the clients for a small duration of time, when communicating with the AP. Thereafter, the maximum
internet bandwidth each user u can provide to himself and the connected clients at a given time t is
Cmaxtu = min(Cwiredu,Cwireless
t
u) and is considered to be the bottleneck in the connection.
We model IS users with different cooperation levels, determined either from the priority Pu they
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give to their own traffic or the probability Popenu they have their AP open and available to IS users.
Priority Pu determines the amount of bandwidth user u will reserve for his home users (e.g., himself,
family, etc) and his community requesters, as we will see in section 7.3.2. We consider that the APs
of the IS users are arranged in a square area (see Fig.7.1(b)), which is divided in L subsquares (cells)
with a side of Cside, at the center of which each AP is placed and covers the whole cell. The length
and width of the studied neighborhood is Nsize = Csize ∗
√
L. In Fig.7.1(b) we further see how the
community identities (IDs) of the users are determined according to their location, starting from ID 1
to ID L. Each user has at least one WiFi-enabled device with which he can use the internet connection
of other community members as he passes by through his neighborhood. All his devices along with
his own AP are distinguished with the same community ID.
The consumption profile of each user u is reflected by the probability with which he requires
Internet service at any minute from his community, Prequ. A user with higher Prequ tends to occupy
the resources of the community APs for more time. Throughout the user’s walk toward his destination
and during his stay there, he requests Internet service with probability Prequ from the nearest to
his position at any time AP, in compliance to 802.11 standard (see the black APs in Fig.7.1(b)), or
according to the policy proposed in 7.3.3.
Each time t, an AP owner receives Internet connection requests from IS users he allocates his
available capacity to them, as described in section 7.3.2. Each IS user then calculates the reputation of
the owner of the serving AP based on his perceived quality of service (see section 7.3.1) and sends this
information to his home AP. In case IS users would like to secure their traffic against eavesdropping
attacks by possible untrusted visited APs we consider that they could open a VPN tunnel to their
home APs and use it to tunnel their Internet traffic. This functionality could be incorporated in IS
APs.
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7.3 Reputation-based Internet Sharing
7.3.1 Reputation System
Each IS user keeps a local reputation value for each one of the members of his community according
to the quality of Internet connection he is offered by them. The physical proximity of the users in
a wireless neighbourhood community and the fixed location of their home APs lead to long-lived
relationships and foster frequent transactions between them. Consequently, each user can acquire his
own personal opinion about the cooperation of any member of his community. On the other hand,
when users use recommendations to determine one’s reputation, they can speed up their perception of
their community. However, there should be mechanisms to guarantee the trustworthiness of the users
who vote which induce complexity to the system [23].
Unknown or new IS members are given an initial small reputation Rinit in order to have the chance
to receive some resources. If they prove to be collaborative enough, their reputation will quickly
increase, permitting them to receive more resources, as we will see in the sequel. Each user u further
keeps a variable named Rtoptu, which is initially set equal to Rinit and is updated to hold the maximum
perceived average QoS from the community, as described in algorithm 2.
Each time t a user u requests service from user i, he assesses the total amount of bytes he sends
and receives through i’s connection, btui, during the service time, s
t
ui. Then, he can calculate the
average bandwidth he is offered by user i by:
Btui =
∑
τ∈Ttui
bτui
∑
τ∈Ttui
sτui
, (7.1)
where T tui denotes the set of the specific time instances in which user u requested service from
AP owner i, till time instance t, including time instance t. Please note that Btui expresses the average
bandwidth (or elsewhere QoS) that user u received from user i, calculated from his admission to the
community till the end of the service that started at time t.
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We have seen from our simulations that a history of 10 past and most recent connections with
the AP of a given user is enough to evaluate his reputation. So, each time a user u completes 10
transactions with any user i, he starts replacing the oldest values of bui and sui with newer ones,
always keeping a history of, at the most, 10 past values, maintaining the overhead low. Therefore, Btui
is calculated based on the 10 most recent transactions log in our simulation studies. After calculating
Btui, user u computes the local reputation of i to him, R
t
ui, as described in algorithm 2.
Algorithm 2 Reputation calculation
if Btui > Rtop
t
u then
Rtoptu = B
t
ui
for j = 1 TO L do
Rtu j =
Btu j
Rtoptu
end for
else
Rtui =
Btui
Rtoptu
end if
It is obvious that reputations take values between [0,1]. The most reputed users to u have reputa-
tion equal to 1, while all others’ local reputations are proportional to the ratio of the QoS they offer
over the one offered by the most local reputed users. User u will update the local reputations of all
community members in case of (Btui > Rtop
t
u), i.e., when the average QoS he receives from user i
exceeds the maximum perceived average QoS from the community, so far.
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7.3.2 Reputation-based Internet Sharing Policy
Suppose that at a given time t, an IS user u receives internet connection requests from community
members in his vicinity. We denote by V tu the set of his visiting requesters at time t. Then, we propose
that u will allocate his maximum available capacity Cmaxtu among his competing visitors according
to:
W tui =
(Mtui)
aRtui
∑
j∈V tu
((Mtu j)aR
t
u j)+Pu
Cmaxtu, (7.2)
where W tui represents the allocated bandwidth from user u to i at time t and M
t
ui =
MinCountertui
MinCountertiu
.
MinCountertui represents the total amount of time in minutes that user u received service from user
i in past requests till time t; therefore, Mtui represents how much user u occupied the connection of
user i compared to how much user i occupied the connection of user u in previous requests till time
t. These variables are initialized to 1 and change through time. Parameter a can be adjusted by the
software designer to balance the fairness in the IS system. The bigger a is, the more restrictive the
policy is for the greedier users. We note that user u keeps the remaining bandwidth of his connection
for his own use and is given by W tuu =
Pu
∑
j∈Vtu
((Mtu j)a∗Rtu j)+Pu Cmax
t
u and is proportional to his own priority
Pu. The bigger priority a user puts to himself, the less resources will be donated to his visitors. In
case of a = 0, i.e., when the users’ consumption profiles are not considered in the allocation decision,
or in case of Mtu j = 1 ∀ j ∈V tu , a priority Pu = 1 means that u will equally share his resources among
himself and another user i ∈V tu with reputation Rui = 1, which is the maximum attainable reputation
in the community.
Each time a client completes service, or a new visitor requests service, user u dynamically real-
locates his resources based on (7.2). By using this policy, u prioritizes most cooperative community
members who further tend to occupy his Internet connection less than he occupies theirs. In this way,
he somehow repays them for the excess service he has received from them in order to hope for more
future collaboration with them. We see that user u takes his allocation decisions based not only on the
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average QoS that he has received from his requesters but also on the amount of time he has reserved
their resources. This information is very important, since there may be more than one competitors
who offer similar QoS Internet connections but for much different session times; the one who has
offered his connection for longer time should be prioritized.
7.3.3 Reputation-based AP Selection Policy
In this section, we propose a reputation-based AP selection policy, refereed to as R-AP, in order
to help users avoid requesting service from less contributive users and improve their received QoS.
Under this scenario, we consider that a user u in a given cell can also hear the active APs in the
neighboring cells and can select with which one to associate. Optimally, we suppose that he can
attain equally good channel conditions with all of his neighboring APs consisting the set Atu at time t
and selects to associate with AP i ∈ Atu with probability ptui equal to:
ptui = R
t
ui/ ∑
j∈Atu
Rtu j (7.3)
A more sophisticated association policy would select the AP that has the best pair of reputation
and channel conditions at the time of request; however, in our simulation study we focus on the
cooperation levels of the AP owners, assuming optimal channel conditions.
7.4 Implementation of Proposed Scheme
In order to realize our reputation-based internet sharing scheme over existing 802.11 APs and clients,
we designed a reputation-based application based on HTB tool [48], which we call R-HTB and de-
scribe in detail in following sections.
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Figure 7.2: Reputation-based application in the AP side.
7.4.1 The reputation-based application in the AP side
The application that runs in the AP of an IS user u consists of the modules presented in Fig.7.2.
The monitoring module is responsible to listen whether data traverse the link between the AP and
its associated clients. As soon as more than one client occupies the available link with the AP, the
monitoring module estimates the average wireless throughput for duration of 5 seconds by summing
the average bit rates of the clients. It then informs the decision making module about the estimated
capacity Ctu of the link and the IP addresses of the associated clients who transmit or receive data.
The decision making module gathers the information about the reputations of the associated
clients from the Reputation Map table along with the MinCounter variables and then performs the
allocation policy described in section 7.3.2 to determine the offered bandwidth W tui to each client.
Finally, the decision making module informs the network management module about the offered
bandwidth to each associated client.
The network management module uses the hierarchical token bucket filter tool (HTB) [48], lo-
cated in the IP layer, to control how the packets are delivered to MAC layer. HTB is a class based
queue discipline which can be seen as a black box able to queue and dequeue packets in order and at
times determined by the algorithm hidden in it. The decision making module sets the HTB Limits for
each client i equal to W tui apart from the most reputed user. The HTB Limit determines the maximum
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rate with which a client can transmit or receive data. The main advantage of this tool is that it is
easily applicable to 802.11 APs and clients with no modifications at existing standards at the MAC or
network layers.
When the clients only download data, the HTB Limits are only set at the AP and are equal to W tui
for each active client i. However, when the clients both upload and download data, the HTB Limits
must be set both at the AP and the client side. Thus, the network management module sets the HTB
limit equal to W tui/2 and inform the associated clients about the HTB Limits that they should set, equal
also to W tui/2 for each client i. In that case, the maximum available bandwidth for a client i both for
uploading and downloading data would be equal to W tui.
The monitoring module keeps informing the decision making module about the estimated capac-
ity of the link and the active associated clients each time a new event occurs (an active client becomes
inactive or disassociated, or a new client becomes active), or in case of no new events, it informs
the decision making module every 5 seconds. The decision making module updates the resource
allocation decisions accordingly, and HTB adaptively conforms to these decisions.
The monitoring module of an AP should also be responsible to receive reports from its own-
ers about the quality of service they receive from other community members in order to inform the
reputation update module to calculate the new reputations according to algorithm 2 and update the
reputation map table. We haven’t implemented this final stage, since our focus is on service differen-
tiation among users based on their reputations, which are considered known.
7.4.2 The reputation-based application in the client side
The application that runs in the client side consists of the modules presented in Fig.7.3.
The monitoring module is responsible to collect the information about the HTB Limits. It then in-
forms the network management module, which is responsible to adapt the HTB Limits. The network
management module should also inform the user’s home AP through a VPN tunnel about the esti-
mated received quality of service from different community members. However, for reasons already
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Figure 7.3: Reputation-based application in the client side.
explained, we have’t implemented this stage.
7.4.3 Experimental results
The experiments took place both in the UTH Wireless Testbed [79] and individual nodes. ORBIT
nodes have been used with MADWIFI driver and Linux kernel 2.6.16.19. In order to evaluate our
policies, we use Iperf tool [80] to generate UDP and TCP traffic and measure the throughputs of
the clients when they send and receive traffic from the AP. Wireless nodes are based on commercial
WiFi wireless cards as per the the IEEE 802.11 standard. In the following experiments we use the
802.11b/g mode of the cards.
First, we consider the implementation scenario of Fig.7.4. We have four clients associating with
the AP of community member A. The reputations and IP addresses of the clients are as shown in Table
7.1. We assume that the owner of AP A sets his priority at 0 and the variables M are incorporated in
the reputation values. In the sequel, we will show via several indicative scenarios how R-HTB can
dynamically adapt to possible changes in the medium and traffic and realize our proposed allocation
scheme.
Scenario A: Clients transmitting at different rates
An intrinsic functionality of 802.11b progressively degrades the bit rate of a host when repeated
unsuccessful frame transmissions are detected. However, when one host captures the channel for
a long time because its bit rate is low, it penalizes other hosts that use a higher rate, inducing a
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Figure 7.4: Implementation Scenario.
Table 7.1: Reputation Map Table
Client ID IP address Reputation
B 11.11.11.2 0.2
C 11.11.11.3 0.4
D 11.11.11.4 0.6
E 11.11.11.5 0.8
performance anomaly. Here we examine such a scenario and see how our application can jointly cope
with performance anomaly and service differentiation. Suppose that at time 0s only client C is active
in the hotspot transmitting UDP traffic at 11Mb/s with a useful throughput of approximately 6.5Mb/s.
After 10s client B also starts transmitting UDP traffic with a rate of 11Mb/s. However, we suppose
that client B experiences a lower quality channel and its transmission rate progressively decreases
according to 802.11 standard. We model this by decreasing his transmission rate every 20 s from
11Mb/s to 5.5, 2, 1 and then increase it again at 11Mb/s. In Fig.7.5 we see the throughputs of the two
clients when either a) FIFO scheme or b) our R-HTB scheme is used.
When the simple FIFO scheme is employed, the throughput of client C is severely degraded when
the transmission rate of client B decreases. More specifically, the throughput of client C falls down
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Figure 7.5: Throughputs of clients for (a) FIFO scheme and (b) R-HTB scheme under scenario A.
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Figure 7.6: Client C experiences a poor quality channel
the performance of the low rate client B. In order to alleviate this so called “performance anomaly”
and boost the performance of the most reputed client C we use our R-HTB application. What we see
from Fig.7.5(b) is that the throughputs of the two clients are proportional to their reputations, despite
their different transmission rates and the performance of the most reputed client cannot be severely
affected by the performance of the low rate and reputation client.
Next, we consider that the client who experiences the poor quality channel at t=40s is the most
reputed one, i.e., client C, and we control his transmission rate in exactly the same way as we did for
client B in previous experiment. With R-HTB scheme, when Client C’s transmission rate becomes
very low (60-100s), its performance cannot significantly improve despite the substantially restricted
rate of client B (please refer to Fig.7.6). However, the ratio of the throughputs of the two clients is
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Figure 7.7: Throughputs of clients for (a) FIFO and (b) R-HTB scheme under scenario B
almost equal to the ratio of their reputations, despite their different transmission rates.
Scenario B: Clients uploading different kind of traffic
In this section, we present the performance of R-HTB for different kind of transmitted traffic. We
consider that at time 0s only client C is active, sending UDP traffic, while at time t=20s client B
becomes also active sending TCP traffic for 20s and then UDP for another 20s. Finally, at t=60s
client C stops sending UDP traffic and starts sending TCP traffic and at t=80s both B and C send TCP
traffic. In Fig.7.7 (a) and (b) we see the throughputs of clients in case of 802.11 with FIFO and our
R-HTB scheme, respectively. With R-HTB scheme, the ratio of the average throughputs of clients is
approximately equal to the ratio of their reputations for any kind of traffic.
Scenario C: Clients both uploading and downloading data
In this scenario we present the performance of R-HTB for concurrent uploads and downloads. We
consider that at t=0s both clients B and C upload UDP data, while at t=50s they also start downloading
UDP data and at t=100s they stop uploading and only download data for another 50s. In Fig.7.8
(a) and (b) we see the throughputs of clients in case of 802.11 with FIFO and our R-HTB scheme
respectively. While with FIFO, each stream is allocated an approximately equal share of bandwidth,
with R-HTB scheme, the ratio of the total throughputs (sum of upload and download throughput)
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Figure 7.8: Throughputs of clients for (a) FIFO scheme and (b) R-HTB scheme under scenario C.
of clients is approximately equal to the ratio of their reputations. All aforementioned case studies
indicate the ability of R-HTB in succeeding clients’ throughputs proportional to their reputations.
Scenario D: Multiple clients downloading data
Here, we consider that progressively all four clients become active in the system downloading data.
At t=0, only client B is active, downloading UDP data from the AP, at t=20s client C becomes also
active downloading UDP data, and at t=40s and t=60s clients D and E become active, respectively
downloading UDP data. The traffic duration of all clients is considered to be 80s and their transmis-
sion rates are set to auto (i.e., they are adapted according to the medium). In Fig.7.9 (a) and (b) we
see the throughput of each client through time, for FIFO and R-HTB, respectively. We can see that
with R-HTB the ratio of the users’ throughputs is almost equal to the ratio of their reputations at any
time they are active, as desired.
Scenario E: Mobile clients in UTH testbed
Last, we experimented with a mobility scenario in UTH testbed. As it can be shown from Fig.7.10,
the AP is node 11, client A is in fixed position next to node 05 and mobile client B moves from
position 13 (i.e., next to node 13) to position 07 and finally position 12. Via iperf tool, and sending
traffic between clients in the different positions and the AP, we investigated that clients in position
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Figure 7.9: Throughputs of clients for (a) FIFO scheme and (b) R-HTB scheme under scenario D.
05 and 13 have similar performance when associating alone with the AP (node11), while client in
position 07 has worse and client in position 12 has better performance than in position 13 and 05.
For example, when AP 11 sends UDP traffic of 20Mb/s for 20s to node 05, the average throughput of
node 05 is 7,5 Mb/s, when sending to node 13, the average throughput of node 13 is 7,32 Mb/s, when
sending to node 07, the average throughput of node 07 is 3,85 Mb/s and when sending to node 12, the
average throughput of node 07 is 18Mb/s.
Client A is the most reputed client among the two and has a reputation equal to 0.8, while client B
has a reputation equal to 0.4. Initially, at t=0 only client A is associated to the AP and receives service,
while at t=20s client B also connects to the AP from position 13 and receives service. At t=40s,
we consider that client B moves to position 07 and at t=60s he is in position 12, always receiving
service from AP 11. The goal of our proposed R-HTB is to provide to each of the competing clients
an average throughput in proportion to his reputation so that more reputed users can have a better
performance in the community and be given motivation to improve their contributions to it. Ideally,
we would like the ratio between the average throughputs of the two clients to be equal to the ratio of
the reputations, irrespective of the different channel conditions sensed by the users. Therefore, under
this experiment we would like to see that the throughput of client A is approximately twice the one
of client B in whichever position client B is (and different channel quality he perceives).
In Fig.7.11(a) we can see the performance of the two clients when the FIFO scheme is employed.
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Figure 7.10: Scenario E in UTH testbed
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Figure 7.11: Throughputs of clients for (a) FIFO scheme and (b) R-HTB scheme under scenario E.
It is notable that the performance of client B deteriorates as he moves to position 07 after 40s. Due
to his performance deterioration, the performance of client A also degrades, as was expected from
the known performance anomaly of 802.11b/g. In the 60th second, when client B reaches position
07, his performance improves, however it is constrained by the worse channel conditions of client A.
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In Fig.7.11(b) we can see the throughputs of the two clients in the different stages of the experiment
when our R-HTB scheme is used. As we can observe, with R-HTB scheme the throughputs of the
two clients are in proportion to their reputations, and more specifically, the ratio of their throughputs
is almost equal to the ratio of their reputations during all stages of the experiment.
7.5 Performance Evaluation
7.5.1 Simulation Model
In previous section we presented that under R-HTB, we can achieve throughputs of the competing
users proportional to their reputations for any channel conditions, type of traffic and number of clients.
In this section we will present that by succeeding this analogy in reputations and throughputs, our
reputation-based system lead members of a community to cooperation by guarantying that the more
cooperative a member is by offering a good quality of internet connection through his home AP to
community passersby, the better quality of service he can receive from his community, when being
mobile inside it. Towards this goal, we performed simulations on a custom-made simulator in C++.
Since the channel quality of each competing user does not affect the performance of our allocation
policy, as we have shown in section 7.4, in this section we see how users of different cooperation
levels perform in a dynamic large-scale setup, ignoring the lower layer conditions. Therefore, we
consider that the maximum capacity of the Internet connection of each IS member is the same for all
users at any given time and equal to Cmax = 11Mb/s.
We simulate the neighborhood community of Fig.7.1(b) with L= 100 and Csize= 200m. We con-
sider that IS users move in their neighborhood according to the random waypoint mobility model [81],
widely used in the ad hoc network community. In the beginning of the system, users are randomly
placed anywhere inside their community. Each user then randomly selects a destination point inside
the square area and moves to his destination on a straight line (see Fig.7.1(b)) with a randomly chosen
speed Stu, uniformly distributed between [1m/s,20m/s]. As soon as he reaches his destination he stays
Institutional Repository - Library & Information Centre - University of Thessaly
09/12/2017 03:02:41 EET - 137.108.70.7
7.5. Performance Evaluation 141
Table 7.2: Default Values of Variables
Variable Notation Default Value
L Number of community members 100
Cmax Maximum capacity of community members 11Mb/s
Csize Cell size 200m
Smin Minimum speed value 1m/s
Smax Maximum speed value 20m/s
Dmin Minimum requested session time value 1min
Dmax Maximum requested session time value 15min
there for a randomly chosen time duration Dtu, uniformly distributed between [1min,15min] and then
picks another random destination, speed and duration, time, repeating the process. Initial reputation
Rinit for all users is set to 0.1 and parameter a is set equal to 1, unless otherwise stated. The default
values of their consumption and mobility profiles can also be seen in table 7.2.
IS users differentiate in terms of their cooperation levels as explained in following scenarios and
related results are presented to show that the more cooperative they are the better QoS they receive.
We define the average QoS offered to user u from his community till time t, as the average offered
bandwidth from all the members of his community till that time, which is expressed by the ratio of
Total Number of Bytes he sent and received through IS APs other than his home AP, till time t over
Total Duration he was connected to IS APs other than his own, till time t. We further calculate the
global reputation of user u, given by the average of his local reputations to all other community users.
Following results are the average outcome of 10 simulation studies with the same inputs.
7.5.2 Users of different priorities
In this scenario, each IS user u gives a different priority Pu to himself, when he is requested to share his
connection with other community members. More specifically, we consider that the population of the
community splits in 5 equally-sized groups of randomly chosen members with the following priorities
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Figure 7.12: Average QoS through time when (a) no R-AP and (b) R-AP policy is applied for different
priority users in the same community.
(0,0.5,1,2,inf). As it can be seen from eq.(7.2), AP owners with priority 0 are the most altruistic ones,
giving 0 priority to themselves and dedicating their whole capacity to community members whenever
the latter request service. This group, for example, could involve users who rarely use their home
connection but often roam throughout their neighborhood. Members with infinite (inf) priority, on
the other hand, represent misbehaving users who do not offer any resources to the community. In the
following results, we consider that all users have Prequ = 1, i.e., they are all greedy users seeking to
be connected all the time, and Popenu = 1, i.e., they always have their AP open.
In Fig.7.12(a) we see the average received QoS of different priorities’ users through time. The
vertical bars show the standard deviation between users of the same priority. Initially, the perfor-
mance of the same priority group users differentiate, but as time progresses they converge to the same
value. Users receive a QoS in proportion to their contribution levels, i.e., in reverse proportion to
their priorities. In the beginning of time, users do not know each other and thus misbehaving ones
succeed in receiving some resources; however as time passes, misbehaving users are revealed and
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Figure 7.13: (a) Global Reputations of different priority users in the same community (b) Steady
State Performance of different consumption profile users in the same community.
proposed policies block them from receiving any service. In Fig.7.12(b) we see that the performance
of all categories peers (apart from misbehaving ones) significantly improve when they further use
the proposed R-AP policy, indicating the potential benefits of such an association policy and the fact
that reputations correctly capture the contribution levels of the IS users. This can also be seen from
Fig.7.13(a). The global reputations of users at any time are in reverse proportion to their priorities
and in proportion to their received QoS (jointly see with Fig.7.12(a)).
7.5.3 Users of different consumption profiles
In this section, we study users of different consumption profiles. More specifically, the population of
the community splits in 5 equally-sized groups of randomly chosen members with Prequ taken from
the set (0.1,0.3,0.5,0.8,1). The smaller Prequ is, the less time user u requires Internet service from his
community. For simplicity, we consider that all users have the same priority of Pu = 0. What we see
from Fig.7.13(b) is that for a = 0, i.e., when consumption profiles are not captured in the allocation
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Figure 7.14: Average QoS through time for (a) a = 1 and (b) a = 5 for users with different Popen in
the same community.
decisions, all users enjoy a similar average QoS, irrespective of their consumption profile; however
since greedy users tend to occupy AP’s resources for more time, they consume much more resources
in total, than other equally contributive users. For a > 1, on the other hand, the fairness is balanced is
the system by restricting the performance of greedier users; in this way greedy users cannot exploit
the community resources in cost of other equally contributive ones. The higher the value of parameter
a is selected by the software designer, the higher the restriction of greedy users. The same conclusions
hold for different priorities users.
7.5.4 Users of different AP opening times
In this section, the cooperation level of IS users is determined by the percentage of time they leave
their AP open and available to community members. Here, we consider that community population
splits in 5 equally-sized groups of randomly chosen members with the same probability of leaving
their AP open, Popenu, taken from the set (1,0.8,0.5,0.3,0.1). Users with Popenu = 1 have their
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AP open all the time. For simplicity, we assume that under this scenario all users have Pu = 1 and
Prequ = 1. Users who roam throughout their neighborhood connect to the nearest AP that they can
hear (i.e., it is open). From Fig.7.14(a) it is obvious that users who are more cooperative by leaving
their AP open for more time, enjoy a better QoS from the Internet sharing community. A user u
with higher Popenu, tends to serve community members more time than others and variables Miu
for his clients i increase. Thus, the performance restriction of less cooperative users in favor of
more contributive ones can be emphasized by using a higher value of parameter a, as can be seen
from Fig.7.14(b); the amount of desired performance restriction is due to the software designers’
perspectives.
7.6 Summary
In this chapter, we proposed a practical distributed reputation-based scheme to foster cooperation in
a wireless neighborhood community, inside where users can enjoy free Internet access through the
private contributions of the community APs owners. Our scheme ensures that mobile users enjoy a
QoS internet connection in their community proportional to their contribution level; thus, users are
encouraged to cooperate and increase their contributions. Proposed allocation scheme is implemented
in 802.11 APs and clients with no modifications at existing standards at the MAC or network layers
and exhibited via various experimental case studies that users’ throughput can be in proportion to
their reputation, irrespective of the number of competing clients, the kind of traffic sent or received,
or the perceived channel conditions.
Part of the work described in this chapter has been published in the following magazine and
conference proceedings:
* A.Satsiou, L.Tassiulas, Reputation-based Internet Sharing in Wireless Neighborhood Commu-
nity Networks, in Proc. of the IEEE International Conference on Communications, Cape Town,
South Africa, 23-27 May 2010.
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* P.Antoniadis, B.Le Grand, A.Satsiou, L.Tassiulas, R.Aguiar, J.Barraca, S.Sargento, Commu-
nity Building over Neighbourhood Wireless Mesh Networks, IEEE Technology and Society,
special issue on Potential and Limits of Cooperation in Wireless Communications, 27 (1), pp
48-56, 2008.
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Conclusions
8.1 Overview
P2P overlay systems’ rapid and promising evolution is based on their numerous attractive features,
providing the efficient means for resource exchange in the Internet. However, their performance is
critically depended on the cooperation between the peers. This dissertation presented a reputation-
based framework to promote cooperation and fairly regulate the transactions between peers in various
different setups, including single and multiple services environments, single capacity-limited link
systems, the popular file sharing system, BitTorrent, and wireless internet sharing communities.
Proposed reputation-based framework and system design considers many important aspects of
real systems, like peers with heterogeneous consumption (requests and demands), capability and
service evaluation profiles, newcomers, misbehaviour and strategic behaviour. As far as we know, no
work has attempted to encompass all the above under a common design framework.
In the following we delve into the main points, contributions and conclusions from our investi-
gation and research, as these were evolving during this dissertation, starting from general systems to
specific case studies, like BitTorrent and Internet sharing communities.
Single Service Systems
147
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Reputation systems have extensively been studied in the literature to promote cooperation in p2p
systems, as being much simpler and practical than game theoretical or pricing-based schemes. How-
ever, previous reputation systems were focused on distinguishing peers in two categories, declared
either as altruistic and egotistic, or reciprocative and selfish, or contributors and freeriders, and pro-
vided binary service differentiation. On the contrary, our focus was on distinguishing peers in terms
of different contribution levels. By distinguishing users in more layers (in terms of different QoS
offered), we can motivate them to improve their contributions and thus their reputation and perceived
QoS. What’s more, we were interested in differentiating peers not only based on their contributions
levels but also on their consumption profiles, so that greedy users can no longer exploit the network
by absorbing much more resources than other similar contributive ones.
Towards this goal we proposed (i) a novel reputation metric that reflects the satisfaction in terms
of QoS offered by the given peer (ii) a reputation update mechanism to track the contributive behavior
of the peer as the system evolves, (iii) a reputation based allocation policy (RA) which decides the
amount of resources offered to each competing peer according to his reputation and demands (iv) an
enhanced version (ERA) that further considers the competing peers’ consumption profiles in the allo-
cation decision, and (iv) a reputation-based server selection policy (RS) to help peers choose among
most contributive servers and avoid misbehaving ones. Our reputation-based framework can be im-
plemented in a distributed manner at each peer independently of the others. The only information that
is passed from one peer to another is the requested amount of resources.
Proposed reputation-based framework with its desirable properties was firstly examined, via sim-
ulation studies, on single service environments where only one resource (e.g., bandwidth) is being
exchanged. We presented how our policies greatly outperform previous representative reputation
scheme which solely binary differentiate peers and observed how our policies shield the system from
(a) misbehaving peers and whitewashers, (b) strategic peers who seek to maximize their satisfaction
with the least possible effort/contributions and (c) peers who generate much more requests than the
others without contributing a proportional amount of resources. The aforementioned peers neither can
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exploit the system nor can harm the performance of the other peers. In fact, peers can only receive
resources in proportion to their contributions; the higher demands and the more requests a peer has,
the more resources he will have to contribute in order to satisfy his needs in a loaded network.
Peers benefit by using our proposed policies as they tend to favor/satisfy those peers, who have
been more contributive to them, and with whom more future collaboration is expected. Consequently,
peers of similar capabilities and needs are dynamically self grouped, in order to improve their per-
ceived satisfaction from the network. The proposed allocation scheme is further robust to network
changes (e.g., peer arrivals and departures).
Multiple Services Systems
As a next step, our interest was directed to multiple services environments. P2P grids are an
example of such systems where more than one resources are being exchanged between peers. Pre-
vious market-based models that have been proposed in such environments to control the transactions
are subject to several complexities, while some reciprocity based mechanism face several limitations,
as we point out in the introduction and related work of this thesis. This motivated us to extend our
practical reputation-based framework to control the exchange between different services and promote
cooperation in such systems. Towards this goal, we defined (i) the reputation vector of each peer con-
sisting of his reputations in providing each service of the system and (ii) each peer’s service evaluation
profile to determine the value of each service according to his criteria. Thereafter, our allocation pol-
icy was extended , forming RA-MS policy, to consider the reputation vectors of the competing peers
and the service evaluation of the server. Under RA-MS the allocated resources to each competing
peer depend on the weighted sum of the peer’s reputations in providing each service of the system,
where the weights are the corresponding values of the services, as estimated by the server. By weight-
ing reputations in the allocation decision, the server provides more resources to those peers who have
offered him more satisfaction (captured by their reputations) in the services he values more, in order
to repay them and foster their bond.
Our simulation studies in multiple services environments demonstrated that proposed policies out-
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perform previous work, leading to the dynamic formation of coalitions (cooperation) among peers,
who mutually profit by the exchange of their services, without pre-existing knowledge of one an-
other’s capability and service evaluation profiles. In this way, the utilities of all peers progressively
increase. Only misbehaving (non contributive) peers do not benefit, as proposed policies efficiently
recognize and block misbehavior. Peers’ coalitions are further adaptive to network changes and self-
organized accordingly.
Single Capacity-Limited Link Systems
Next, we extended our framework to promote cooperation in systems of rational peers who share
their capacity-limited access link among their download and upload streams. These systems impose
a different problem to solve, since the contributions of one peer would directly and negatively affect
his performance, if no incentive mechanisms incurred. Towards solving this problem, we proposed
a novel capacity adaptation algorithm based on which peers, being aware of the reputation system’s
existence, dynamically adapt the capacity that they dedicate for uploading and downloading in order
to improve their utility. Our simulation studies have shown that rational peers are inclined to cooper-
ation, while fairness is preserved, as peers receive resources in proportion to their contributions even
in heterogeneous setups. Proposed framework outperforms existing work in this area in which the
slowest link becomes the bottleneck of a heterogeneous system of different link capacity peers. In
the contrary, no such bottleneck appears when our policies are used, improving the performance of
the system even in more general systems where parallel downloads and uploads take place and peers
with different request generation profiles exist.
BitTorrent
Following research targeted at popular file sharing system BitTorrent. An extensive investigation
has indicated several deficiencies of the protocol. First of all, it lacks of an incentive mechanism
for seeders to motivate them to remain and contribute in the system, although seeders’ presence has
been proved crucial for the performance of BT. On the other hand, BT’s reciprocation policy fails
to prevent unfairness across peers, as well as misbehavior, and, therefore, is vulnerable to strategic
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clients. We adapted our reputation-based framework over BT-like systems and exhibited via simula-
tions that it can outperform the reciprocation mechanism of BT and preserve fairness among peers
by guarantying that they can receive a proportional to their contributions amount of resources, while
blocking misbehaviour. Furthermore, we presented how our policies can motivate seeders to remain
in the system by gaining reputation during their contributions and exploiting it in their future requests.
It is also remarkable that the work related to BitTorrent and several improvements over it, assumes
a clear distinction between the upload and the download capacity of the peers. The download capacity
is much bigger than the upload capacity (as in ADSL connections), which is considered to be the bot-
tleneck in the connections. If BT peers had to share a limited single-link capacity both for uploading
and downloading data, they should decide how to allocate it between their uplink and downlink con-
nections. Current implementations of BT do not support a capacity adaptation algorithm to help peers
dynamically alter their download and upload capacities in order to improve their performance. The
problem with that is that if all peers acted rationally, they would rather use their whole capacity solely
for downloading and the system would collapse. In case of arbitrarily determining their contributions,
our simulations have shown that in a loaded network, the average bandwidth peers receive per period
is less than the half of their total physical capacity, while some peers receive more resources than their
contributions and some less.
In order to improve BT performance under single capacity-limited link systems, we proposed two
extensions over it. The one that cannot be hacked by a software is based on our capacity adaptation al-
gorithm. We have seen that indeed the performance of the peers improve when our capacity adaptation
algorithm is used in combination with the reciprocation mechanism of BT; however the performance
gains are even more, if the capacity adaptation algorithm is combined with our reputation-based
framework, instead.
Wireless Internet Sharing Communities
Finally, being attracted by the latest public interest on wireless communities and internet sharing,
we decided to propose an incentive mechanism for such environments in order to establish coopera-
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tion among the users and motivate them to contribute their internet connection to mobile community
members. The principles of the reputation-based framework that we have already designed guided our
efforts, although we propose a different reputation metric, update mechanism and allocation policy to
better comply with such systems.
Our goal was to design simply implementable reputation-based allocation policies for current
wireless infrastructure, without the need of modifications to existing standards at the MAC or the
network layer. This was a challenging task since the unreliable nature of the wireless medium com-
plicates the QoS provision in wireless networks. Towards this goal, we proposed a reputation-based
application, which we call R-HTB because it makes use of HTB tool, in order to control the amount
of bandwidth offered to each competing client according to his reputation and estimated channel ca-
pacity. Our experimental results both in UTH Wireless Testbed and individual ORBIT nodes have
shown that the throughput each user can achieve by connecting to community APs is proportional to
his reputation for any channel conditions, type of traffic sent or received and number of competing
clients.
Thereafter, we simulated a wireless community of users with different contribution and consump-
tion profiles who roam inside it and connect to nearby community APs, while offering their own inter-
net connection at home to community passersby through their own AP. Our simulations demonstrated
that by succeeding throughputs in proportion to reputations for competing users, our reputation-based
system lead users to cooperation. More specifically, it ensures that the more cooperative a user is by
offering a good quality of internet connection through his home AP to community passersby, the bet-
ter quality of service he can receive from his community, when being mobile inside it. Whats’ more,
the more greedy for community resources users are, the more contributive they should be to satisfy
their needs under our reputation-based framework.
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8.2 Future Directions
As we have already pointed out in this dissertation, there have been several recent research and com-
mercial efforts towards wireless neighborhood communities which can provide free internet access
service to its members. These communities can provide even other kind of services to its members,
like additional network capacity (e.g., for content distribution or games), the sharing of other re-
sources such as storage (e.g., for backup services) and content (file sharing or caching). It would be
very challenging to fit in such kind of communities a reputation-based scheme to ensure that the un-
derlying network is formed among trusted and contributive users and control the exchange of different
kind of services from the network to the application layer.
In this thesis we adopted a local reputation system according to which each user keeps a local
reputation for each other user of the system according to his past transactions with him. As we have
already discussed and presented in this thesis, by keeping local reputations, users can distinguish and
form coalitions with the most suitable for them partners, improving their performance. Moreover,
load from communication exchanges due to recommendations and other possible problems like mis-
reporting, reputation pollution and collusion, appearing in global reputation systems are avoided. On
the other hand, when peers use recommendations/votes to determine one’s reputation, they can speed
up their perception of the p2p system. It would be very interesting to investigate an appropriate mech-
anism to differentiate users according to a combination of a local and a global reputation, in order for
peers to maintain the ability of selecting and prioritizing suitable providers for their individual needs,
while speeding up the cooperation in the community. However, it is critical to provide suitable mech-
anisms to guarantee the trustworthiness/sincerity of the peers who vote, which is a very difficult and
demanding task, as we highlighted in the introduction.
Considering the internet sharing scenario studied in this thesis, clients in their association/ server
selection decisions were ignorant of the channel conditions perceived by each sensed AP. We as-
sumed that a mobile user can perceive the same channel conditions with each neighboring AP and
either was associated to the nearest one (similar to 801.11 association policy) or, according to our
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reputation-based association policy, to one among the most reputed in a given distance range. A more
sophisticated association policy could select the AP that has the best pair of reputation and channel
conditions at the time of request, or according to a metric reflecting both the channel quality at a given
time with a specific AP and the cooperation behavior of his owner. It would be very interesting to
observe the performance gains of such a policy for wireless internet sharing users.
Institutional Repository - Library & Information Centre - University of Thessaly
09/12/2017 03:02:41 EET - 137.108.70.7
Bibliography
[1] Th. G. Papaioannou and G. D. Stamoulis. Reputation-based Policies that Provide the Right
Incentives in Peer-to-Peer Environments. Computer Networks (Special Issue on Management in
Peer-to-Peer Systems: Trust, Reputation and Security), Elsevier, 50(4):563–578, 2006.
[2] M. Mowbray et al. A Reciprocation-Based Economy for Multiple Services in Peer-to-Peer
Grids. In Proc. of the IEEE International Conference on Peer-to-Peer Computing, pages 193–
202, 2006.
[3] G. Hardin. The tragedy of the commons. Science 162,, pages 1243–1248, 1968.
[4] E. Adar and B.A. Huberman. Free Riding on Gnutella. First Monday, 5(10), 2000.
[5] D. Hughes, G. Coulson, and J. Walkerdine. Freeriding on Gnutella Revisited: the Bell Tolls.
IEEE Distributed Systems Online, 6(6), June 2005.
[6] V. Vishnumurthy, S. Chandrakumar, and E. G. Sirer. KARMA, a Secure Economic Framework
for Peer-to-Peer Resource Sharing. In Proc. of the Workshop on the Economics of Peer-to-Peer
Systems Berkeley, California, 2003.
[7] R. T. B. Ma, S. C. M. Lee, J. C. S. Lui, and D. K. Y.Yau. Incentive and Service Differentiation in
P2P Networks: A Game Theoretic Approach. IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking, 5(14),
2006.
[8] M. Feldman, K. Lai, I. Stoica, and J. Chuang. Robust incentive techniques for peer-to-peer
networks. In Proc. of the 5th ACM Conference on Electronic commerce, ACM Press, pages
102–111, 2004.
[9] H. Ma and H. Leung. A Demand and Contribution Based Bandwidth Allocation Mechanism in
P2P Networks: A Game-Theoretic Analysis. In Proc. of the 20th International Conference on
Advanced Information Networking and Applications (AINA06), Vienna, Austria, pages 1005–
1010, April 2006.
[10] H. T. Kung and C. H. Wu. Differentiated Admission for Peer-to-Peer Systems: Incentivizing
Peers to Contribute their Resources. In Proc. of the Workshop on Economics of Peer-to-Peer
Systems, June 2003.
155
Institutional Repository - Library & Information Centre - University of Thessaly
09/12/2017 03:02:41 EET - 137.108.70.7
156 Bibliography
[11] N. Andrade, M. Mowbray, A. Lima, G. Wagner, and M. Ripeanu. Influences on Cooperation in
BitTorrent Communities. Proc. ACM SIGCOMM, August 2005.
[12] L. Mekouar, Y.Iraqi, and R.Boutaba. A contribution-based service differentiation scheme for
peer-to-peer systems. Peer-to-Peer Networks and Applications journal, Springer, 2(2), June
2009.
[13] A. Odlyzko. The case against micropayments. In Proc. International Conference in Financial
Cryptography, 2003.
[14] C. Buragohain, D. Agrawal, and S. Suri. A Game Theoretic Framework for Incentives in P2P
Systems. In Proc. of the 3rd IEEE International Conference on Peer-to-Peer Computing, 2003.
[15] S. D. Kamvar, M. T. Schlosser, and H. Garcia Molina. The EigenTrust algorithm for reputation
management in P2P networks. Proc. 12th ACM International Conference World Wide Web
(WWW), pages 640–651, May 2003.
[16] S. Marti and H. Garcia-Molina. Limited Reputation Sharing in P2P Systems. In Proc. of ACM
Conference on Electronic Commerce, pages 91–101, 2004.
[17] PeerTrust: Supporting Reputation-Based Trust for Peer-to-Peer Electronic Communities. IEEE
Transactions on Knowledge and Data Engineering, 16(7):843–857, 2004.
[18] V. Pai and A. E. Mohr. Improving Robustness of Peer-to-Peer Streaming with Incentives. In
Proc. of the First Workshop on the Economics of Networked Systems, June 2006.
[19] Y. Yan, A. El-Atawy, and E. Al-Shaer. Ranking-based Optimal Resource Allocation in Peer-to-
Peer Networks. In Proc. of IEEE INFOCOM, 2007.
[20] D. Banerjee, S. Saha, S. Sen, and P. Dasgupta. Reciprocal Resource Sharing in P2P Environ-
ments. In Proc. of the 4th International Conference on Autonomous Agents and Multi-Agent
Systems, pages 853–869, 2005.
[21] R. Mahajan, M. Rodrig, D. Wetherall, and J. Zahorjan. Sustaining Cooperation in Multi-hop
Wireless Networks. In Proc. of the Networked Systems Design and Implementation, May 2005.
[22] Q. He, D. Wu, and P. Khosla. SORI: a secure and objective reputation-based incentive scheme
for ad hoc networks. In Proc. of the IEEE Wireless Communications and Neworking Conference,
March 2004.
[23] T.G. Papaioannou and G.D. Stamoulis. An incentives’ mechanism promoting truthful feedback
in peer-to-peer systems. In Proc. of the Fifth IEEE International Symposium on Cluster Com-
puting and the Grid, Cardiff, UK, May 2005.
[24] M. Meulpolder, J. A. Pouwelse, D. H. J. Epema, and H. J. Sips. Bartercast: Fully distributed
sharing-ratio enforcement in BitTorrent. Technical report, Delft, 2008.
[25] A.R. Bharambe, C. Herley, , and V.N. Padmanbhan. Analyzing and improving BitTorrent per-
formance. Technical Report MSR-TR-2005-03, Microsoft Research, 2005.
Institutional Repository - Library & Information Centre - University of Thessaly
09/12/2017 03:02:41 EET - 137.108.70.7
Bibliography 157
[26] The Economist. Who wants to buy a computon?, March 2005.
[27] A. AuYoung, B. N. Chun, A. C. Snoeren, and A. Vahdat. Resource Allocation in Federated
Distributed Computing Infrastructures. In Proc. of OASIS ’04, October 2004.
[28] M. Feldman, K. Lai, , and L. Zhang. A Price-Anticipating Resource Allocation Mechanism for
Distributed Shared Clusters. In Proc. of the 6th ACM Conference on Electronic Commerce, June
2005.
[29] http://www.planet-lab.org/.
[30] I. Foster, C. Kesselman, and S. Tuecke. The anatomy of the grid: Enabling scalable virtual
organizations. International Journal of SuperComputer Applications, 15(3), 2001.
[31] K. Eger and U. Killat. Bandwidth Trading in Unstructured P2P Content Distribution Networks.
In Proc. of the 6th IEEE International Conference on Peer-to-Peer Computing, 2006.
[32] A.Satsiou and L.Tassiulas. Dynamic Cooperation Enforcement through Trust-based Allocation
Policies. In Proc. of the 4th EURO-NGI International Conference on Next Generation Internet
Networks, April 2008.
[33] H. Ma and H. Leung. A Demand and Contribution Based Bandwidth Allocation Mechanism
in P2P Networks: A Game-Theoretic Analysis. Proc. 20th Interantional Conference Advanced
Information Networking and Applications (AINA), pages 1005–1010, April 2006.
[34] M. Meo and F. Milan. A Rational Model for Service Rate Allocation in Peer-to-Peer Networks.
In Proc. of 8th. IEEE Global Internet Symposium, March 2005.
[35] L. Guo, S. Chen, Z. Xiao, E. Tan, X. Ding, and X. Zhang. Measurements, analysis, and modeling
of BitTorrent-like systems. Proc. 5th ACM SIGCOMM, October 2005.
[36] M. Piatek, T. Isdal, T. Anderson, A. Krishnamurthy, and A. Venkataramani. Do incentives
build robustness in BitTorrent. Proc. 4th USENIX Symposium Networked Systems Design and
Implementation (NSDI), pages 1–14, 2007.
[37] S. Jun and M. Ahamad. Incentives in BitTorrent Induce FreeRiding. Proc. ACM SIGCOMM
Workshop on Economics of Peer-to-Peer Systems (P2PECON), August 2005.
[38] A. Sherman, J. Nieh, and C. Stein. FairTorrent:Bringing Fairness to Peer-to-Peer Systems. Proc.
ACM CoNEXT, December 2009.
[39] M. Li, J. Yu, and J. Wu. Free-Riding on BitTorrent-like Peer-to-Peer File Sharing Systems:
Modeling Analysis and Improvement. Proc. IEEE Transactions on Parallel and Distributes
Systems, 19(7):954–966, July 2008.
[40] A. Legout, N. Liogkas, E.Kohler, and L.Zhang. Clustering and Sharing Incentives in BitTorrent
Systems. Proc. ACM SIGMETRICS, 2007.
Institutional Repository - Library & Information Centre - University of Thessaly
09/12/2017 03:02:41 EET - 137.108.70.7
158 Bibliography
[41] J. H. Park, R. Chen, and X. Yang. Free-riding in BitTorrent Networks with the Large View
Exploit. Proc. Interntional Workshop on P2P systems (IPTPS), 2007.
[42] P. Shah and J-F. Paris. Incorporating Trust in the BitTorrent Protocol. Proc. Symposium on
Performance Evaluation of Computer and Telecommunication Systems (SPECTS), July 2007.
[43] http://en.fon.com/.
[44] NetShare, http://www.speakeasy.net/netshare/.
[45] Skyrove, http://www.skyrove.com/.
[46] P.Antoniadis, B.Le Grand, A.Satsiou, L.Tassiulas, R.Aguiar, J.Barraca, and S.Sargento. Com-
munity Building over Neighbourhood Wireless Mesh Networks. IEEE Technology and Society,
special issue on Potential and Limits of Cooperation in Wireless Communications, 27(1):48–56,
2008.
[47] K. Choumas, T. Korakis, and Tassiulas L. New Prioritization Schemes for QoS Provisioning
in 802.11 Wireless Networks. In Proc. of the 16th IEEE Workshop on Local and Metropolitan
Area Networks, pages 25–30, September 2008.
[48] B. Hubert, T. Graf, G. Maxwell, R. van Mook, M. van Oosterhout, P. Schroeder, J. Spaans, and
P. Larroy. Linux Advanced Routing Traffic Control HOWTO.
[49] A. Satsiou and L.Tassiulas. Trust-Based Exchange of Services to Motivate Cooperation in
P2P Networks. Accepted for publication in Peer-to-Peer Networking and Applications Jour-
nal, Springer.
[50] A. Satsiou and L. Tassiulas. A Trust-based Exhange Framework for Multiples Services in P2P
Systems. In Proc. of the 7th IEEE Internatianal Conference on P2P Computing, pages 45–52,
September 2007.
[51] A.Satsiou and L.Tassiulas. Reputation-based Resource Allocation in P2P Systems of Rational
Users. IEEE Transactions on Parallel and Distributed Systems, April 2010.
[52] A.Satsiou and L.Tassiulas. Reputation-based Internet Sharing in Wireless Neighborhood Com-
munity Networks. In Proc. of the IEEE International Conference on Communications, May
2010.
[53] G. Iosifidis and I. Koutsopoulos. Reputation-assisted utility maximization algorithms for peer-
to-peer networks. In Proc. of the 16th IEEE International Workshop on Quality of Service, June
2008.
[54] G. Iosifidis and I. Koutsopoulos. Distributed resource allocation algorithms for peer-to-peer net-
works. In Proc. of the 3rd International Conference on Performance Evaluation Methodologies
and Tools, October 2008.
[55] D. Qiu and R. Shrikant. Modeling and performance analysis of BitTorrent-like peer-to-peer
networks. Proc. ACM SIGCOMM, September 2004.
Institutional Repository - Library & Information Centre - University of Thessaly
09/12/2017 03:02:41 EET - 137.108.70.7
Bibliography 159
[56] J. A. Pouwelse, P. Garbacki, D. H. J. Epema, and H. J. Sips. The BitTorrent P2P File-Sharing
System:Measurement and Analysis. Proc. International Workshop on P2P Systems (IPTPS),
February 2005.
[57] B. Fan, D.-M. Chiu, and J. C. Lui. The Delicate Tradeoffs in BitTorrent-like File Sharing
Protocol Design. Proc. IEEE Interantional Conference on Network Protocols), November 2006.
[58] M . Izal, G. Urvoy-Keller, E.W. Biershak, P.A. Felber, A. Al Hamra, and L. Garces-Erice. Dis-
secting BitTorrent:Five Months in a Torrent’s Lifetime. Proc. Passive and Active Measurements,
2004.
[59] B. Cohen. Incentives Build Robustness in Bittorrent. http://bittorrent.com/bittorrentecon.pdf
2003.
[60] A. Legout, G. Urvoy-Keller, and P. Michiardi. Rarest First and Choke Algorithms Are Enough.
Proc. Internet Measuremet Conference (IMC), 2006.
[61] N. Liogkas, R. Nelson, E. kohler, and L. Zhang. Exploiting BitTorrent For Fun (But Not Profit).
Proc. International Workshop on P2P systems (IPTPS), 2006.
[62] T. Locher, P. Moore, S. Schmidt, and R. Wattenhofer. Free Riding in BitTorrent is Cheap. Proc.
5th Workshop Hot Topics in Networks (HotNets), November 2006.
[63] D. Carra, G. Neglia, and P. Michiardi. On the Impact of Greedy Strategies in BitTorrent Net-
works: The Case of BitTyrant. Proc. 8th IEEE Internationla Conference Peer-to-Peer Comput-
ing (P2P), September 2008.
[64] W. Yang and N. Abu-Ghazaleh. GPS:a general Peer-to-Peer simulator and its use for modeling
BT. Proc. 13th International Symposium on Modeling, Analysis, and Simulation of Computer
and Telecommunication Systems, 2005.
[65] K. Eger and U. Killat. Fair resource allocation in peer-to-peer networks. Computer Communci-
ations, Elsevier, 30:3046–3054, 2007.
[66] N. Laoutaris, D. Carra, and P. Michiardi. Uplink Allocation Beyond Choke/Unchoke. Proc.
ACM CoNEXT, December 2008.
[67] N. Ben Salem, J. P. Hubaux, and M. Jakobsson. Reputation-based Wi-Fi deployment. Mobile
Computing and Communications Review (MC2R), July 2005.
[68] E.C. Efstathiou, P.A. Frangoudis, and G.C. Polyzos. Stimulating Participation in Wireless Com-
munity Networks. Proc. IEEE INFOCOM, April 2006.
[69] E.C. Efstathiou. Public infrastructures for internet access in metropolitan areas. Proc. 1st Inter-
national Conference on Access networks, 2006.
[70] B. Cohen. Incentives Build Robustness in Bittorrent. http://bittorrent.com/bittorrentecon.pdf,
2003.
Institutional Repository - Library & Information Centre - University of Thessaly
09/12/2017 03:02:41 EET - 137.108.70.7
160 Bibliography
[71] W. Cirne, F. V. Brasileiro abd J. Sauve, N. Andrade, D. Paranhos, E. L. Santos-Neto,
R. Medeiros, and F. Silva. Grid computing for Bag-of-Tasks applications. In Proc. 3rd IFIP
Conference on E-Commerce, E-Business and E-Covernment, 2003.
[72] S. Basu, S. Banerjee, P. Sharma, and S. J. Lee. NodeWiz: peer-to-peer resource discovery for
grids. In Proc. 5th IEEE International Symposium on Cluster Computing and the Grid, 2005.
[73] OurGrid. http://www.ourgrid.org/.
[74] E. C. Efstathiou, P. A. Frangoudis, and G. C. Polyzos. Stimulating Participation in Wireless
Community Networks. In Proc. of IEEE INFOCOM, 2006.
[75] B. Hubert et al. Linux Advanced Routing & Traffic Control HOWTO, Documentation from
http://lartc.org/.
[76] D. Smith. Azureus Speed Scheduler. http://thesmithfam.org/blog/azureus-speed-scheduler/.
[77] UTH Wireless Testbed, http://inf-server.inf.uth.gr/ testbed/doku.php.
[78] A. Tirumala, F. Qin, J. Dugan, J. Ferguson, and K. Gibbs. Iperf,
http://dast.nlanr.net/Projects/Iperf/.
[79] C. Bettstetter. Mobility modeling in wireless networks: categorization, smooth movement,
and border effects. ACM SIGMOBILE Mobile Computing Communication Review, 5(3):55–
66, 2001.
Institutional Repository - Library & Information Centre - University of Thessaly
09/12/2017 03:02:41 EET - 137.108.70.7
